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1. Introduction And Literature Review 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Background of Islamist-focused CVE and Deradicalization 
Western Efforts to Combat Violent Extremism in Brief 
Disengagement and Deradicalization Literature 
Individual-level Deradicalization: Theory Review 
Definitions: Extremism, Radicalism, and Terrorism  
 
Following a high-profile terrorist attack in Nice, France, in which a French 
Muslim drove a truck through a crowded beach, the French government extended its 
State of Emergency once again.  A newsletter that the French government sent to French 
citizens at the time noted that the State of Emergency “is an integral part of our fight on 
our own soil just as it is in Africa and the Levant.”1  The claim is representative of a 
general trend in Western states facing a phenomenon of homegrown Islamist terrorism: 
declaring States of Emergency, known in academic literature as “states of exception”.   
Countering Violent Extremism, or CVE, has come to dominate discourse for 
counter-terrorism academics, students and policymakers alike.  The appeal is easy to see: 
they’re programs that make people less likely to become violent, meaning that there 
won’t be home-grown terrorism to combat in the first place.  The implementation of 
community policing would mean that costs could be cut in intelligence and lives could be 
saved, just by informing Muslims that they are not terrorists.  Yet the buck stops there.  
No one has defined CVE and how to best approach it, there have only been criticisms of 
those systems currently in place.  The defense is far too general and unexamined to be 
evaluated in any consistent manner.  Furthermore, CVE policies have not been in place 
for long enough for law enforcement and government agencies to understand the extent 
to which their policies may or may not work. Furthermore, much academic literature 
surrounding CVE considers the policies in the context of Muslim-State interactions, and 
the ability of a state to integrate or assimilate Muslim communities into the host society.  
The academic literature about connections between immigration and integration is 
                                                
1 “Partagez et Diffusez”.  Gouvernement.fr, 21 July 2016 
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already sparse.  Beyond studies of immigration, academic studies also lack a 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between integration trends, integration-level 
responses, and CVE.  
 CVE incorporates a variety of strategies for, primarily, integration of mal-aligned 
minorities or at-risk youth groups and communities.   Foremost among CVE strategies is 
cooperation between law enforcement and local leaders to foster a sense of appreciation 
for the government; after-school activities like soccer team to occupy youth’s time and 
make them feel included, and programs to aid immigrants in finding housing or 
employment.   Each component has some merit, but as a whole, CVE programs appear 
fairly ineffective, both to professionals and community members.2 The ineffectiveness is 
particularly apparent in states such as France and the U.S., where a number of “Muslim 
extremists” conducted large-scale attacks in 2015 and 2016.  
 The problem is not only that they are ineffective (or effective, for that matter).  
The problem is that neither policymakers nor academics understand what does or does 
not work in CVE policies.  There is little consensus as to which communities or groups 
are to be targeted, and even definitions for the word “extremism” has been through 
multiple iterations in the countries presented in this study.  One area of concern is the 
extent to which CVE or de-radicalization efforts target communities that wouldn’t 
otherwise be at risk, and which may ultimately feel marginalized or even demonized by 
the blatant presence of law enforcement in their community.  Another area of concern in 
CVE is the disparate nature of authority and accountability.  For example, many 
strategists for CVE programs suggest using the gang prevention techniques of the 1980s 
as a cookie-cutter solution to radicalize or violent communities.  Yet those very gang 
prevention techniques began failing when law enforcement had been present for too long 
and its liaisons became wary of the long arm of the law.  The same would happen in 
almost any other situation.  Finally, and most concerning, is the tendency to equate CVE 
and de-radicalization programs with anti-Islamist extremism programs.  This narrow-
sightedness has led to policies that will be unable to address future, non-Islamist threats 
to homeland security.   
                                                
2 Interviews conducted by author, April 2016.  
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 CVE programs could be harmless enough, if they are just rhetoric with some 
small indicatives.  What I fear, however, is that CVE is part of a soft-medium-hard power 
cycle, in which the discussion of “soft power,” integration- and counter narrative-based 
counterterrorism efforts veils actual government action in the medium power range.  The 
governments in this study have rarely resorted to hard power as a solution to integration 
programs, but often turn to what I’ve termed “medium power”.  Medium power is the 
utilization of the state’s authority to restrict freedom of movement for particular groups 
of people.  This restriction of freedom tends to be through law enforcement, including 
raids on homes, confiscations and excessive imprisonment.  The state also restricts 
freedom through immigration control and profiling immigrants, and marginalizing a 
community from the state’s general society. Medium power is dangerous in that it 
threatens civil liberties and the liberal nature of Western governance.  Perhaps more 
worrisome, medium power use may result in increased radicalization, as communities 
ultimately must turn inward – without support from external society.  This trend is 
unfortunately beginning among the American Muslim community, where there are 
reports of less trust in law enforcement and a greater sense of being targeted unfairly.  
 I will argue here that states typically resort to “medium power” during “States of 
Emergency”, or their per-literature term, States of Exception.  That is, when a state is 
presented with an internal threat, the best option is not to operationalize brute force and 
hard power against the internal threat, but rather to degrade it through medium power 
measures. Citizenry are less apt to criticize measures that seem, while perhaps unfair, at 
least not outrageous.  These ideas will be considered in the following cases, which Asses 
the degree to which the U.K., France, and the U.S. have relied on medium power both 
historically and in the present.    
In turn, the extent to which a state resorts to medium power can be used as a 
measure of the effectiveness of CVE, at least as far as government policymakers 
determine.  An increase in law enforcement or immigration control may reflect a sense of 
emergency coming not only from specific events but also a public belief in a constantly 
present threat.  CVE programs are intended to react against the perception that there is a 
constant threat, so it seems that a public perception of danger implies CVE have not 
adequately done their job.  
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Another challenge to policymakers around the Western world is the idea of 
deradicalization. For instance, on November 7, 1983, a bomb exploded in the U.S. Senate 
building, representing the height of terrorist activity by the “Weather Underground,” a 
far-left terrorist movement active in the United States in the 1960s and 1980s.  In 2002, 
Laura Whitehorn, an ex-member of the group, spoke to a filmmaker producing a 
documentary about her involvement with the group: “I still have hope...I do think people 
never stop waiting for the moment…” In a clip a minute earlier, one of Whitehorn’s 
colleagues from the Weather Underground had noted, “I certainly would do it again.”  
The Weather Underground ceased to exist in 1981.3  
 The documentary, also titled Weather Underground, involved extensive 
interviews with ex-members of the organization, many of whom now teach in universities 
-- the very locale in which they became radicalized in the 1960s.  The final remarks of its 
interviewees leave feelings of empathy and unease.  If they were willing to bomb the 
capitol of the United States in the 1980s, and they still feel that a revolution is imminent, 
couldn’t they do it all again?  
 Given the drastic increase in security and counterterrorism measures within the 
FBI, CIA and State Department since the 1970s, it seems implausible that the Weather 
Underground or any like far-left domestic terrorism group could resurface in any kind of 
threatening way.  The problem, however, is that the motivations behind terrorism have 
not ceased.  Some members stated unabashedly that they still believe in the movement 
and stand by their actions.  These ex-terrorists, while disengaged, are not deradicalized. 
Similarly, The significant difference between disengagement and deradicalization has 
remained largely unexamined in academic works.4  Scholars have analyzed forces of 
radicalization in great depth, but have not attempted to formulate and assess 
deradicalization programs.  Instead, scholars and policymakers alike have debated the 
                                                
3 The Weather Underground<br><br>, Film, directed by Sam Green and Bill Siegel 2003)  
4 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 1. publ. ed. (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2009b).   
(cont. below) 
Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," 
International Security 31, no. 1 (Jul 1, 2006), 7-48. doi:10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137538.  
Stephen Vertigans, The Sociology of Terrorism : Peoples, Places and Processes (Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2011).  
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extent to which the “securitization of immigration” has led to more or less terrorism, with 
scholars such as Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia arguing that heightened security in fact 
exacerbates the tensions underlying radicalization in contemporary America.5 
d’Appollonia provided scholars with a breakthrough analysis that demonstrated the 
conflation in the American and European psyches of immigrants and terrorists since the 
late eighteenth century.6 
While d’Appollonia contributed significantly to the conversation surrounding 
state responses to terrorism, she did not adequately address the ways in which “new 
terrorism” had bred new counterterrorism; in fact, she noted “neither the United States 
nor European countries dramatically changed their policy options in the aftermath of 
9/11.”7 She took issue with the claim that “the emergence of obscure, idiosyncratic 
millenarian movements, zealously nationalist religious groups, militant antigovernment, 
far-right paramilitary organizations, and a transnational network of religious extremists 
that seeks the restoration of theocratic rule over what was once a vast pan-Islamic empire 
arguably represents a different and potentially far more lethal threat than traditional 
terrorist adversaries,” such as the Weather Underground.8  The implied debate between 
these two camps has been largely ignored among academics, although numerous 
conceptions of “modern terror” abound, especially with regards to the changed nature of 
terrorist organizations’ international outreach and expanded military capabilities.  Jeanne 
K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas theorize that the increased lethality of “new 
terrorism” is “actually the product of terrorists’ reasoned response to loosening 
constraints on their behavior caused by changes in funding sources.”9 Funding sources 
have evolved to enable terrorists or extremists to have access to funds from drug or oil 
trafficking, as well as international networks of financial support for groups.  For 
example, the Tamil Tigers notably received significant funding from international donors.  
There is an assumption that the evolution of technology and globalizing forces has 
                                                
5 Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, Frontiers of Fear (Ithaca [u.a.]: Cornell Univ. Press, 2012) 4.   
6 ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Rev. and expanded ed. ed. (New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 2006). Pp. 127 
9  Terrorism Financing and State Responses : A Comparative Perspective&nbsp;, eds. Jeanne K. 
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created terrorism in an entirely unprecedented way.  Such an assumption is inherently 
dangerous, because when regimes are presented with something they can’t understand, 
the tendency is often to criminalize it.   
Lorenzo Vidino suggests that the categorization of Muslims as a terrorist “other” 
is inherently bad for society and, moreover, represents bad counterterrorism 
policymaking. He notes, “on the one hand, the idea of establishing a police-led system 
that singles out individuals simply for expressing views that, according to very vague and 
subjective standards, could be considered extremist is at odds with the ideals of all 
Western democracies and could stigmatize the Muslim population.”10 Vidino’s argument 
is compelling, yet he fails to fully demonstrate the extent to which a “police-led system” 
isn’t only bad for Muslims: it is, rather, an ineffective and time-consuming approach to 
counterterrorism for future generations.   
Without a proper understanding of the radicalization process and the ways in 
which CVE and Deradicalization programs may or may not be effective, governments 
have proven prone to taking drastic actions against individuals.  The classic example in 
the United States, of course, is the passage of the an amendment to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act which enabled U.S. law enforcement officials to detain “any alien for 
forty-eight hours without charge and to extend detention for an additional period in the 
event of an ‘emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.’”11 Such a statement 
enabled an expansion of counter-terror measures that de-legitimized the U.S.’s moral 
stance in matters of criminal justice and human rights.  The USA PATRIOT Act, of 
course, followed suit in the trend towards actions taken directly against individuals, 
consistent with state actions which Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia has labeled the 
“Immigration-Security Nexus.”12  
                                                
10 Lorenzo Vidino, "Countering Radicalization in America," in Radicalization, Vol. 4 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010), 411-429. http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo19413.  
11 66 Fed. Reg. 48334-35 (Sept. 20, 2001), Amending 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(D), . (September 20, 
2001).  
12 Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, Frontiers of Fear (Ithaca [u.a.]: Cornell Univ. Press, 2012)1.  
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Background of Islamist-focused CVE and Deradicalization 
Although the threat of Islamic extremism, especially from large, organized groups 
such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, has remained omni-present since the 1980s, 
governments did not begin to formulate pre-radicalization programs until the United 
Kingdom presented “Prevent”, meaning “Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy” in 
2003, in order to combat Al Qaeda-inspired rhetoric in the UK as part of CONTEST, the 
larger counterterrorism strategy.  Although critics of “Prevent” abounded, policymakers 
in other states followed suit slowly, with the U.S. not addressing the topic until late 2010.   
Countries such as Denmark and Germany have advertised their respective CVE policies 
as largely successful in diminishing the number of foreign fighters leaving to fight for 
Syria.   One noted that “the notion of ‘countering violent extremism’ is rarely defined let 
alone conceptualized or theorised within the literature...the focus in the literature on 
countering violent extremism is generally on strategies that aim to respond to, or prevent 
violence...rather than on understanding how ‘countering violent extremism’ is constituted 
and emerges in particular ways.”  While academics frequently use the term, it is 
significant to note that even Wikipedia doesn’t include a page for “Countering Violent 
Extremism” - a search for the term re-directs to the mostly different term “counter-
terrorism.”  Implicit in this is a conflation of two entirely separate topics. The conflation 
is telling.  
 Another dilemma in the study of CVE programs is to what extent they have been 
a factor in preventing radicalization among populations, especially because it is nearly 
impossible to prove that someone was influenced to, for example, not travel to Syria to 
fight.  Take for instance Denmark.  Denmark heralded its CVE program as having 
decreased the number of Danish foreign fighters significantly.  However, the Danish 
government’s data may not concretely indicate a correlation to its CVE program. A 
number of other factors, such as a decrease in ISIS’s need for Danish foreign fighters or 
ISIS’s diminishing ability to pay its foreign fighters, may have been the primary 
influence in lowering the number of Danish foreign fighters in 2015.  It is thus unclear 
whether programs implemented since the rises of Al Qaeda and ISIS have, in fact, 
worked to deter radicalization. CVE studies systematically lack an ability to demonstrate 
causation from the correlative studies.  
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 An understanding of CVE also requires an assessment of its political expediency.  
CVE may be a means for government officials to formulate an answer to a problem 
perceived as not having an answer.  If that is the case, it is imperative to present an 
argument for or against using CVE policies to diminish the threat posed to a state’s 
security by radicalized non-state actors.  Furthermore, CVE policies may unintentionally 
bolster nationalist movements heralded by far right parties in both the U.S. and abroad.  
In the ISIS-centered context of contemporary politics, CVE programs seem to target and 
single out Muslim communities by simply delegating de-radicalization or prevention 
tasks to the “Muslim communities,” meaning usually, a single imam. The programs 
thereby separate Muslims from society, which may further potential causes of 
radicalization. 
 CVE policies are under-evaluated.  CVE arose out of a desire to formulate 
preventative measures against radicalization and movement to extremist action. Yet 
“prevention” is in-and-of itself vague, and raises extensive questions as to how 
policymakers ought even begin to go about formulating preventative approaches.  The 
Director of the U.S. Office for Community Partnerships, George Selim, defined CVE, as 
encompassing “a number of efforts, including prevention and intervention programming, 
as well as alternative dispositions which involves the possible development of 
disengagement programs in the post-crime context, both prior to trial and following 
conviction.”13  Director Selim’s definition is appropriate for a general audience 
unfamiliar with CVE programs, but, alarmingly, Selim presented this rather unfocused 
definition to the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs -- the very audience that would supposedly be regulating and, to an extent, 
formulating some kind of CVE programming measures.   
Selim’s presentation was part of a Senate hearing meant to enable the Committee 
to begin assessing CVE measures in place, in the hope that these CVE measures would 
prove to be remarkably effective.  Unfortunately, the results of the oversight hearing were 
mixed, if not entirely unclear.  The Committee heard testimony from representatives of 
the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of State, as well as 
                                                
13 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Written Statement of George Selim, Director 
Office for Community Partnerships U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016, .  
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two analysts.  The representatives from each department affirmed that their respective 
efforts were making slow but steady gains against ISIS, but analysts contested this claim, 
as did senators.   Moreover, Twitter has been heralded for its suspension of well over 
10,000 ISIS-related or -promoting accounts in the past two years, suggesting that the 
private sector may be more effective than government measures to counter extremist 
propaganda.14  The French government blames social media and the private sector for not 
doing enough, but no government has addressed the relative harm it may cause.     
Disengagement and Deradicalization 
 Peter R. Neumann’s four-volume Radicalization is a comprehensive collection of 
essays discussing the development of deradicalization programs around the world.  
Neumann’s approach is to underline the critical concepts towards deradicalization, 
whether in strategic or military terms.  However, most of Neumann’s selections for the 
volumes reflect a desire to understand the processes of radicalization.  Neumann is thus 
guilty of encouraging a line of thinking in which understanding of radicalization in 
context is integral to formulating an approach to deradicalization.  It is thus necessary, for 
this paper and other academic inquiries, to evaluate how important an understanding of 
the whole gamut of radicalization forces exist; it seems, based on USAID’s approach, 
that paying such attention to radicalization prohibits an efficient system.  
Notably, Anthony Richards provided a helpful essay titled “The Problem with 
‘Radicalization:’ the remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK.”15 
Richard’s argument centered around the idea that the UK has suffered from no 
“consistent notion of what is meant by ‘radicalization’...while there have been significant 
successes in thwarting terrorist attacks since 7/7, the lack of clarity as to who the 
radicalized are and what Prevent is precisely supposed to address has given rise to a 
sense of strategic drift.”16  The fundamental problem in the ‘Prevent’ program, according 
to Richards, is that it does not consider deradicalization as a separate process from 
                                                
14 Delshad Irani, "How Social Media is Preventing the ISIS Advance Online [Brand Equity]," The 
Economic Times (Online)Nov 3, 2016. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1835099191.  
15 ANTHONY RICHARDS, "The Problem with ‘radicalization’: The Remit of ‘Prevent’ and the 
Need to Refocus on Terrorism in the UK," International Affairs 87, no. 1 (Jan, 2011), 143-152. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00964.x.  
16 ibid. pp 143.  
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disengagement, and expands surveillance of individuals who may be “vulnerable” to 
becoming radicalized based on an expansive set of potential causes of radicalization.  The 
USAID report confirms this theory by demonstrating a vast array of potential causes.  If 
CVE policies were to rely on radicalization theories, nearly all individuals in a society 
would be categorized as “vulnerable” to becoming radicalized.  Therefore, there is a lack 
of a discussion as to how to narrow the definition of radicalization and “vulnerable” 
individuals.   
Klejda Mulaj noted the distinct importance of DDR methods, as simple 
disengagement leaves the possibility for a return to violence or other forms of extreme 
political action.  DDR refers to programs to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate.17 The 
concept has been used specifically in the context of civil wars and insurgencies, but may 
be relevant to an ongoing discussion of counterterrorism.18  The challenge, as Vertigans 
suggests, is that “civil wars appear to have a credibility in terms of justification and 
rationale that is rarely attributed to terrorist forms of political violence.”19 Yet CVE and 
deradicalization programs must consider the extent to which domestic “home-grown” 
extremist networks are a form of civil war.  
It is also imperative to understand the role of formal state-led “integration” 
systems that offer a way to bring immigrants into a community.  States generally lie 
somewhere along a spectrum, which is composed of Germany or France’s strict 
assimilation policy on one end and British multiculturalism on the other.  Assimilation, 
generally, refers to integration by total assumption of the “native” culture – 
understanding the native language with fluency, passing tests to assess levels of civic and 
historical understanding, and, sometimes, adoption of “Western”-style dress or values.   
The process is conducted on an individual’s own will – immigrants are expected to learn 
and conform on their own.  Multiculturalism, on the other end, refers to a system of 
integration by which the state takes a rather laissez-faire approach to integrating 
immigrants, preferring to allow ethnic groups to form communities that support 
themselves and usually maintain their home culture.  There is less of a requirement to 
                                                
17 Klejda Mulaj, Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 
2009).  
18 Horgan, Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis  
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adopt specific values or perceptions. Integration strategies will be referred to throughout 
this work, as most studies (at least, those governments tend to cite) suggest radicalization 
occurs when an individual feels disempowered and disconnected from their society due to 
a lack of integration and acceptance by the host community.  States tend to deal with the 
problem of integration differently, but it is certainly connected to programs to 
deradicalize.  Additionally, community-level-focused government initiatives usually 
emphasize the need to foster appreciation for the host culture and society – an initial step 
in attempting “integration.”  For instance, a 2011 report on the Prevent Strategy in the 
UK observed, “the dependence of successful Prevent work on developing a sense of 
belonging to this country and on a perception of the importance and legitimacy of 
integration.”  
Individual-level Deradicalization - Theory Review  
 There is significant literature theorizing about the potential roots of individual 
radicalization.  The USAID analysis, while informative, focuses on radicalization agents 
in non-Western countries, and therefore is difficult to apply to individuals living in 
Western countries.  USAID efforts in non-Western countries are directed towards 
preventing individuals from joining U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(FTOs), and are therefore biased to focus on groups that would be more likely to carry 
out attacks in the U.S.  Stephen Vertigans takes a comprehensive look at the academic 
literature surrounding the sociological explanations for radicalism. Most critically, 
Vertigans presents contemporary theories about the terrorist psyche and puts them into 
historical context.  For example, Vertigans notes that the present association of terror and 
poverty has precedence in past waves of terrorism, in which relative deprivation; 
frustration-aggression, narcissism-aggression and blocked social mobility theories played 
a prominent role.  He notes that even “in the fourth century BCE Aristotle blamed 
poverty for acts of political violence.”20  
 The Sociology of Terrorism presents explanations for individual-level decisions to 
join terror groups, and then moves on to understanding the psychological and 
sociological underpinnings of groups engaged in terrorism.  His perhaps most compelling 
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argument is that the individual may desire to join a terror group because of integration 
into a “social habitus.”  Social habitus theory purports that terrorism may be more likely 
in societies where violence is an accepted norm within a given society.  Governments 
play a role in the creation of this context through normalized and legitimized uses of 
violence such as war and utilization of the death penalty.  Violence can also become 
engrained in a social habitus as part of a common history of protest or violence.   For 
example, protest is highly normalized in France, making individuals more likely to 
pursue heightened forms of protest (e.g. terrorism) in their efforts to achieve regime 
reform or change.  
 Social habitus theory is supported by examples in which “engagement with 
broader social movements leaves more room for radicalization,” such as the 
radicalization of the so-called “Hamburg cell” prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on 
the United States.21  
 Ultimately, Vertigans’ historical examples demonstrate the similarities in 
contemporary terrorism.  While Vertigans does not directly assess state policies towards 
various forms of terrorism in the past, the examples in his book share a similar narrative: 
incarceration as a response to terror.  As he noted in a discussion of post-anarchist state 
actions, “anarchists in Germany and Russia were largely eradicated through persecution, 
imprisonment and execution”.22 Indeed, this is the crux of this paper’s analysis of the soft 
vs. medium vs. hard power.  Governments, both historically and in present time, respond 
far more often with medium and hard power than with soft power when faced with 
“existential” threats to national security.  
 Vertigans fails to adequately examine ways in which governments or societies 
may begin to address the problems of terrorist recruitment and deradicalization.  His 
adherence to a sociological framework prevents him from suggesting any kind of forward 
movement; instead, he relies on past examples to demonstrate that contemporary society 
must face similar challenges from terrorism as it has since nation-states and violence 
have been possible.  Several of Vertigans’ examples provide the reader with an 
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opportunity to glean insight, yet true insight will require examination of a much broader 
range of topics than Vertigans’ approaches.  
 His analysis covers roles of the media, mosque and community building, bottom-
up recruitment, and group dynamics.  He briefly acknowledges the importance of some 
historical examples, such as the Italian policy of leniency in the 1980s. The program has 
more recently been used in the Colombian government’s efforts to offer immunity to 
FARC rebels in Colombia. Both these examples suggest that the only way to overcome 
extremists and to aid in de-radicalization is to incorporate and welcome the extremist 
groups into their general society.  An in-depth historical analysis across cases enables us 
to evaluate the extent to which a decreased acceptance of an extremist group within 
society is correlated to levels of extremist activity and/or radicalization rates.  To measure 
such a relationship, this study will consider immigration levels compared to actual threat 
levels and integration or law enforcement reactions from the state.  
 Disengagement programs demonstrate the extent to which governments are 
willing to conduct integration efforts only with a proven and present threat.  Aside from 
the sociological aspects investigated in Vertigans, Horgan dove into the psychological 
formation of extremists.  John Horgan considers de-radicalization in the context of 
disengagement, for which, according to Horgan, “there is a critical need to identify and 
collect data that would inform and develop our knowledge on individual disengagement 
from terrorism.”23 Horgan presents an analysis of disengagement processes based in a 
separation of psychological disengagement and physical disengagement.  He notes that 
this separation begs the question of different levels of de-radicalization among the two 
groups; it seems reasonable that terrorists who only left a violent extremist group because 
of physical pressure would not necessarily have removed their motivations to conduct 
violence24.  
 While presenting a strong case for the difference between the two types of 
disengagement, his analysis of cases inadvertently draws attention to the lack of data 
supporting his claims of a legitimate disengagement process.  His data comes primarily 
from interviews and statements made by self-proclaimed ex-terrorists, but there does not 
                                                
23 John Horgan, "Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis," in Leaving Terrorism 
Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (New 
York: Routledge, 2009a). Pp. 28  
24 Ibid.   
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exist a real measure by which to assess the legitimacy of the individual's’ separation from 
terrorism.  For instance, he quotes an ex right-wing extremist as saying, “Prison was the 
best thing to ever happen to me.”25 The quote is difficult to legitimize considering its 
anecdotal nature, and underlines the inherent problem with deradicalization programs: 
there is not a means to legitimately and authoritatively say that someone has 
“deradicalized.” While literature abounds about the defining characteristics of 
radicalization, there is little explanation of what a deradicalized individual would be.  
 Tore Bjorgo, on the other hand, turned to an assessment of deradicalization of 
right-wing extremist groups in order to assess the psychological processes involved in 
moving away from an ideology.26  Bjorgo et al. evaluated disengagement programs in 
Sweden, Norway, and Germany to come to the conclusion that NGO disengagement 
groups appear to help more extremists than government groups, despite the larger amount 
of funds available for governmental programs.  They suggest this anomaly may be due to 
NGOs’ inability to conduct follow-up research tracking their clients.  There is thus very 
little analysis of recidivism rates among disengaged far-right extremists in these 
countries, just as there is for the cases studied in this work.  
 Bjorgo et al. did, however, contribute an understanding of the early programs 
seeking “de-radicalization.”  They note that a “common trait is that these projects are 
addressing the general life situation of the clients rather than giving priority to changing 
racist and extremist attitudes, which has also been the approach of traditional 
programmes to reduce racist movements.”27 The importance the authors give to this idea 
of de-radicalization evidences their bias towards a “relative deprivation” theory of 
extremist radicalization, at least within the scope of their study (comprising Sweden, 
Norway and Germany).  
The most prolifically written in topics of deradicalization are John Horgan and 
Tore Bjorgo.  John Horgan and Kurt Braddock are arguably the pioneers in research on 
the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs. Their analysis of Northern Ireland’s, 
                                                
25 Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism  
26 Tore Bjorgo, Jaap van Denselaar and Sara Grunenberg, "Exit from Right-Wing Extremist 
Groups: Lessons from Disengagement Programmes in Norway, Sweden and Germany," in 
Leaving Terrorism Behind, 1st ed. (Hoboken: Routledge Ltd, 2008).  
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Columbia’s, Indonesia’s, Yemen’s, and Saudi Arabia’s various approaches to 
institutionalized de-radicalization concluded that each state uses de-radicalization 
towards slightly different specific objectives is somewhat unsupported: their evidence 
equates territorial insurgencies with ideological terrorist groups, as well as equating states 
with secular agendas and states with Islamic agendas.  Yet the diversity of factors in their 
examples is also a strength for Horgan and Braddock.  By developing a framework to 
assess programs in a variety of contexts, Horgan and Braddock are able to propose a 
method that may help policymakers regardless of the state, constituency, or target.  Saudi 
Arabia will be considered later in this work, as its historical efforts at CVE and 
deradicalization have targeted interpretations of Islam and Islamist terrorism more often 
than the other cases in this work (the U.S., U.K. and France).  
With regards to radicalization in the United States, Lorenzo Vidino opened a 
conversation about how to evaluate current deradicalization28.  He then proposed seven 
policy recommendations, which warrant listing here:  
1. Policymakers should understand the radicalization process 
2. Policymakers need to decide whether to target only violent radicalism or, more 
broadly, cognitive radicalism.  
3. Policymakers should be aware of the deepening role of ideology in the 
radicalization of Western Muslims 
4. An effective counter radicalization strategy must be prepared to intervene in 
ideological and theological matters 
5. Counter radicalization programs should choose partners carefully 
6. Policymakers and program managers should deliver appropriate messages to 
mitigate problems in implementation.  
7. Policymakers need to devise metrics to empirically measure the results of their 
actions.  
To an extent, most governments have followed Vidino’s suggestions.  Policymakers 
have begun refining methods and processes.  However, the lack of consensus as regards 
definitions of terms like “extremism” and “radicalism” makes it extremely difficult for 
“community engagement” efforts to be applied in any sort of strategic way.  Moreover, 
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there has been little research into the metrics to measure the efficacy of CVE and de-
radicalization programs.  Indeed, most rely on the most basic metric: the low number of 
attacks perpetrated since a program’s initial implementation.  Such failed reasoning and 
logic should be unacceptable for policy standards.  
These recommendations are helpful for formulating and assessing CVE programs as 
well. Throughout this work, a common theme will be the connections between 
deradicalization programming and CVE programming.  Interagency cooperation is 
difficult to achieve within one sector, but it may be necessary to cooperate across 
agencies and across fields of research.  It is imperative that CVE and Deradicalization 
programs be assessed so as to assure that they do not target Muslims in the West, and so 
that they can be adaptable for future versions of extremism, regardless of ideological 
foundations.   
Defining Extremism, Radicalism and Terrorism  
 Various scholars have debated the validity of terrorism definitions, yet there is 
relative consensus about the terms “extremism” and “radicalism”.   This distinction is 
likely due to the way in which politicians have employed “terrorism” as a buzzword, 
intended to elicit emotional responses rather than a relaxed academic approach.  Zartman 
and Faure claim, “the [Obama] administration currently tends to avoid the term 
“terrorist” and prefers “extremist.” How synonymous the two terms are is a matter for a 
not-too-interesting debate...for the purposes of analyzing state decisions, the term 
“terrorism” must be accepted as meaning ‘any movement termed ‘terrorist’ by the state,’ 
since it is that designation that underlies the state’s problem with 
engagement.”29   Zartman provides this analysis in order to discuss modern terrorism and 
extremism, but is slightly mistaken in his assumption that the terms can be used 
interchangeably.  
For purposes of this study, extremism will refer to the belief in an ideology that 
advocates or sanctions the use of violence towards the expansion of that ideology’s 
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popularity. Radicalization refers to the process by which an individual adopts extremist 
beliefs and begins to condone violent action in the name of a particular ideology. 
Terrorism refers to a violent action committed by non-state actors against non-
combatants in order to achieve a political goal or to stimulate widespread fear among a 
population.   
Therefore, the two terms are separable as ideology-driven (extremism) and action-
driven (terrorism).  By this definition, all acts of “violent extremism” are also acts of 
terrorism (such as Islamist “lone wolves”) but acts of terrorism may be only political in 
nature, and therefore not violent extremism (such as revolutionary terror groups seeking 
to overthrow a regime).  Far-Right parties and far-Left parties advocating violence for 
political and ideological objectives are examples of extremists which are highly likely to 
transition into terrorist groups.  There is therefore an important opportunity for 
lawmakers and counterterrorism task forces to stop a group from transitioning from an 
extremist movement into a terrorist movement.   
“Countering violent extremism (CVE)” policies are intended to stop this process 
before it has begun, whereas “deradicalization” policies intend to transition a terrorist 
into an extremist and then from an extremist to a non-violent citizen.  Deradicalization 
therefore encompasses CVE in theory and ambition.  Deradicalization programs have 
been in place for much longer than CVE programs; thus, CVE programs are likely to 
incorporate deradicalization concepts.  But from where do policies makers derive 
conceptions for how to deradicalize an individual? Peter R. Neumann is perhaps the 
leading authority with regards to deradicalization. His four-volume text Radicalization 
explores the various facets of radicalization as it was and is understood in both the 
historical and contemporary contexts.  Neumann’s work will be an important cornerstone 
for this study’s conception of deradicalization.30  From there, CVE policies are largely 
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The following case studies are presented in chronological order according to the 
debut of each state’s efforts to officially “combat violent extremism.”  This analysis will 
thus begin with the United Kingdom, which many scholars herald as the preliminary 
community-integration programming effort related to contemporary Islamist terrorism.  It 
is important to note, however, that many states had been involved in various forms of soft 
power counterterrorism and even anti-violence community engagement long before the 
creation of Prevent in the UK, and indeed, even long before September 11, 2001.   
 The UK provides an interesting starting point because it has the most extensive 
history of domestic terror for these case studies.  Furthermore, as Jacobson notes, “a more 
in-depth review reveals that while aspects of the USA PATRIOT Act are far-reaching, 
there are also respects in which other countries such as Britain...have enacted laws giving 
their prosecutors and law enforcement officials even greater power.”31 Britons have 
indeed struggled to reconcile various counterterrorism measures with human rights and 
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constitutional obligations.  For instance, the Law Lords found Part IV of the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (2000), which required exemption from the European 
Convention for Human Rights, to be an unconstitutional abrogation of British citizens’ 
rights.  Parliament replaced Part IV with an act allowing for “control orders,” which were 
also subjected to constitutional review and subsequently outlawed by the Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, enacted in December 2011.    
 Therefore it is exigent to analyze and assess not only the effectiveness of CVE 
and deradicalization legislation in the UK, but to address whether those programs violate 
civic or human rights of citizens and/or noncitizens and the extent to which the state may 
be found culpable for actions taken by law enforcement which stigmatize certain 
communities.  There is no dispute that so-called Islamophobia is a societal phenomenon, 
yet there is significant ambiguity in the analysis of the role the state has played in 
allowing such a xenophobic phenomenon to take root in a country which advocates for 
“multicultural integration.”  In order to fully understand the context of CVE and 
deradicalization legislation in the UK, this chapter will consider the legacy of the IRA’s 
domestic terror campaign and the counterterrorism measures enacted to combat it.   
HISTORICAL APPROACH: Soft Counterterrorism Measures 
and Deradicalization of the IRA 
 The United Kingdom has experienced one of the longest ongoing terrorist and 
insurgent threats in modern state history.  The Irish Republican Army (IRA) formed in 
1919 in order to advocate for the reunification of Ireland and separation from UK rule.   
Despite ongoing internal splits, the IRA continued to exist and challenge British rule until 
1998.  The violent faction of the group, IRA-Provisional (PIRA), believed terrorism to be 
an integral component in their challenge of British rule, and consequently claimed 
responsibility for attacks that killed over 3,500 people between 1969 and 1998.32 British 
reactions to the IRA and larger empire-wide nationalist campaigns were relatively 
consistent: outlaw opposition groups and incriminate group leaders.   The policy persists 
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through today to some extent, as 60 former IRA militants remain imprisoned in 
specialized units in the UK.   
 Eamon Collins, a former militant who was allowed to leave prison as a provision 
of the Good Friday Agreement’s Early Release Scheme, provided an interesting look at 
the psychology involved in becoming a member of the PIRA.  His commentary is 
illuminating in the current context, as it examines the role of the greater public in terrorist 
campaigns, which mimics to some extent the ways in which “Islamophobia” and the rise 
of Far Right parties are seen to increase support for radical Islamist groups among 
Western Muslims.  Collins noted “I believe that everyone in Ireland should be prepared 
to examine critically where they stood in relation to the war. It corrupted thousands of 
people by making them ambivalent towards violence…. they contributed to the 
continuation of the blood feast by quietly exulting in particular acts of violence, as they 
watched the television news from the safety of their living room.”33 Furthermore, the case 
Collins presented of the PIRA actions includes the transnational nature of terrorist 
campaigns, an aspect of modern terrorism that many analysts consider “new”.  Collins 
pointed to the Italian anarchist group the Red Brigades, noting “I believed the IRA could 
be turned into an organization which could take on the capitalist state and the agents of 
that state, as the Red Brigades had done in Italy.”34 The IRA therefore constituted a sort 
of transnational non-state group; sometimes conducting attacks abroad (albeit on British 
targets).  Viewing the IRA’s activity as in some way transnational makes the British 
government’s interactions with and attempts to destabilize the IRA a particularly 
poignant example for comparison to the present-day CVE and deradicalization-focused 
preventative approach today, when transnational and external groups are considered the 
primary threat to national security.   
Soft Power: De-radicalization and Prevention Programs in Northern 
Ireland (1929-1995) 
Scholars and journalists have documented various similarities between the 
struggles that Northern Irish republicans faced during the Troubles and the contemporary 
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obstacles facing the Muslim community throughout UK territory.35 Several news stories 
in 2016 reported an increasing trend of British citizens -- even young children -- being 
required to participate in deradicalization programs.36  There is talk in both the public 
media and in Parliament and the British Home Office of expanding the use of “mandatory 
deradicalisation” programs, which raises questions of liberty of action and freedom of 
thought. Mandating certain individuals to go through deradicalisation without their 
consent implies a certain authority of the state over individual minds.  Corinne Purtill 
remarked that proposals to segregate Islamist extremists in prison bear a striking 
resemblance to programs (which have since been denounced as counter-effective) 
enacted in the 1970s that moved Irish terrorists to specialized prisons in Belfast, Long 
Kesh, Maze, and Maghaberry.37 Purtill echoed the concerns of many radicalization 
scholars that “prison authorities tend to respond to security fears by creating a more 
restrictive environment, facilitating the creation of oppressive and minimalist regimes,” 
and in turn the object of the restrictive measures creates a distinct target.  In the historical 
case, the distinctive targets were Irish ex-paramilitaries.  In the contemporary case, it is 
Muslims, especially young Arab men.38  
Prison-specialization proposals differ only slightly from deradicalization 
programs in the latter half of the twentieth century, aimed at Irish paramilitaries. This is 
despite the fact that the fight against a domestic insurgency with a straightforward 
objective (the Troubles) was motivated in significantly different ways than present-day 
lone wolf Islamist or Far Right terrorism.  As such, however, the similarities between the 
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governmental responses to the Irish terrorist threat and contemporary threats provide a 
solid framework for a study of how current policies may have grown from the old.   
The Good Friday Agreement marked a turning point in the so-called “Irish 
Troubles.” The “Troubles” refer to the period between 1920 and 1998 in which Irish 
paramilitary groups conducted violent attacks in order to protest and fight against the 
British military presence in Northern Ireland.  Irish-focused deradicalization programs 
fall into the category of DDR, or disarmament, disengagement, and reintegration.   The 
Good Friday Agreement ensured both disarmament and demobilization, as the signatory 
terrorist groups were required to disarm immediately and cease terrorist activity.  In 
exchange, prisoners from the groups were allowed shortened stays in prison, under the 
Agreement’s Early Release Scheme.  The Early Release constituted the “reintegration” 
component of the agreement, yet failed to truly create a framework in which ex-
paramilitaries could truly re-integrate into society.  Interviews conducted with ex-
paramilitaries indicate a difficulty finding employment and acceptance by the greater UK 
society.  This lack of integration represents a failure of the Agreement’s effort at DDR, 
and has left a security gap for re-radicalization.    
Community groups took on a role in the reintegration process.  For instance, the 
group Tar Isteach offers counseling to former IRA combatants, even today.39  The 
community-involvement has been heralded as an important element of the Prevent 
category of the UK’s CONTEST strategy.  Yet there is little governmental oversight, and 
these unsupervised community groups are the main bulwarks against re-radicalization.  
“Community engagement” programs have thus become a central means for ex-
paramilitaries to reorganize and, in fact, re-radicalize.  Neil Ferguson highlighted a 
problem in stating that “for many participants, they had actually become more radical 
through their time in the organization or especially whilst in prison rather than less.”40  
Community groups have existed since before the Good Friday Agreement, meaning that 
they constituted and established procedure prior to any official government involvement.  
There is not sufficient data to consider whether such groups were more effective before 
or after governmental oversight.  A comparison between heavily monitored community 
engagement deradicalization groups and those that operate more independently of the 
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government may be a particularly helpful comparison considering the ambiguity 
surrounding current groups’ effectiveness.  
Soft Power: Resources Provided to Irish Deradicalization Programs 
Resources for Irish terrorist deradicalization programs significantly decreased as 
Islamist terrorism rose and increasingly threatened UK territory and citizens.  This trend 
started in prisons, where there remain at least 60 Irish ex-paramilitaries as of early 2017. 
Purtill observed that the “ability of the prison service to adequately staff such units and 
provide deradicalisation programmes is questionable.  
Over the last few years, staffing and resourcing difficulties have led to a rapid 
deterioration in safety and security within English and Welsh prisons. 
Meanwhile, over 1,000 prisoners are believed to be extremist or vulnerable to 
extremism – yet only 60 are engaged in specialised interventions addressing 
these issues. This raises concerns about the ability of the prison service to 
maintain order and control in such units and what those detained there will spend 
the majority of their time doing.”41 
 Such an analysis confirms the theory that specialized prisons may in fact lead to 
further radicalization.  Unfortunately, work with Irish ex-paramilitaries hadn’t matured 
before British government officials began efforts to create legislation directed towards 
extremist Islamist groups.  Some British government CVE and deradicalization policies 
and statutes do mention Far Right extremist groups, yet there have been limited efforts to 
“deradicalize” Far Right extremists and even fewer efforts to create “specialised prisons.” 
A clear problem with British deradicalization is that it is too focused on Muslim 
extremism and therefore not focused enough on other forms – a critique which 
policymakers tend to ignore when faced with the political pressure to act on crises.  
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH: Multicultural Integration, 
Prevent, and Community Engagement (Channel) 
 The 9/11 attacks on the United States created repercussions worldwide, especially 
within states allied to the United States that suddenly felt an increase in threat to their 
national security from external sources.  The United Kingdom, accustomed to dealing 
with internal terrorism began efforts for a reformed counterterrorism strategy soon after 
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the attacks, and in 2003 released CONTEST, whose goal as stated in a 2011 report 
summary released by the Crown, was “to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests 
overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with 
confidence...This new strategy reflects the changing terrorist threat and incorporates new 
Government policies on counter-terrorism.”42  The stated aim of CONTEST suggests that 
the UK Government considers the contemporary terrorism threat to be completely 
unprecedented in UK terror and counterterror history, and that the threat of terrorism is 
such that people cannot “go about their lives freely and with confidence.”43  This last 
claim has been the subject of significant criticism, as scholars and Muslim community 
leaders alike have pointed to the myriad ways in which CONTEST has, in fact, prevented 
more British citizens from living “freely” than prior to the strategy’s enactment.44  
 Prior to implementation of CONTEST, governmental efforts to prevent terrorism 
were fairly sparse.  The British experience with the IRA cemented the idea that terrorism 
was the result of extreme political views by domestic groups, at least in the UK.  Anthony 
Richards noted, “the broad remit of Prevent lay in being in denial about...the significance 
of internal factors as underpinning radicalization.”45 Parliament did enact a series of laws 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s directed at immigration control, which notably 
demonstrate the UK’s ignorance (prior to 2005) of the potential for “home-grown,” non-
Irish terrorism on a large scale.  The Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999 was smaller in 
scope and purpose than the subsequent Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 
and then the Asylum and Immigration Act of 2004.  The 2002 Act instituted a nationality 
test, the passing of which would be requisite for gaining British nationality.  Many 
commentators noted the test is overly difficult, somewhat reminiscent of Jim Crow voting 
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prohibitions in the United States.46  That action, in addition to the later 2004 Act, 
reinforced a closed-border attitude towards permanent immigration in the early part of the 
21st century.  The Acts also increased control over asylum-seekers, mandating them in 
some cases to undergo programs to “adapt” to British culture.  The programs conflict 
with Western liberal values, which would espouse freedom of though, and seem to 
contradict the UK’s purported “multicultural” approach to immigration, which would 
enable those of different cultural backgrounds to nevertheless be a part of their society.  
 The 2011 report mentioned above, the first released government report regarding 
CONTEST, suggested two primary targets of needed counterterrorism efforts: Northern 
Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) and radical Islamist terrorism coming from Al-Qaeda 
affiliates and, mainly, “terrorist groups based in Pakistan.” Interestingly, the 2011 report 
suggested that tackling of NIRT should be done by the central UK government, despite 
efforts in 2002 and subsequent years to divert NIRT-related counterterrorism to MI5, in 
Ireland.47 The 2002 effort is indicative of a trend that will be described throughout this 
chapter and each case study, in which counterterrorism policymakers shift focus to target 
specific groups, as opposed to formulating programs to combat terrorism in a more 
general way – the “medium power” approach.  
  CONTEST created four strategies in order to combat extremism (albeit without a 
clear-cut definition of the word “extremism”): Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare.  As 
the comparative case studies will demonstrate, a significant problem with this form of 
targeted counterterrorism is that it leaves a gap in which groups outside the program’s 
target pool may conduct terrorist attacks or threaten the security of a state without the 
state being able to truly “Prevent” or “Prepare.” This paper will assess the Prevent tenet, 
as analysts and foreign policymakers have most often looked at Prevent as the tenet most 
in need of reform and most vital to maintaining state security, indeed, to maintaining the 
integrity of many modern states.  
 Prevention of “homegrown” terrorism is a new concept, even within the 
CONTEST framework.  Between 2003, the inception of CONTEST, and the July 5, 2005 
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London bombings, political rhetoric remained largely focused on the threat of externally-
based terrorism, that is the “Pakistan-based groups” which targeted Western values and 
Western democracies.  However, the July 5 bombings demonstrated to the British 
population and British policymakers that domestic terrorism, the terrorism inflicted by 
so-called “Lone Wolves” represented a severe threat.  Analysts have yet to truly identify 
the causes of domestic radicalism; theories vacillate between socio-economic disparities 
and psychological problems.48 In several European countries, a dominant theme has been 
the lack of integration of Muslim communities into the country’s political and social 
fabric.  Integration techniques will be evaluated as a part of CVE and soft power policy 
considerations in each case study; however, it is important to note that integration efforts 
have never been seriously considered as the primary soft power approach. Indeed, there is 
a clearer tendency in developed countries to make efforts at deportation and mass 
detainment than integration -- in a return to a “medium power” approach.  Thus, to some 
ends, talk of “integration” in various forms is more political rhetoric and appeal than true 
policy objectives.  
In the wake of the July 5, 2005 London Underground bombings, various Muslim 
organizations in the London area published communiqués which not only condemned the 
attack, but asserted a sense of cooperation between security services and the Muslim 
community.  For instance, the Muslim Council of Britain noted, “we must and will be 
united in common determination that terror cannot succeed. It is now the duty of all us 
Britons to be vigilant and actively support efforts to bring those responsible to 
justice…”49 Likewise, the Muslim Association of Britain stated, “all communities, 
including the Muslims, must cooperate with the security agencies in order to prevent any 
further such attacks. We cannot rule out the possibility of a conspiracy to carry out more 
attacks in the future, whether near or distant...community leaders, clerics, journalists, 
academics, politicians and decision makers need to face up to the causes of radicalisation 
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of the Muslim youth in the United Kingdom.”50 Yet between 2005 and 2016, the UK 
security services in fact increased the rift between them and Muslim communities, 
ostracizing many communities through mosque raids and heightened supervision.  
Soft Power: The UK’s Multicultural Integration Model  
Discussion of integration as a means of preventing terrorism tends to contradict policy 
responses to terrorism, such as the three state responses promoted by David Lake, Robert 
Pape, Scott Atran and other terrorism experts.51 Such experts suggest that terrorism is a 
rational approach to a perceived power dynamic in which the terrorist-employing group 
cannot defeat the state through non-violent or state-structured responses. Prevention and 
CVE policy, on the other hand, is predicated on an assumption that some part of 
homegrown terrorism may be motivated by isolation from the state’s general community, 
revenge, psychological illness, or a by-product of socio-economic disadvantage. Indeed, 
the UK Parliament has stated that integration will be its primary focus in the prevention 
of extremism: “whereas Prevent is part of CONTEST, a counter-terrorism strategy, and 
deals with terrorism, the Government will address the challenge of extremism -- and 
extremist organisations in particular -- primarily through other means. They include: the 
Government’s new approach to promoting integration, which DCLG is leading; other 
parts of the criminal justice system, notably legislation regarding religious and racial 
hatred; and debate and civic challenge.”52 Thus, policy took an impetus towards 
decentralization. The concern, moreover, is driven by a claim that “there is an association 
between support for terrorist violence and a rejection of a society...which is cohesive and 
integrated…Prevent depends on a successful integration strategy.”53  As recently as 2016, 
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another Parliamentary policy command paper noted that there would be a sophisticated 
“review into how we can boost opportunity and integration in our most isolated 
communities.”54 It is therefore prudent to take a deeper look at how the UK approaches 
integration in relation to its efforts with Prevent, especially considering the frequent 
revisions to Prevent implying that it needs continual improvement.   
 Government officials and academics in the UK began to consider integration to be 
a key aspect of counter terrorism in 1998 after the signing of the Good Friday Accords. 
Integration strategies were initially considered a rehabilitative measure, and in counter-
terrorism related more closely to 21st century deradicalization programs, as they sought to 
re-integrate members of the PIRA into British society with a more favorable and non-
violent view of the radical’s former enemy state.  This perspective explains the reliance 
on specialized prisons and community rehabilitation groups.  
 Many scholars have observed the relatively closed-off nature of the assimilation 
model used in France when compared to the relatively open nature of the UK’s 
multicultural approach.  Yet, as CVE programs have made evident, the UK’s approach is 
only multicultural so long as the multiple cultures adhere to “shared British values.” It is 
those undefined “shared values” which pose such a significant problem for CVE program 
implementation, and perhaps a driving reason that the UK resorted to more “medium 
power” approaches.   Prevent’s strategy has seemed dependent on a common cultural 
understanding, which in many cases may ultimately lead to further radicalization of the 
targeted populations and communities.  The state’s actions in the absence of “shared 
values” is perhaps more telling than the grandiose conception of “multiculturalism.”  
Indeed, state targeting of minorities and ghettoization leads one to question whether 
multiculturalism can exist on a society-wide level anywhere.  
Soft Power: CVE in the UK: The “Prevent” Framework (2005-2016) 
As is obvious by its name, Prevent is the CONTEST tenet devoted to the prevention of 
radicalization and attacks on British home soil.  Prior to July 2005, Prevent aimed to 
obstruct British citizens from joining extremist groups abroad.   The focus on groups 
abroad and the threat they pose to UK security is evident in the 2011 legislative report 
assessing each component of CONTEST.  The report’s authors suggested that  
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“preventing radicalisation must mean challenging extremist ideas that are 
conducive to terrorism and also part of a terrorist narrative. Challenge may mean 
simply ensuring that extremist ideas are subject to open debate. But where people 
seek to enter this country from overseas to engage in activity in support of 
extremist as well as terrorist groups we will also use the Home Secretary’s 
powers to exclude them.”55  
Thus, there is a general impression that extremism coming from groups abroad presents 
the greatest challenge to UK security.  This is similar to with the USA’s post-9/11 focus 
on foreign intervention and USAID work abroad, as will be discussed later.   
More recently, however, Prevent has been used as the foundation of efforts to prevent 
homegrown radicalism and terrorism.  As part of Prevent, the UK Parliament has 
organized significant amounts of research into radicalization (causes, drivers, and 
theories).  A review of Prevent highlighted the  
“search for identity, meaning and community,” radicalization as a “social process 
particularly prevalent in small groups” and, mainly, “an ideology that sets 
Muslim against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global 
Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its 
defence; a network of influential propagandists for terrorism, in this country and 
elsewhere, making extensive use of the internet in particular; and by specific 
personal vulnerabilities and local factors which make the ideology seem both 
attractive and compelling” as the primary causes of radicalization, especially Al 
Qaeda and Islamist-related radicalism.56 
The report also suggests that extremism is more likely among youth and those disaffected 
with the government and police force.  Yet there has been little effort to repair the level 
of trust citizens have in the police force.  
In order to tackle the identified radicalization tendencies and policing 
complexities, the Prevent framework incorporates elements of police work, community 
engagement, and international development work.  The most tension exists between the 
first two areas of Prevent, with policymakers and government officials repeatedly 
asserting that community engagement is essential, like has been successful with both the 
IRA case and with gang prevention and disengagement.  
While laudable in its scope of research and attempted policy solutions, Prevent, at 
least as presented in official reports, is full of contradictions.  Foremost among these 
contradictions is the relationship between the state and law enforcement and 
communities: community-members are more likely to become radicalized when they 
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perceive a strong law enforcement presence in their community, yet increased policing 
and “strict monitoring” is the proposed solution for gaps and problems within Prevent.  
Parliamentary Command Papers and Reports indicate that policymakers are aware of this 
contradiction and have made various efforts to solve it, first in 2007 and subsequently in 
2011 and 2015.  For instance, the 2011 report has been used by various governmental 
agencies for its succinct definition of extremism: “vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and 
mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs [and] calls for the deaths of 
members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.”57 This definition is 
rather all encompassing, as it covers values, governmental obedience and loyalty, and 
military authority.  The definition implies that “extremism,” while not relating to a 
specific form of extreme belief, is rather a term to refer to antipathy towards the British 
state, even in “vocal opposition.”  Again, this aspect of Prevent raises serious concerns 
for the “values” of British legislation, and the extent to which free speech may 
increasingly fall by the wayside.  
The most consistent complaint in each subsequent review of Prevent is succinctly 
stated in the 2011 review: “there have been allegations that previous Prevent programmes 
have been used to spy on communities…. Prevent must not be used as a means for covert 
spying on communities. Trust in Prevent must be improved.”58  Considering the broad 
scope of the “extremism” definition alone, it is no surprise that many British citizens fall 
into the category of “extremists,” thereby warranting, from a legal perspective, 
supervision and surveillance.  Allocation of resources and a comparison with the 
treatment of ex-PIRA militants shows that supervision and surveillance is considered a 
priority in the absence of public forms of soft power.  
 A 2015 Prevent review gave more emphasis to extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi 
groups, including groups like Blood and Honour which do not overtly conduct violent 
attacks but rather promote and advocate for violence towards minority groups.  This may 
to some extent answer the critique earlier in this paper that Prevent, and UK de-
radicalization programs more specifically are too narrow in scope and audience. 
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Moreover, the ‘mandatory deradicalization’ has been the implemented against solely the 
Muslim community, justifying the perception that the UK government is spying on 
Muslim communities.  
Medium Power: Law Enforcement and Immigration Control 
 Authorities and policymakers have often highlighted Peter Clarke’s 2014 
investigation into the predominantly Muslim Birmingham community known as Trojan 
Horse.  In that investigation, Clarke revealed that law enforcement had failed to respond 
to clear trends in radicalization.  In particular, Clarke pointed to extremists occupying 
high-level posts in schools.  The law enforcement therefore has stepped up it’s 
monitoring of school administrators.  
 Immigration control has been another area on which media attention has focused 
as a reaction to increased risks from terrorists.  The UK government began using 
immigration control in order to maintain a tighter grasp of the non-citizen population, 
having observed that most Islamist attacks (foiled and perpetrated) in London were 
committed by individuals with extensive familial links to foreign countries, and Pakistan 
in particular. The 2011 report noted that  
“The Government already uses immigration powers to protect the public from 
extremists...We will continue to use these powers when it is necessary and 
proportionate to do so. We will make it more explicit that the criteria for 
exclusion on the grounds of unacceptable behaviour include past or current 
extremist activity, either here or overseas. Those who intend to travel to the UK 
should be clear about our expectations...we will strengthen the ‘good character’ 
requirement in citizenship applications to include whether an individual has 
promoted extremist views, or acted in a way which undermines our values...We 
can already refuse to grant a visa to those whose presence in the UK is not 
conducive to the public good.”59 
 
 Hidden in the above language is an effort to exclude from the UK not only those 
who may pose an overt security risk, but those who may disrupt the “public good” or may 
fail to live up to standards of “good character.”  Such exclusions are similar to France and 
the USA, but are difficult to compare to the earlier example for Great Britain, as the IRA 
constituted an entirely domestic threat. A slight similarity may be drawn between the 
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Early Release Scheme’s criteria, which required characteristics to be met in order for an 
ex-militant to qualify for early prison release.  It is important to consider, however, that 
the effort to shut down immigration is in fact a central component of far-right parties, and 
is widely considered to have been a major factor in the 2015 UK “Brexit” referendum in 
which British citizens opted to leave the European Union.  Immigrants have been 
portrayed by conservative politicians as vying for scare jobs and resources while 
decreasing overall national security; a fact which scholars such as d’Appollonia state is 
untrue.  Yet large influxes of refugees coming out of the Syrian civil war and terrorist-
related violence around the world has made immigrant populations, especially new 
groups which may not speak local languages, prevalent around Europe.  The UK’s exit 
from the European Union would enable it to cease abiding by EU agreements on refugee 
and migrant acceptance into the country; portending even more closed-off borders.  
 As such, the Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales, a 2011 policy 
document outlining the role of leaders in law enforcement working to prevent violent 
extremism and the radicalization leading to it, is illuminating.  The policy statement 
suggests that Prevent is intended to be a risk-based approach, as opposed to the broad-
based Islamophobic law enforcement system initially implemented in 2002 as a response 
to the increasing public demand for action against terrorism.  Law enforcement officials, 
according to the policy, are “frontline staff who engage with the public” and  
“should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable 
to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it. They need to be aware of 
what we mean by the term ‘extremism and the relationship between extremism 
and terrorism.”60  
 
This well-intentioned effort to clarify extremism and terrorism have not been 
substantiated by open source investigation, but it is promising that such a goal has been 
established.  However, it may be a misguided approach, as it has been shown that 
political suggestions of a link between terrorism and immigration actually increase 
radicalization by stigmatizing communities to the point that they feel completely 
excluded from a piece of their identity and thus must seek radical identities.61  The policy 
furthermore emphasizes a decentralized power framework in which “local authorities” 
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such as county councils spearhead efforts to regulate law enforcement and ensure it 
remains consistent with the Prevent ideals and the recommendations of experts in 
countering extremism and radicalization. As recently as August 2016, a report on Islamist 
extremism in prisons commented on the need to improve security service and law 
enforcement understanding of the definitions of radicalization and the causes leading to 
extremism, as well as greater coordination between police and central counter-extremism 
and counter-terrorism groups.62  
Prison reform in order to prevent radicalization is an area of significant interest for UK 
policymakers. The very same report suggested a return to the system of “35specialized” 
prison units, used for Irish terrorists.  The 2016 report suggests that containing known 
highly violent extremists – the report uses the term TACT (Terrorism Act) to represent 
those individuals imprisoned under the Terrorism Act of 2000 -- ought to be placed in 
contained units with specially trained police and deradicalization specialists.  It is further 
justified, by the report, because “[Islamist] prisoners extend the threat of radicalisation 
beyond those arrested for terrorist offences.  
Other prisoners -- both Muslim and non-Muslim...are nevertheless vulnerable to 
radicalisation by Islamic Extremists. Statistics show an increasing and 
disproportionate representation of Muslims within the criminal justice system, 
which could chime with the radicalisers’ message of the victimisation of 
Muslims.”63  
Unfortunately, the report does not consider whether the victimization of Muslims 
is justified. Rather, the proposed action is to expend resources in order to create more 
prisons and to, in fact, congregate Muslims -- extremist and non-extremist alike -- in 
separate prisons.  Such action would negate the potential positive effects of prison-time, 
which in countries like Indonesia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia have been proven to 
decrease radicalization.64 Moreover, findings in other countries have suggested that 
prison radicalization occurs in the absence of an imam-and the specialized prisons don’t 
provide any actions to improve that.  
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Soft Power: Community Engagement: Channel and its subsets 
 The most widely-adopted aspect of Prevent internationally has been “Channel,” 
an effort implemented by which police seek to work with “liberal Muslims” in order to 
engage potential extremists and prevent their radicalization. The “community 
engagement” aspects of Prevent are supposedly separate from law enforcement and 
intelligence components.   Community engagement strategies comprise efforts to connect 
government authorities with leaders in civil society, including NGOs, community service 
organizations, and religious organizations.  Since 2014, there has been a push in 
governmental policy to regulate positions of power in schools.  Yet then-Home Secretary, 
now Prime Minister Theresa May noted in March 2016 that  
“The House debated the Second Reading of the Investigatory Powers Bill, which will 
ensure that the police and the security and intelligence agencies have the powers they 
need to keep people safe in a digital age. Through our Prevent and intervention 
programmes, we are working to safeguard people at risk and to challenge the twisted 
narratives that support terrorism. That includes working with community groups to 
provide support to deliver counter-narrative campaigns.  Our Channel programme works 
with vulnerable people and provides them with support to lead them away from 
radicalisation, and, as we announced as part of strategic defence and security review in 
November last year, this year we will be updating our counter-terrorism strategy, 
Contest.”65 
 The efforts have evolved over the year, but presently focus 54% of resources and 
programs in “debates, discussions and forums” – activities linked to Western efforts to 
formulate an effective counter-narrative.  Other activities that Prevent purports to 
advocate for are general educational activities, leadership and management activities, 
non-accredited training, arts and cultural activities, and sports and recreation.  These 
strategies parallel programs in Saudi Arabia discussed earlier; however, the UK’s 
programs have much more limited scope as a result of more limited resource allocation 
and limited legitimacy.  
 In terms of the deradicalization side, an upsurge in Syrian refugees beginning in 
2014 has led to increased calls for deradicalization efforts. As of mid-2016, reports 
calculated that authorities have referred nearly 4,000 individuals to Channel. An article in 
The Guardian noted that this number averages to about 11 people per day, “nearly triple 
                                                
65 Gabrielle Garton Grimwood and Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons., 
Radicalisation in Prisons in England and Wales&nbsp; (London: House of Commons 
Library,[2016]).  
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the figure of the previous year [2015].”66  The National Police Chiefs Council’s figures 
list that 293 of those referrals were Muslim, outnumbering the next most populated 
religious group, “not known” by over 100 people.  In an age breakdown, the majority of 
those referred were between the ages of 15 and 19, far younger than the target age range 
suggested by investigative reports that the UK Parliament commissioned.  
 Within the prison setting, there is a suggestion that prison imams have failed to 
prevent radicalization of prisoners, due to the “intimidation” posed to imams by 
“charismatic [Islamist Extremist] prisoners acting as self-styled ‘emirs’ and exerting a 
controlling and radicalising influence on the wider Muslim prison population.”67 Such 
claims demonstrate ignorance on the part of investigators to the nature of Islam or the 
ways in which Imams may be able to influence prison radicalization. Indeed, the 2016 
UK prison report noted that,  
“While most chaplains were dedicated members of staff and did good and useful 
work, there is also evidence of a weak understanding and effective approach to 
IE. There is for example a...lack of management control over access to extremist 
literature and materials. The review further noted that Deobandism being the 
‘default’ version of Islam in prisons could be problematic if non-Deobandi 
chaplains and prisoners felt marginalised...vetting and clearance arrangements for 
chaplains should be strengthened.”68  
Such a move lends credence to those in the Muslim and wider UK communities which 
point to the ways in which UK government is attempting to control Islam and Muslims, 
giving, in fact, more fodder to the fire of radicalization.  It is, in fact, the polar opposite of 
“community engagement CVE” and contrary to ideals expressed by the 2011 and 2015 
Prevent summaries.  For example, the prison report recommends the following in order to 
clamp down on radicalization:  
1.  “An independent advisor on counter-terrorism in prisons, accountable to 
the Secretary of State and responsible for an over-arching counter-
extremism strategy.”    
2. Ensuring that “senior post-holders responsible for the strategy have 
sufficient and credible operational experience.”  
                                                
66 Josh Halliday, "Almost 4,000 People Referred to UK Deradicalisation Scheme Last Year," The 
Guardian-03-20, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/20/almost-4000-people-
were-referred-to-uk-deradicalisation-scheme-channel-last-year.  
67 "Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and 
Youth Justice."   
68 "Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and 
Youth Justice."   
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3. Creation of a “new security category for TACT and Islamic Extremist 
prisoners, to be managed by the central government.”   
4. Creation of specialized prison units for the “small subset of extremists 
within this group who present a particular and enduring risk to national 
security through subversive behaviour, beliefs and activities.” 
5. Systematic records of “the promotion of extremist beliefs and threats of 
violence to staff”.   
6. Providing “suitable training for staff, with particular emphasis on 
distinguishing religious from cultural traditions.”  
7. Tightening the “vetting of prison chaplains to assess association with 
organisations linked to extremism.”  
8. “Tackling the availability and source of extremist literature.” 
9. Giving greater focus to the “safe management of Friday prayers, with 
sanctions imposed for abuse or misuse of all acts of worship.”  
10. Reviewing “procedures under ‘Rule 39,’ to ensure confidential privilege in 
legal correspondence is not being abused.”  
11. Improving the “capacity for responding swiftly to serious violent 
incidents, with regular exercising of this capability and improved 
coordination with the police, who should be given primacy in handling 
serious prison incidents.”  
These 11 recommendations make it clear that efforts to reform prison systems in 
order to combat “radicalization’ are directed solely towards Muslims within the prisons, 
and are hardly related to the formulation of a counter-narrative or promotion of British 
values.  For instance, with regards to the first suggestion about a specialization, as of 
mid-2016, this simple task had not been implemented, and in fact, further reports 
suggested a strategy specifically for prisons would be needed. There has also been some 
progress in the training of prison officers, and “senior post-holders,” as the National 
Offender Management Service (NOMS) and the Prison Officers’ Association (POA) have 
implemented some more expansive officer training programs.  Yet the extent to which 
“senior post-holders” are well informed about radicalization remains to be seen -- there 
have been few comments by senior post-holders (aside from former Prime Minister 
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David Cameron and current Prime Minister Theresa May) indicating an understanding of 
prison radicalization reports. 
The emphasis on Islamist radicalization alone may be misguided, in that it 
responds to a deeply engrained prioritization of imprisonment for Muslims and minority 
communities in the UK.  It also leaves a security gap in which other forms of 
radicalization may go 
unnoticed, unreported, 
and unresolved. For 
instance, the NOMS 
Offender Equalities 
Annual Report, in 2015, 
noted that 14.4% of the 
British prison populations 
are Muslim, whereas the 
general population represents only 7.7% of those imprisoned.69  The figure above denotes 
the increasing numbers of Muslims in British prisons.70  
Soft Power: Resources provided to Prevent programs 
 The budget for Prevent as an entire program has been consistently between £40-
45 million annually, although individual communities shoulder most costs, and the 
funding from the Prevent budget is allocated through grants to high-need or high-
performing regions in a competitive grant process.  Table 2.1 shows a selection of grant-
receiving regions, and demonstrates the extent to which resources have gone from a 
somewhat equitable distribution to a rather skewed one.  The skew reflects the trend of 
programs becoming more and more focused on high-visibility locations, and urbanized 
areas, rather than instituting a durable training program for CVE on a continuing basis.  
The data points to Parliament’s tendency towards immediate effects and the general 
dismissal of any genuine CVE programs; even going so far as to defund the College of 
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Police from receiving Prevent grants.  The implication is that Parliament does not value 
putting resources into training the police on a large scale to deal with new forms of 
radicalization.  
The actual “prevention of violent extremism” takes place much more frequently 
on the small scale, with local authorities and law enforcement mechanisms.  There are 
even 43,000 directly employed prison staff members working to prevent prison 
radicalization.  Despite concerns that these employees are not properly directed or trained 
in the prevention of radicalization, it is still notable that resources for prisons are 
allocated from local communities.   
 Notably, whereas the UK budget allocates up to £45 million annually to Prevent, 
the budget to reinforce borders and the closing of migration has been consistently around 
£130 million.  Thus, even within the budget there is a significant emphasis placed on the 
importance of immigration control rather than truly relying on soft power efforts.  The 
effectiveness of CVE programs thus can’t truly be measured, as the government itself has 
prevented an environment in which to test out reliance on soft-power measures alone, but 
rather provide a framework from which to see that medium power plays a hidden role.  
Prevent in an International Context 
The 2011 report on Prevent suggested as component 1.29, “Our objectives will be 
to...work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, 
charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to 
address.” This effort is consistent with the nature of Saudi Arabia’s CVE and 
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deradicalization programs, which were developed from the start in order to deal with 
homegrown terrorist threats.  
 The UK has increased its efforts to work with France in counterterrorism, 
especially with regards to military intervention and prevention of radicalization.  A 2016 
bilateral counterterrorism summit of the two states concluded that “our two countries aim 
at intensifying their fight against radicalization, particularly online: by building the 
capability of civil society to develop positive, counter and alternative messages targeted 
to those vulnerable to extremist and radicalising influences; by promoting the sharing of 
best practice between counter and de-radicalisation experts…”71 While the promotion of 
best practice sharing and efforts to coordinate with civil society groups seems promising, 
it is overshadowed by the remaining five pages of the document, which outlined 
increased security and anti-immigration measures, emphasizing a reliance on medium 
and even hard power instead of soft, integration-based approaches, and with no 
acknowledgment of any current “expert” knowledge of best practices for working with 
civil society or countering online radicalization messaging.  Nor is there any evidence 
that any additional resources will be devoted to the effort; indeed, the clear turn to greater 
hard power indicates that if additional resources were to be available, they would be 
almost entirely directed towards increased law enforcement.  
Deradicalization: An element of Prevent or an underfunded side-
project?  
 Frank Gardner, the BBC’s security correspondent, noted in 2015 that, out of the 
four aspects of CONTEST, Prevent “is the most controversial and arguably the least 
successful. It’s stated aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.  
Yet in the 12 years since its inception, the number of UK suspects coming to the attention 
of the police and security service has ballooned into the thousands.”72 Gardner, and many 
analysts like him, fined Prevent to be so unsuccessful because there has been little to no 
discernable decrease in radicalization.  “Soft power,” in general, is intended to prevent 
terrorist actions by affecting the “hearts and minds” of potential terrorists and 
marginalized communities, in order to make communities more resilient in the face of 
                                                
71 UK and France, "UK France Summit Conclusions" 3 Mar 2016).  
72 Frank Gardner, "Prevent Strategy: Is it Failing to Stop Radicalisation?" BBC News-03-
06T04:26:25+00:00, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31756755.  
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challenges and less likely to turn to or condone violence.  Yet any sort of “hearts and 
minds” approach would need to entail a serious effort by the government to ameliorate 
the public perception of the State-Muslim community dynamic, which the UK has been 
largely unsuccessful in doing.   
 Indeed, the UK Prevent efforts have been lackluster even in the basic sphere of 
Internet security and prison deradicalization.  Deradicalization programs, such as Mosaic, 
take a distinctive approach of introducing ex-foreign fighters to help de-radicalize those 
who are at high-risk to become radicalized and perpetrate attacks.   Local deradicalization 
efforts try to work within communities and with mosques to address lapses in education 
or instruction.  While there are many such programs in the UK, there is an unfortunate 
lack of funding or publicity given them by the government.  Furthermore, people who 
have worked in British deradicalization non-profits suggest that the programs have little 
lasting effect, and seem to be increasingly distrusted by the leaders of the British Muslim 
communities in which Mosaic and the like work.73  
Decreasing CVE, Increasing Law Enforcement 
The UK has grappled with re-integration of Irish radicals for decades, and its 
multicultural approach sounds like a perfect way to allow integration without forced 
assimilation of new immigrants.  Both facts suggest that the UK ought to be fully 
prepared to deal with emerging threats to homeland security coming from radicalization, 
and that integration measures in place should be entirely sufficient.  Yet such is not the 
case.   
It is telling that many of those who work in deradicalization programs in the UK 
don’t see them as separate from CVE.  They consider deradicalization to be an aspect of 
community outreach, whereas leaders in the British Muslim community have noted a 
distinct rise in distrust associated with the imposition of “mandatory” deradicalization 
programs.  There is, in fact, evidence demonstrating that the British Muslim community 
ought not expect the UK government to approach security as softly as Prevent initially 
made it appear.  Critics of Prevent have for considerable time dismissed it because it 
unfairly (and likely, unwisely) targets Islam in the UK while espousing multiculturalism 
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as a tenet of British identity.  In response to critiques, Parliament and the Home Office 
have released various reports suggesting guidelines for improving the credibility and 
efficacy of Prevent. At the same time, however, Parliament has been allocating increasing 
funds to immigration control and law enforcement – the crux of medium power filling the 
gap of soft power’s slow implementation  
The main criteria for considering Prevent effective would be an increase in local 
community trusting of the government and law enforcement authorities.  Even in the case 
of the IRA, however, former militants do not have an enhanced view of law enforcement.  
Some have moved on in their lives and are more integrated into society, but many face 
difficulty finding employment and social inclusion, despite the minimal governmental 
efforts to reach out to former militant communities.  Recent legislative actions have sadly 
proven an observation made by an astute journalist in 2002 that,  
“Under the guise of ‘anti-terrorism measures’, this government will legislate to 
introduce the European arrest warrant into Britain. It is expected to take effect on 
January 1, 2004.  Under its provisions any British subject or, for that matter 
anyone on British soil, can be extradited to any country in the European Union 
for any one of 32 listed offences including racism and xenophobia”(September 
2002).74 
It is exigent that Parliament and policymakers in general consider the implications 
that British Prevent policy has moved backwards in the twelve years of its existence, and 
that counterterrorism measures in general have been in keeping with the worst of alarmist 
scholars.   
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 Of the case studies examined in this work, France has perhaps the most notorious legacy 
in terms of integration and immigrant-focused counterterrorism.  The Algerian War for 
Independence in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as various other colonial independence or anti-
French revolts habituated many French to the idea of violence as a tool to oppose oppression.  
Yet the French always considered such violence to be a tool used by the immigrant or religious 
minority other. There is a perception, even in France today, that the legacy of the French 
Revolution has made the French state inherently non-violent, in that violent attacks must by 
nature be caused by external intervention.   
It is this sort of perception that led the French government to legislate under the famed 
principle of laïcité since the 19th century. Laïcité has no direct translation in English but refers to 
a very strict form of secularism in which the state directs a separation between Church and State.  
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French revolutionaries fighting in 1789 against the then-King objected both a lack of 
egalitarianism in society and the powerful influence of the Catholic Church.  The anti-Monarch 
France that emerged in 1800 retained that anticlerical sentiment. Far down the road, in the latter 
half of the 20th century, following the brutal Algerian War, the French laïcité took on the role of 
creating a systematic “inequality” between secular français de souches (white, native French) 
and immigrant or religious minorities.75 Violent campaigns by pro-Algerian and pro-Palestinian 
terrorists in the 1990s in France exacerbated the assumption that violence resulted from a 
Huntingtonian “Clash of Civilizations” and that Arab-Muslims were the largest threat to national 
security. Arabs, who began appearing in large numbers as refugees or migrant workers from 
former French colonies in North Africa, tended to live clustered together, reinforcing the idea 
that they were not able to assimilate and become true French citizens.  In fact, many of these 
bidonvilles were forced upon immigrants who had no other housing options. Tensions between 
francais de souces and Muslim and immigrant communities continued increasing into the early 
and mid-2000s as a response to government crackdowns (the Headscarf Affairs of 1989, 1994 
and 2004) and a contemporaneious rise in immigrant community identities, seen in the beurs 
marches and banlieu riots in 2005.  
French marginalization of immigrant, especially Muslim, communities has been well 
documented in academic works, popular literature and film, and in music, especially raï music.76  
For those who identify as français de souches, the exclusion of Muslim communities from 
general French society is due in large part to a Muslim unwillingness to integrate into French 
society and to renounce divisive practices. Indeed, one interviewee noted that “France has 
always been a multicultural country, we’ve always had to take in foreigners...but they’ve always 
been resentful of the French and they aren’t true French citizens.”77 This sentiment, while 
extreme, is representative of many of the older French citizens, and is commonly considered to 
stem from a strict understanding of laïcité as integral to French identity.78  Those, whom Kenan 
Malik refers to as “multiculturalism’s critics,” who suggest, “Europe has allowed excessive 
immigration without demanding enough integration -- a mismatch that has eroded social 
                                                
75 Jaques Mandelbaum, "Le Film Qui Répond À Claude Guéant," Le MondeFeb 14, 2012. 
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76 Raï music is a genre of French music which originated in Algeria, and has evolved into a major source 
of “homeland” music around which immigrant communities in France can rally.   
77 Emily Murphy, Interview with Brigitte Bachelot, April 25, 2016.  
78 Data compiled from a series of interviews conducted in Aix-en-Provence, France (2016).  
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cohesion, undermined national identities, and degraded public trust”, echo it.79 Growth of this 
sentiment seems contemporary to a rise in the popularity of nationalist parties, but it is certainly 
rooted in a deep historical bias.   
The French conception of laïcité, especially as it relates to Muslim communities, became 
significantly more defined between 1995 and 2005.  In those 10 years were three “headscarf 
affairs,” in which female students at public French schools fought against being forbidden from 
wearing the hijab, the Islamic head-covering which Muslim women around the world wear as a 
part of their personal faith and belief.  The Stasi Commission, which first convened in 1998 in 
response to the first headscarf affair, found that laïcité encompassed three “indispensable 
values”: freedom of thought, equality, and the total neutrality of public powers.80  The effect of 
such a ruling was a total exclusion of religion, particularly Islam and Islamic religious practice, 
from the public sphere.  
 There is a tendency in today’s journalism and parlance to equate the aggressive 
secularism of laïcité to a secular French identity that does not incorporate religious people.   
Colette Beaune suggested that French nationality developed over the years from Charlemagne’s 
consolidation of France in 800 to the French Revolution, and then subsequently re-defined itself 
with each regime.  She defined the development of French national identity in terms of territory, 
ethnicity, language, religion and culture.  Even many French philosophers of old have figured 
into the foundation of French identity; of note is Montesquieu’s belief that popular sovereignty 
would only work if a system of common virtues and identities were in place.  
 The French state ascribes to the assimilationist model of integration.  Each citizen is 
expected to know the French language, have some appreciation for French history and culture, 
and participate in civic life.  The “Citizenship and Equality Law” of December 22, 2016 
demonstrates this effort.  The effect of the law, as stated in the beginning of its documentation, is 
that “the Government reinforced its action for bringing all French together around the values of 
                                                
79 Kenan Malik, "The Failure of Multiculturalism: Community Versus Society in Europe," Foreign 
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the Republic…”81 The law consists of three main subject areas: increasing citizenship 
engagement, especially among younger French citizens and in schools, measures to create equal 
access to housing in order to diminish territorial segregation and prioritizing societal integration 
and a sociopolitical mix, and finally an effort to create new rights in order to benefit all citizens 
and reinforce “true equality.”   
 The assimilationist model, however, presumes a lack of equality.   Implicit in the “need to 
assimilate” is the notion that one is distinctly not French if one does not fit the very specific 
cultural, racial, and linguistic benchmarks of French identity.  Under public education laws such 
as the Debré Law of 1959 enforce the narrow conception of French-ness. Scholars see this as the 
root of radicalization among French Muslims; as one Palestinian woman living in Marseille 
noted, “Islam becomes an identity marker because of social categorization.”82   With integration 
schemes and laïcité, Muslims or even non-religious Arabs and other minority groups may find 
themselves seeking an identity, and in some cases that identity marker has been radicalized in 
order to combat the radical segregation with which the individuals find themselves placed.   
 The French state abides by this theory of radicalization to some extent.  Assimilation 
programs are intended to make citizens feel included in society by making minorities feel they 
can speak perfect French or look like French people.  The emphasis on laïcité, however, 
indicates that the anti-clericalism that undergirded the French revolution remains a force in 
French governance, and the implementation of CVE reflects this turn against religious peoples.  
It therefore seems like less of an attempt to assimilate those with different views into a distinct 
society, and more an attempt to continuously and aggressively remove religion from, not only the 
public sphere, but also the state and society itself.   
Beyond this, the selective implementation of laïcité in the Headscarf Affairs and laws 
such as Debré seem to target Islamic community and practice while making exceptions for 
Christianity and Judaism.  French press in recent years has covered significant debates 
surrounding the public financing of religious institutions.   It is a contentious issue because the 
French Parliament has effectively financed Church construction through back channels for 
decades, while it remains adamantly opposed any public funds being used for mosque 
construction.  The unwillingness of French policymakers to support mosque building has been a 
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major reason behind the lack of large mosques around France.  There are, at the time of this 
writing, only four mosques of normal size in France (meaning a mosque which can hold most of 
the Muslim community in the region and includes a minaret tower).    
HISTORICAL APPROACH: Integration and Exclusion as 
Preventative Measures  
Figure 2.1. Immigrant Nationalities in France, 1931 and 199083 
1931 1990 (59% non-European) 
Italians 808,000 (30.4% of foreign 
population on French soil)  
Portuguese  504, 000 
Polish 507, 000 Algerians 473, 000 
Spanish 351, 900 Moroccans 396, 500 
Belgians 253, 700 Italians 222, 900 
North-
Africans 
102, 000 Spanish 190, 000 
Swiss  98, 500 Tunisians 135, 500 
Russians 71, 900 Turks 146, 700 
 
There is much work to be done in incorporating the analysis of immigration and terrorist 
attack correlation in Western countries. The media’s tendency to focus on immigrants as 
terrorists, and to see the subsequent reactions of the state, likely reinforce in immigrants’ minds 
that their communities are more inclined towards terrorist action.  Figure 1 shows the utility of 
this study’s focus on the early twentieth century as a comparison to now; as small communities 
seemed to grow out of similar trends in ethnic immigration.  
The total North Africans arriving in 1990 almost equaled the number of Italians 
migrating into France in 1931, and both groups faced similar levels of distrust in French society.  
The French government responded to both with some integration measures, but primarily 
through law enforcement.  Indeed, in both cases there seems to have been only a cursory 
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attention paid to assimilating the groups – many of the Italian immigrants in 1931 would later 
return to Italy.84 
Integration efforts for immigrant groups were extremely minimal; indeed, an immigration 
advocacy group, the Luttins Collective, noted that  
“People who dared defend immigrants were scarce.  Elites, however, recommended several times 
that the French state recognize the huge role immigrants played in French manual labor, and the 
necessity of conserving this labor force.  Also note that it was not until the victory of the Popular 
Front in 1936 that immigrants were given any sort of legal status.” 85 
 To some extent, we may call this “integration.”  The first step in integrating a 
community is to acknowledge their worth and legitimacy as role-players in one’s society.  
However, the classification of Italian immigrants with low-level manual laborers would be 
ingrained in the French psyche.  Lequin noted that this was association led to an assumption that 
the Italians were dirty and criminal (a sentiment likewise found in U.S. perceptions of Italians 
and Irish).   
The Italian government made some efforts to assist its citizens living abroad in their 
integration to their host society, especially through sending priests and church-related support to 
Italians in France.  In France, unfortunately, the oversight of the Italian government was 
perceived as yet another cause for alarm vis-à-vis the incoming immigrants.  
“More generally, French opinion came to doubt the possibility of assimilating foreigners as had 
been done in schools, language, religious practice, the onset of the nineteenth century. 
Immigrants were too numerous, to diverse and, moreover, unlike the Belgians and the first 
Italians, they tended to hold onto their national identity and to assume their 
practices.  Unfortunately, they were aided in the conservation of their culture by their home 
governments.  
“In 1922, an auxiliary bishop from Paris, Mgr. Chantal, was charged with a mission to lead the 
Italians [in religious matters]. But the Opera Ferreri, which, since its founding, had by 1927 
created libraries, organized reunions, pilgrimages, and brought together 20,000 Italians to protest 
at Sacre-Coeur with songs, banners and fervor in front of the nonce and ambassador.”86  
   
Medium Power: Law Enforcement Efforts for European Immigrants 
Immigration Levels and Potential Causes for Immigrant Radicalization 
 Lequin describes the high concentration of Italian immigrants as an “onslaught”.  He 
notes that: “between 1851 and 1866, the number of Italian immigrants doubled in Marseille...the 
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Italians, in more and more broken ranks, continued to come back to France, pushed by the crisis 
of 1920-1921, then by the onslaught of fascism, defeated militants -- a minority -- mixed with 
job-seekers...among them, a third were women”87.  Other data sources suggest that large numbers 
of Germans and Belgians also moved into France in large numbers.  By 1923, they lived 
primarily in ghettoized suburbs around major cities, a common theme in Western nations.88 
Immigrant communities both seek out living in close proximity to their shared ethnic group and 
are pushed to do so by housing agents, affordability, and pressure from the wider community. 
There may be some evidence for correlation between ghettoization and radicalization, although 
scholars have yet to come to a consensus.89  
 Italians formed a large part, in both the U.S. and France, of the unionized, manual labor 
force.  Often, leaders of strikes and protests were Italians or second-generation Italian 
immigrants. Strikes often erupted into violence, leading to the demonizing of Italian unions like 
“the Marseillaise Vipers.”90 It is important to note, however, that while the Italians were 
marginalized and imprisoned in large numbers, North African immigrants fared far worse, often 
being completely excluded from the workforce or political action. The exclusion of North 
Africans, according to Lequin, was “first of all the doing of the public powers themselves,” not 
French society.  This perhaps foreshadowed the present-day exclusion of North African 
immigrants in France, which persisted throughout the twentieth century and increased drastically 
after Algerian independence.  
Gérard Noiriel, in a piece titled “Inter-war politicization of migration: The influence of 
the Communist Party”, connected the draconian measures which the French government took 
against immigrants to both economic conditions and the emergence of a transnational, violent 
Communist movement. He noted that, “throughout the 1920s, the PCF (Parti Communiste 
Français) was the only political party to attempt to address the demands of the immigrant 
proletariat. In September 1921, the first Congress of the Communist Federation of Italian 
Sections gathered at Nugent-sur-Marne.  The same year, the PCF organized the first Sacred 
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Congress on the Colonial Question at Marseille.”91 There was thus a created affiliation between 
communists and immigrants; meaning immigrants became associated in the public sphere with 
communist violence.  Anarchists and communists tended to use violence because their groups 
were economically disadvantaged, which may have incentivized some newly immigrated 
individuals to support their causes.  
While communist and anarchist terror thus did constitute a threat to the stability of the 
government, the ethnic side of the immigration-terrorism nexus bore a closer resemblance to 
modern-day racial tensions.  In 1925, a homeless Kabyle (a Berber, from the Maghreb) 
assassinated two women in broad daylight and wounded two others, leading to a general fear of 
Arab immigrants.  The incident sparked pre-existent racial and ethnic tensions brought about by 
the low status of Arabs in the French workforce, which had solidified as French immigration 
policy allowed them in solely for manual labor jobs.  Pulling migrants from less developed 
countries was a common tactic for European states in their efforts to rebuild infrastructure 
following the devastation of World War I.  
Levels of terror and government responses 
French anti-terrorism views in the early part of the 20th century were informed by the 
events of the Paris Commune in 1871.  The brutal reign of French communists and the effort to 
combat them left Parisians and French communities wary of plots to overthrow the French state.  
Between 1867 and 1900, moreover, a large number of violent marches, strikes, and protests 
erupted between immigrant communities and native French citizens.  For example, in 1899 a 
large group of native French citizens sought to lynch all “Florentines” from prisons in their 
community.92  Rhetoric surrounding the Italians in the last few decades of the nineteenth century 
characterized Italians as brutes: “thin, pruney bandits,” “enraged with fanaticism,” and “lacking 
dignity” are just a few examples of the general public’s perception of Italians. It is easy to see, 
then, why the state was able to turn the Italian community into a violent enemy.  
Blevis et al. noted that “The creation of a police unit specifically for immigrants from 
North Africa, in Paris then in numerous other cities around France beginning in 1925, gave the 
state additional means of putting in place the same repressive politics against militant 
Algerians...the repressive crackdown against the militants of the CGT was accompanied by 
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draconian measures of expulsion and repatriation.”93 This aggressive law enforcement may be 
seen as a side effect of assimilation’s exclusive approach; but more likely is representative of the 
tendency toward medium power use as the main way to deal with perceived existential threat 
immigrants posed to the state and citizens’ well being. 
A fair argument against the significance of this “medium power” example is that the state 
had not developed “soft power” as a concept for dealing with complex issues of national 
security.  Lawmakers would turn to medium and even hard military power as the sole options for 
addressing these forms of threats, as the go-to.  Sending states also posed a challenge for even 
small-scale efforts to “integrate”: many Italians sought to return home in a few years.  The 
Vatican and Italian government supported programs to keep Italian-language instruction and 
Italian culture present even across borders.  Notably, immigration policy centered around labor 
alone – family reunification was not a primary reason for migration, but rather the reason that 
most labor migrants in this early period ultimately returned to their home country.  
Medium Power: Historical Law Enforcement Efforts targeting North 
Africans 
A variety of state actions promoted a particular segregation of the North African and 
Muslim communities, which were thus subjected to what Lequin terms a “double exclusion: that 
due to the existence of particular, separate institutions and that of public opinion which perceived 
them as infectious and cunning.”  
“The ultimate setting aside of North Africans was primarily enacted by the public powers 
themselves…. the spirit of “indigenous affairs’, strongly colored by paternalism, and which was 
particularly present in the Marseille region and in Paris, where the government constructed a 
mosque, and opened halls and even a franco-Muslim hospital in Bobigny.  Thus the North 
Africans won a double exclusion: that due to the existence of particular [segregated] institutions 
and that of the public opinion which saw them as spreading infection and spying or snitching.”94 
The Vichy regime took a particularly strong tack against North African immigrant 
communities. A series of laws passed throughout the early 1930s restrained the ability of 
migrants to receive French identity cards, making it almost impossible without French 
nationality or a physical contract for work, and nearly ending family reunion as a policy (it 
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would be later implemented).  Such laws spurred law enforcement to further target North 
Africans and solidified a segregated society.  
Soft Power: Integration’s Limited Success for North African Communities 
Lequin considers the poor housing conditions into which immigrants were forced to be a 
major factor in the failure of integration during the latter half of the twentieth century.  While 
Polish and Italian immigrants had been able to find shelter through work, the waves of North 
African immigrants were greeted with diminishing housing availability and employment 
opportunity.  Even the promise of the HLM (low-rent housing) wasn’t sufficient to diminish the 
ghettoization of immigrant communities, although they were no longer perpetually homeless 
communities (“bidonvilles”).  The housing opportunity situation became worse after the Algerian 
War, as pieds noirs95and Algerian refugees migrated in large numbers back to Southern France.  
The harkis, in particular, suffered a great deal from the neglect of the French state towards their 
communities.    
Downtown Marseille, a French city on the southern Mediterranean border, exemplifies 
this trend.  A series of streets in the Belsunce and Le Panier neighborhoods are de facto 
segregated along lines of national origin: sub-Saharan Africans on one street, North Africans on 
the next, Armenians the next, and so on.  Recent French legislation has aimed to improve access 
to housing across neighborhoods and streets, but the effects will be long-term.  Moreover, the 
lack of a mosque in Marseille means that each community of Muslims must further segregate 
into small prayer groups, who meet in obsolete “prayer spaces” in basements or the first level of 
buildings.  
The feeling of exclusion and derogation felt by many in immigrant communities in 
France are expressed in immigrant literature and art. For example, books such as Kiffe Kiffe 
Tomorrow, a novel written by Faïza Guène in 2006 and based in her real experience and Le Gone 
du Chaâba, a similar novel written by Azouz Begag in 1986 depict the harrowing daily lives of 
children growing up in the bidonvilles and banlieus (shantytowns and suburbs) of French cities.  
Their stories indicate on the one hand that integration of immigrant communities, even Armenian 
families who’ve lived in France for almost a century, have utterly failed. The popularity of the 
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books, on the other hand, bears credence to a growing willingness among the public to discuss 
segregation in France.  
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH: Assimilate, Propagate, Educate  
There is a plethora of scholarship; both in France and externally, which seeks to 
understand why French-speaking countries tend to have a higher rate of Islamist-related radicals 
and extremists than non-French speaking countries, and why France in particular has had such a 
problem fixing its relationship with its domestic Muslim community.  France today houses the 
largest Muslim community in Europe (especially in Marseille, Lyon and Paris, and in the suburbs 
of those cities) and has struggled since the Algerian War of Independence to deal with labor and 
liberty-related migration from North Africa.  Most scholars suggest that these large communities 
of, by now, second- and third-generation immigrants have been cut off from mainstream French 
society and the political process due to the exclusive “assimilationist” model of integration.   
The parallel worlds of “native” French and “immigrant” communities has led to what 
Olivier Roy termed “France’s Oedipal Islamist Complex.”96 The term refers to the fact that 
certain immigrants or even “native” French feel so excluded from society that they will be 
radicalized in search of an identity no matter what the identity or the radicalization.  In other 
words, jihadists will continue in France whether or not it is about Islam or the Middle East.  
According to Roy, second-generation immigrants “choose Islam because it’s the only thing on 
the market of radical rebellion. Joining the Islamic State offers the certainty of terrorizing.” This 
idea affirms Masarwa’s comment that, in fact, radicalization is embedded in failed integration 
efforts.  It legitimizes soft power attempts to formulate a counter-narrative to Islamist and other 
forms of radical propaganda. The governmental response, however, has been to turn away from 
integration and to rely increasingly on targeted efforts against Islam, Muslim communities, and 
criminalization.   
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Soft Power: Official CVE Framework and Governmental Actions 
 Muslim communities in France are linked to the French state through the Grand Mosqueé 
de Paris (Paris Grand Mosque, GMP) and the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French 
Council of Muslim Community, CFCM).  Imams are allocated to mosques and prayer spaces 
around France by the GMP, which aids in the distribution of imams, and coordinates requests 
made to Algeria for trained imams to work in France.  The process can take several years: an 
imam at the al Arrahama mosque in Istres, France noted that the Istres community requested a 
mosque in 1987 but wasn’t able to build one until 2001, and even then it took until 2007 to 
complete and inaugurate the mosque building.97  Furthermore, the mosque building is prohibited 
from having a minaret, the tall tower that normally sits next to a mosque in order to broadcast the 
call the prayer.  There is thus distance from official government control of mosques and, 
moreover, a lack of willingness to invest in the Muslim community in France.  
 It has been much more difficult for French policymakers to refine the scope of 
deradicalization than those in Britain combatting the I.R.A.  As noted in the first chapter of this 
work, theories abound as to the best way to engage in deradicalization efforts, and examples 
range from gangs to far-right parties.  French deradicalization has emphasized threats posed by 
radical Islamist extremism far more than any other sector.   It can be broken down into two main 
categories of efforts: online deradicalization and prison deradicalization.  There is significant 
literature surmising the best ways to approach radicalization in prisons from examples around the 
world, but France has pursued the topic more than most European countries.    
 French Prime Minister Manuel Valls announced in early January 2015, following the 
Charlie Hebdo attacks. It is a directed effort by the French government to implement online 
deradicalization programs.  The announcement reflected a trend in worldwide radical Islamist 
attacks coming from homegrown terrorists being radicalized online.  The programs seek to 
“diminish the ideological pull that violent radicalizing propaganda exerts.”98 Details in the 
programs make it clear that the “counter-narrative” to be offered through state-sponsored 
agencies will be directly against Islamic jihadist and radical propaganda.  The French state 
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furthermore sought to implicate web companies such as Facebook and Google and to encourage 
the companies, at least in France, to monitor and eliminate accounts or web pages promoting 
violent extremism.  The extent to which such actions may be an infringement of freedom of 
speech and expression, enshrined in the French constitution, was not addressed in the 
government’s gentle push for online private-sector censorship.   
Medium Power: Law Enforcement and Immigration Control  
Immigration Levels and Other Security Fears 
Despite anti-immigration sentiment in Western countries, the levels of immigration in 
France have actually increased in the decade or so after 9/11.  It is relevant to note that French 
anti-immigration policies before 9/11 tended to be particularly harsh; Martin Schain commented 
that, “the changes in American law have not gone as far as British and French laws had gone 
even before September 11, 2001.”99 Considering the legacies of terrorism across Europe 
considered in this and the previous chapter, it makes sense that the UK and France would have a 
more developed approach to counterterrorism.  Schain documented an increase in Middle 
Eastern/Arab immigration into France between 2001 and 2008.  In recent years, these numbers 
have increased even more drastically as France (similarly to other European and Western 
nations) accepted thousands of refugees fleeing Bosnia, Kashmir, the Syrian War, and similar 
conflicts. 
Interestingly, data analysis suggests that community marginalization would be far greater 
in France than in the United States.  This is consistent with general scholarship regarding the 
assimilationist model. In 2002, for instance, a study by Pew Research Center found 67.4% of 
Americans considered “immigration from the third world” to be “good,” compared to only 43% 
of French citizens.100 Another study, however, demonstrated that between the years 1984 and 
2004, French citizens have consistently considered law and order, unemployment, and social 
inequality as greater concerns in voting than immigration.101 
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As noted in Heisbourg and Marret, terrorism poses a wide variety of threats even outside 
the immigrant community.  Most significant is the potential for transnational recruitment 
networks and the possibilities that “their territory was and is used as an external base from which 
it is possible to manage widespread operations, Muslim communities living in Europe become 
stigmatized in spite of themselves by terrorist groups, and some Islamist militants organize in 
cellular structures, and undetected, are likely to conduct attacks on French/European soil.”102 
Those fears have led to a variety of governmental responses, as seen above.   Yet an honest and 
deeper look at the nature of law enforcement 
is required in order to best assess whether 
the French state has relied more heavily on 
soft power (CVE), hard power 
(imprisonment, surveillance, and 
deportation) or a combination (immigration 
control).  
Levels of terror and government 
responses 
The November 2015 Paris attacks 
and March 2016 Brussels attacks 
demonstrated the ability of terrorists to hide 
from arrest simply by escaping to other 
European countries. Numerous scholars have 
highlighted the complexities of French 
immigration policies, especially as pertains 
to the assimilationist method by which 
France deals with immigrants once living on 
French soil.103 Figure 1 above is an image distributed in early 2016, in an effort to more 
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outwardly address the insecurity of the French state.  The poster suggests that, in the event of a 
terrorist attack, one must first “escape”, and if that is not possible, “barricade yourself in and 
hide” – fairly straightforward suggestions.  Yet by distributing this poster, the government 
implies that terrorist attacks are such a significant threat that they warrant explicit instructions 
and procedures – reinforcing the need for a security state as well as the amplified military and 
police presence in French cities.    
France differs from other countries in its assimilationist policy and adherence to strict 
laïcite, but it also differs from the United States in that it is part of the European Union, wherein 
European citizens are free to travel between European countries without visas and with ease. The 
terrorist fear in France is exacerbated by its commitment to the European Union -- a fact that far-
right leaders such as Front National leader Marine Le Pen have used to gain popularity among 
the French electorate.  Such a trend can be seen across Europe, but France came under fire about 
it because of Abdul Karim.  Yet, as stated by Pierre Vimont in a recent interview, “on the other 
hand, not all terrorists are coming back from Syria.  Certainly, some radicalized within our 
borders.  The problem is thus also much larger than the Schengen agreement.”104 Vimont’s vague 
statement is indicative of a lack of understanding of the radicalization process and the minds of 
radicals themselves.  
In summer 2016, France suffered from several smaller-scale, yet still terrorist in nature, 
attacks by French citizens motivated primarily by radical Islamist ideology.  The situation so 
deteriorated that French security forces had to admit that they are not strong enough to combat 
the terrorist threat and detect radicalization, especially among potentially marginalized 
communities, which tend to be wary of French security forces.  This reinforced the failure of soft 
power, leading to a need for something stronger.  And thus we see, once again, a state’s 
automatic turn to medium power.  
Efforts to incorporate French-trained imams into mosques and Islamic centers and 
prisons have so far seen minimal results.  While the most prominent terrorist attacks of this year 
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have been of the Arab ethnic minority, which indeed has predominated immigration into France, 
French authorities do not report detailed information about thwarted or far-right, nationalist 
attacks.  France’s recent history has seen far more anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks than 
ISIS-related attacks.  The under-reporting of these attacks, however, indicates that the French 
state, and indeed scholars, may not consider the attacks to be terrorist attacks.105   
The association seems to have held more water in the early twentieth century waves of 
anarchist terrorism.  Immigrant communities organizing through labor groups such as unions 
spurred assassinations and stabbings clearly meant to convey fear to the general population in 
large part.  Government repression against immigrant communities in both the United States and 
France during the 1920s and 1930s also seems to have effectively led to a ceasing of terrorist 
violence.  It would be beneficial to continue this analysis by studying media releases and 
testimonies from immigrants during that time period. 
Law enforcement in France has tended rely on arrests and surveillance related to “affairs 
of Islamist extremism.” Data shows a sharp increase in number of arrests, even during a period 
of relative stability in French Muslim community, as demonstrated in Figure 2.1.106  House 
arrests and raids were implemented as a central aspect of the State of Emergency as well.  These 
measures keep the discriminatory nature of surveillance and law enforcement somewhat hidden 
from public view, as do quietly passed legislative measures providing funding for prison 
building.  The role of technology in surveillance efforts – and the online deradicalization 
conversation more generally – is a question deserving of future study and analysis, although it is 
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Figure 2. 1 Trends in Surveillance Use for Counterterrorism 
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out of the scope of this project  
On the other hand, modern-day terrorism seems less correlated to immigration waves.  
Far more terrorists are “home-grown”, “self-radicalized,” or “lone wolves.”  While receiving 
inspiration from abroad, they do not necessarily need to have direct contact with immigrants.  
Moreover, Arab and Middle Eastern ethnic minorities in the United States are marginalized in 
much the same that Italian and German immigrants in the 1920s were; indicating that the state 
might be more of a cause for attempt at revenge than the target of an ideology propagandizing by 
the deed.  In late twentieth century scholarship, the term “integration” referred to a political, and 
not a cultural intermingling.  The consolidation of the European Union, and even a more-
integrated Western European Union, served to “integrate” marginalized communities by easing 
their ability to move between borders and to structurally equalize access to employment 
opportunities.  The ability to migrate and even travel informally meant that communities came 
more frequently into contact with other cultures.  In other words, the political integration of 
different states proceeded and in fact leads to a cultural integration.  
A similar approach in contemporary politics would mean a close cooperation between 
France and North Africa.  A deep colonial history brings the two regions together naturally, yet 
at the same time has left a residue of resentment.  There is little effort at French integration with 
Middle Eastern and North African states, indeed, there has only been outward military 
aggression.  
The French state has relied extensively on its power to suppress freedom for those 
suspected of being a threat to French security or safety. As of July 2016, French law enforcement 
had placed 268 persons under surveillance and suspicion following travel plans, and had detained 
169 people, with 99 on warrants.  The goal, according to French policy during the State of 
Emergency, was to place people under surveillance or in detention in order to then assess their 
level of “dangerosity” and their “degree of radicalization.”107 Of course, the system doesn’t 
always work, as in the case of Adel Kermiche, the young man who killed a priest in Seine-
Maritime in July 2016.  Authorities placed Kermiche under review after he twice attempted to 
travel to Syria to wage jihad.  Evidently, assessments of his “degree of radicalization” found him 
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to be a low-level threat, and he was released from surveillance.  The revelation that he’d been 
intentionally removed from the law enforcement watch list left many French feeling bitter and 
led to a drop in respect for law enforcement in France.  Similar situations have occurred in the 
United States and elsewhere in Europe.  Scholars suggest the lack of faith in law enforcement is 
a factor in the rise of far-right parties across the Western world that advocates a strict adherence 
to principles of security over principles of liberty.   
Law enforcement has also engaged in shutting down mosques and regulating the flow of 
money for building mosques.  Notably, the French government has strayed away from allowing 
mosque construction: Marseille, which houses between 25,650 to 342,000 Muslims, still lacks 
any formal mosque.108  In fact, there are only three to four large-scale, single-purpose mosques in 
all of France.  Most Muslims organize in small community centers which operate as localized 
neighborhood mosques -- a problem for French surveillance operations, as it has become 
increasingly difficult to find and track local, small-scale imams.  Moreover, as of August 2016, 
French authorities had shut down around twenty, although reports suggest that “of the 2,500 
mosques and prayer halls in France, about 120...are considered to be preaching Salafism, a strict 
Sunni interpretation of Islam.”109  
The problem may, in part, relate to the French state’s avoidance of assisting religious 
leaders in cultivating their religious community.  For instance, Algerian imams requested for a 
mosque to be built in Istres, France, in 1987.  It took until 2001 for the Grand Mosquée de Paris 
to authorize the building and obtain a building permit from the French state.  After subsequent 
attacks with weapons such as Molotov cocktails, the Masjid al Arrahama was finally completed 
in 2007.110   
Soft Power: Community Engagement Programs 
 Since implementation of the State of Emergency, some community engagement programs 
have fallen by the leeway.  The Law of Equality and Citizenship, which the French Parliament 
                                                
108 Based on population estimates and a range of 30-40% Muslims in Marseille. French law prohibits 
collection of statistics on religious preferences.  "Marseille : La Population Ne Décolle Plus," , accessed 
Jan 27, 2017, http://www.laprovence.com/article/edition-marseille/3742335/la-population-ne-decolle-
plus.html.  
109 "French Foundation to Administer and Build Mosques," , accessed Jan 27, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/french-foundation-administer-build-mosques-
160801133029106.html.  
110 Information provided in interview (Istres, France: 21 March 2016).  
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passed on 2 January 2017, attempted to resolve some lapses in community engagement.  In 
particular, the law emphasized the necessity of youth civic engagement and a countrywide 
sociopolitical intermingling.  Two of the three sponsors of the law: Ericka Bareigts and Patrick 
Kanner, belong to the Socialist Party in France, which has suffered a severe loss of popularity in 
France under the administration of French President Francois Hollande. Implications are that 
progressive legislation such as the Law on Equality and Citizenship is not likely to be renewed or 
furthered after the 2017 French elections in Spring 2017.  
 More ingrained in French political structure for CVE is MIVILUDES, the Interministerial 
Mission for Vigilance and the Fight against Sectarian Drift.111  MIVILUDES is fairly well 
recognized and supported among scholars and the French population.  However, there is some 
uncertainty with the direction MIVILUDES ought to take 
considering the record number of radicalized individuals 
committing attacks between 2015 and 2017.  Community 
integration efforts now span beyond the scope of 
MIVILUDES, to include efforts at housing integration, 
language instruction, and public education reform.  
MIVILUDES more targeted works with families of radicalized 
individuals in order to pair the radicalized individuals with 
post-deradicalization advocates.  Their mission is thus to 
promote discussion and a branching of open-mindedness.  
 French academics have generally commended the community-engagement theories for 
the homeland, whereas French governing bodies have tended to work with international aid 
programs, such as Médecins sans frontiers.  Dounia Bouzar is a prolific writer in topics of 
Muslim integration in France, and she has often suggested that integration on the level of social 
workers is the best approach.  The Prevention Center against Radical Islamic Sects  (Centre de 
Prévention contre les Dérives Sectaires liées à l’Islam, CPDSI) is founded on her method of 
countering radicalization through one-on-one and neighborhood-wide social work efforts.  
                                                
111 In French, “La Mission interministerielle de de Vigilance et de Lutte contre les Derives Sectaires.” 
“Sectarian Drift” refers to very strict interpretations, more colloquial a translation perhaps would be 
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Mourad Benchellali is another name that often comes up in discussions of deradicalization. 
Benchallali has taken it upon himself to present at schools and to work with NGOs to prevent 
youths from subscribing to radical ideals.112  More and more ambitious French individuals have 
taken up Benchellali’s example, to the point that such social deradicalization social workers are 
portrayed in contemporary French film.  
Soft Power: Resources provided to CVE and deradicalization programs 
 Aïnoha Pascaul and Raphael Kempf noted that attempts to curb liberties were a way of 
making up for budget shortfalls.  The state of emergency implemented after the January 2015 
Charlie Hebdo attacks cost the state of France both in terms of budgeting, resource allocation, 
and maintenance of civil liberties.  Pascual and Kempf suggest that “thanks to the State of 
Emergency, we don’t need to abide by legal/justice principles in order to take counterterror 
measures...we can talk about taking someone’s liberty even if the Constitutional Council doesn’t 
validate that interpretation.”113 Their argument is consistent with the trend towards medium 
power as a lower-cost method of countering extremism.  The cost is significantly lower 
politically and socially than soft power, and less costly than employing hard military force 
against its own population or the home countries of perceived threatening communities.  
Notably, in the wake of 2015 attacks the Hollande Administration did call for an expanded 
military campaign against ISIS on the ground in Syria, suggesting that the heightened level of 
emergency warranted greater power enforcement than medium efforts.   
 French policy has put some resources into anti-discrimination efforts as a soft-power 
approach to decreasing the likelihood of social or economic estrangement.  French government 
formulated anti-discrimination laws in 1972, 1993 and 2003, before issuing even more extensive 
measures in 2016. Legislation has provided some funding for anti-discrimination public-
awareness campaigns and litigation against offending employers.  It is grounded in the fairly 
rational assumption that those with housing and employment will not go to the effort to commit 
terrorist attacks against the French government or French citizens. However, funding has been 
limited and the public awareness campaigns led to only very moderate changes in patterns of 
employment. 
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On a localized level, the “Four Sisters” have been working since the late twentieth 
century to prevent discrimination against minorities in the workplace and public sphere.  These 
are the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH, founded in 1898), Ligue Internationale contre le 
racisme et l’antisemitisme (LICRA, founded in 1928), Mouvement contre le racisme et pour 
l’Amitie entre les Peuples (founded 1949), and most recently, SOS Racisme (founded 1984).   
1972, 1993, 2003 = anti-discrimination laws  
French policy in international context 
 France, as a member of the EU, grappled with controlling large refugee flows from the 
Syrian Civil War.  Shantytowns popped up along the Northern French coast, as refugees seeking 
to cross the English Channel became stuck in less-welcoming France.  In mid- to late-2016, law 
enforcement authorities began forcefully removing refugees from these camps and leaving 
thousands homeless.   
The French and Medium Power 
 In assessing the French approach to CVE and deradicalization, this chapter has 
considered France’s legacy of integration struggles and radicalism.  Historically, labor 
movements (composed primarily of migrant workers) challenged the state in the most organized 
form.  Immigrant communities consistently lived clustered in small suburban regions around 
major French cities, with little access to French public goods.  Integration efforts were also 
minimal, and in fact, laïcité was used, especially in the late twentieth century, as a means to 
systematically remove non-French religious and cultural identities from French soil and the 
social sphere.  Contemporary legislation has focused on the threats posed by radical Islamist 
terrorism, but soft power efforts have continued to be somewhat lackluster.  MIVILUDES and 
similar localized efforts to deradicalize have had a moderate effect at decreasing levels of 
radicalization, but state-level policies have operated on incentivizing non-discrimination and 
online counter-narrative campaigns, while channeling most resources towards medium power 
use, such as increased law enforcement through raids, arrests, and deportations. Political rhetoric 
has villainized immigrant populations, especially as attacks continue to occur.    
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If CVE were effective in the French case, there would be significantly less controversy 
over anti-discrimination legislation and integration actions. The State of Emergency 
implemented in France during 2015 and 2016 proved that there was little to no respect for the 
Muslim communities in France, and demonstrated the extent to which immigrants living in 
French cities, especially Paris or Marseille, would be subject to violations of human and civil 
rights.  Foreigners or recent immigrants conduct many attacks on French citizens, and so 
France’s targeting of immigrants as the source of the security dilemma is perhaps more 
warranted in France than in the UK or U.S.  
 But France does not prove the immigration-security nexus; rather, it confirms that the 
CVE-immigration nexus is ineffective.  The reliance on integrative measures and efforts to 
assimilate immigrants to a certain ideal has led to a massive stigmatization and demonization of 
immigrant communities. The turn from soft to medium power largely reflects desperation on the 
part of French policymakers; CVE and deradicalization, despite the immeasurability of their 
success, are seen as failures each time an attack occurs.  The de-legitimization of soft power 
efforts at integration portends a future of increasingly tight security measures and decreasing 
attempts to assimilate in any multicultural way.  
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4. CASE THREE: THE UNITED STATES 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Historical Case: 1920s Anarchist Scare, post-WWII Communist scare (Red Scares 1 and 2)  
 Exclusionary integration model 
 Immigration controls and law enforcement 
 Education through unions 
Recent History Case: Community-engagement approach to gangs, 1970-present 
Contemporary Case: The transition from post-9/11 hard power to post-2010 soft power 
 Melting pot approach to integration 
 Review of CVE programs, policy aims, departmental general strategies 
 Law enforcement and immigration controls 
 Community engagement  
 Resources provided to programs 
Conclusion: Considerations for incoming administration with respect to preventing the growth of violent 
extremism  
HISTORICAL APPROACH: The Red Scares, Nativism And 
Americanization Programs 
Soft Power: Assimilationist/Exclusion Model  
“There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying 
the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the 
same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.”  
- James Madison, Federalist 10114 
 
The 1920s and 1930s, considered to be the “Roaring Twenties” and Great Depression, 
respectively, represent distinct economic situations in American history.  Both are relevant for 
our understanding today, as many scholars have drawn parallels between the integration of 
Italian and Jewish refugees during these decades and the modern phenomenon of Syrian 
refugees.  
                                                
114 James Madison. “Federalist 10.” The Federalist Papers.  
"MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)," , accessed Feb 4, 2017, 
https://casetext.com/case/meyer-v-state-of-nebraska.  
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Indeed, the inter-war period (roughly 1920 – 1945) of American history is a prime 
example of the USA’s limited multiculturalism.  Nationalist sentiment, reacting to foreign wars 
led to the creation of formal “Americanization” programs. Peter Roberts defined 
“Americanization” as “the molding and shaping of the ideas of foreign-born men as to what 
America stands for, the training of the foreign-born in the modus operandi of democratic 
institutions as found in these United States, the informing of these men as to the history of the 
country and the founders of the Republic…”115 The presence of intentional American state effort 
is conspicuously missing from Roberts’ statement, notably because Roberts referred throughout 
his 1920 book to Americanization as a spontaneous process undertaken by individual businesses.  
In point of fact, Americanization efforts were primarily a localized effort, although some state 
governments enforced Americanization requirements on employers.  City councils were often 
responsible for oversight and implementation, usually through lower-level agencies. This has 
come to be known in academic and policymaking circles as “community engagement”.  
Despite the seeming inclusiveness of the small-scale Americanization model, some 
analysts held strong opposition to the programs on the basis of their threat to the concept of 
democracy.  In 1919, amid actions to foster “Americanization” programs, Carol Aronovici wrote, 
“the Americanization movement which has sprung into being not from any desire to develop 
democracy at home, but rather as an effort for national integration that would strengthen our 
hands in our effort to safeguard democracy abroad, is pregnant with dangers that threaten the 
very ideals upon which the United States built its foundation…”116 At base, however, the 
programs seem innocent enough: they typically encompassed city- or state-run English language 
courses, public lectures and entertainment, and public group recreational activities.   
The problems Aronovici observed are strikingly similar to contemporary criticisms of 
law enforcement and CVE: “sectionalism...race or class prejudice, and, above all...the stifling 
effects of a rigidity of thought that is the enemy of all progress and fair play. Instead of 
beholding a vision of a new national life, a new interpretation of our social and economic order 
consistent with the rate of the march of the times, I am haunted by the old ghost of patriotism.”117  
                                                
115 Aronovici, Americanization p. 5 
116 Peter Roberts, The Problem of Americanization (New York: Macmillan Company, 1920) p.28. 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0wp9w84f.; Carol Aronovici, Americanization (St. Paul: 
Keller Publishing Co., 1919) p.5.  
117 Aronovici, Americanization  
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The similarities between Aronovici’s commentary and contemporary discussions of CVE 
is striking, and warrants a deeper analysis of how community-based programs may target 
immigrant communities.118  It would be helpful to see how such programs might have interacted 
with law enforcement, to test whether discriminating “Americanization” programs and targeted 
CVE programs could lead to similar ostracizing of certain groups, and to what extent the State 
can have a role in preventing that phenomenon.   Policies directed at preventing ostracizing 
groups rest on the assumption that the United States is, in fact, stronger and a better democracy 
when supported by a diversity of socio-ethnic groups, and when as many people as possible are 
able to participate in democratic institutions.  The 2016 election, however, demonstrated that the 
US population and Administration might not consider inclusion of minorities to be as important 
as in the past.   
Soft Power: Americanization Programs 
“Americanization programs” refers to a series of measures implemented in the first few 
decades of the twentieth century. States created (sometimes mandatory) English-language and 
American history learning programs, mandated education for immigrant children and established 
informal forms of civic engagement with the wider non-immigrant community.  Boston, New 
York and Chicago initiated the Americanization efforts at a smaller community level, but large 
states became known for the extent and comprehensiveness of their statewide regulations and 
grants.  For example, the California Commission of Immigration and Housing’s authority 
encompassed a large range of purposes, including developing English-language programs and 
integrating immigrants into predominantly non-immigrant housing communities.  Advocates, 
such as Americanization proponent Florence Keller, promoted federally consolidated programs 
in order to best prepare newly-immigrated families to work and live in American culture; 
however, as Kathleen Arnold notes, “in the end, rivalry between the Bureau of Naturalization 
and Bureau of Education helped foil hopes for a centralized federal Americanization system.”119 
The onset of World War I also significantly halted public support for moderate Americanization 
programs.  The perceived emergency and threat coming from Asian and Southern European or 
                                                
118 For example, see Jeremy Shapiro “Countering Violent Extremism: the quixotic quest for a rational 
policy on terrorism.” Order from Chaos, Brookings Institution; 16 February 2016. 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/02/16/countering-violent-extremism-the-
quixotic-quest-for-a-rational-policy-on-terrorism/  
119 Arnold, Kathleen. Anti-Immigration in the United States: A Historical Encyclopedia. Denver: 
Greenwood Publishing, 2011. P. 12-13 
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German immigrants pushed support towards groups like the American Legion, which 
encouraged “100% Americanization” programs in which immigrants were told to disregard any 
previous linguistic or cultural norms.120 
For many scholars of American politics and constitutionalism, the concept “100% 
American” seems self-contradictory.  It makes little sense that a country composed of 
immigrants and from disparate cultural and religious backgrounds would have blended into such 
a homogeneous population that “American” could even become an ethnicity.  Indeed, James 
Madison noted in Federalist 10 that a large population is essential to the correct functioning of 
the American republic, as the diversity of interests would prevent any single interest from 
oppressing minorities.121 The Supreme Court supported Madison’s defense of U.S. diversity in 
the 1923 case Meyer v. Nebraska.  The case took issue with a Nebraska law which  
“Said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting 
training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn 
English and acquire American ideals; and ‘that the English language should be and become the 
mother tongue of all children reared in this state. It also affirmed that the foreign born population 
is very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, 
move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are thereby hindered from becoming citizens 
of the most useful type and the public safety is imperiled.”122 
 
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled such a piece of legislation unconstitutional via the 
due process clause, which inherently guaranteed all citizens the right to choose their language 
and education.  The precedent in approaching CVE evaluation, then, should be the same 
legalistic terms used to evaluate a very similar set of programs, aimed at improving the level of 
“American” among immigrant populations.  
Studies of the 1920s Americanization programs suggest that they were successful in 
causing more students to stay in school increased some English-language abilities and ultimately 
led to a slight increase in likelihood of later employment for immigrants.  However, there has 
been no conclusive study which found an increase in integration of immigrant communities; in 
fact, one study noted that “the nation as a whole was moving away from using foreign languages 
                                                
120 Arnold 2011 
121 The extent to which the modern-day American system is or is not a republic is outside the purview of 
this analysis.  
122 Meyer v. Nebraska 
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voluntarily.”123 As such, the programs at best accelerated the adoption of English as a more 
natural language of discourse in the first half of the twentieth century.  Studies indicate there 
may have been a connection between Americanization programs and integration, but that 
specific measures such as English-language programs and child labor/schooling laws did not 
directly influence that movement.  School enrollment increased among foreign-born and native-
born groups, but the increased enrollment did not correlate with an increase in English fluency or 
literacy among foreign-born groups.  It is thus likely that school did not adequately replace the 
native influence within living communities, and the soft attempt at Americanization or 
integration failed, insofar as communities and families did not replace their native cultures with 
American culture.  
 
Soft Power: The Near-Miss: Gang Deradicalization Programs  
Measures in major cities to de-radicalize gang members in the latter half of the twentieth 
century reveal another shortfall of community-based de-radicalization efforts.  Gang 
deradicalization had the potential to work, but ultimately failed.  Gangs, groups of youths using 
criminal activity to generate revenue and power, largely recruited unemployed or otherwise 
disenfranchised community-members.  Once involved with the gangs, as suggested by Bjorn’s 
work, it was extremely difficult for members to de-radicalize and leave the gang.  Members and 
their families were bound to the gang, usually until the member found alternate employment and 
measures to ensure his/her safety.   
Law enforcement officials utilized community intervention techniques to help members 
leave gangs and diminish the recruitment appeal.  In so doing, states and local government hoped 
to greatly reduce the threat gangs posed to the wider community as a result of their violence and 
economic delinquency.  Usually, “community intervention” involved law enforcement working 
with housing leaders in gang-ridden areas in order to promote a sense of trust for law 
enforcement officers within the community.  Officials also worked to provide alternative 
employment and safety guarantees in order to expedite gang members leaving and de-
radicalizing from the group.  In particular, work to provide paths to employment led to modest 
success in decreasing gang activity in large cities.    
                                                
123Adriana Lleras-Muney and Allison Shertzer, "Did the Americanization Movement Succeed?" American 
Economic Journal 7, no. 3 (2015), 258-290. http://www.econis.eu/PPNSET?PPN=83454475X.  
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Yet such efforts had little resilience in the face of an economic downturn, which 
ultimately led to cooperation between the housing/community leaders and gang leaders, in 
conspiring against law enforcement or at least blatantly ignoring law enforcement efforts.124  
Thus, the community intervention tactics used were not successful in truly de-radicalizing or 
even preventing further radicalization -- it seems that economic stability was the only factor able 
to really influence gang membership and gang activity in a community. There is a lesson to be 
learned about the economic factor in anti-extremism efforts.  It is highly likely; furthermore, that 
employment offers one of the best paths to CVE-type inclusion measures.   
Medium Power: Immigration And Law Enforcement 
 Contemporary journalists struggle with the question of defining “emergency.”  Schmitt 
and Agamben formulated the idea of “State of Exception” to counterbalance anarchist thought 
and tendencies, and there is some evidence to support that the United States became a State of 
Exception in response to anarchists and communists themselves.  During the early twentieth 
century, the “First Red Scare” referred to, as noted by a former Communist Murray Levin, “a 
nationwide anti-radical hysteria provoked by a mounting fear and anxiety that a Bolshevik 
revolution in America was imminent -- a revolution that would change...the American way of 
Life”.125 Indeed, U.S. Governmental policies during the “First Red Scare” indicate a deep level 
of societal fear.  Both the Immigration Act of 1917 and the Anarchist Act were used in numerous 
cases of state assaults against citizens’ bodies and liberties, culminating in the Palmer Raids in 
1919 and 1920.126 The Palmer Raids represent a pretty direct parallel to present-day 
counterterrorism interrogation and detention strategies, which often capture innocent individuals 
in drawn-out and violent episodes of detention.127 This tendency towards targeted law 
enforcement is central to what I’ve termed the use of medium power.  
 There appears to be a direct connection between a widespread sense of impending doom 
for “the American way of life” and a governmental response that focuses on controlling the 
liberty of those individuals considered to pose a grave threat to “the American way of life.”  
                                                
124 C. Ronald Huff, Gangs in America, 2. ed. ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif. [u.a.]: Sage, 1996).  
125  Levin 1971, 29 
126 Chacon, Jennifer M. “The Security Myth: Punishing Immigrants in the Name of National Security.” In 
Immigration, Integration and Security, ed. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich, 145-163. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008.  
127 Biswas and Zahi 2011 
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Indeed, President Woodrow Wilson pushed Congress to authorize the Sedition Act of 1918 in 
order to surveil and deport immigrants in the United States during the Red Scare of 1918-1920.  
By 1920, rhetoric had evolved into active aggression against anarchists and promoted “vigorous 
enforcement of the law.”128 In December of 1920, the U.S. Senate considered legislation to 
further constrict immigration and naturalization laws.  The defense of naturalization laws, in 
particular, supports the hypothesis of this work that states respond to states of emergency with 
restrictions to immigration and overt suspicion of minority or immigrant groups. Despite the 
mass deportations under the Immigration and Anarchist Acts, and mass surveillance authorized 
by President Wilson, another “Red Scare” emerged in the wake of the Second World War and 
the onset of the Cold War.   
Historians have come to consider McCarthyism a period of broad infringements on civil 
liberties. Most potently, the period was characterized by broad, baseless accusations and 
detentions of suspected “communists” throughout the 1930s through the 1950s.  Detention 
without cause constitutes a serious breach of Western liberal practice, but more significantly, 
likely led communities to feel marginalized, leading, potentially to radicalized groupings.  It also 
conforms to patterns in British and French experience of infringing political rights in order to 
preserve an aura of safety.  
The U.S. Government’s responses to crisis during World War II perhaps legitimized and 
cemented repressive politics of fear.  War is arguably one of the most threatening of emergency 
situations, and the World Wars served to justify strong military leadership and decision-making 
abilities.  Yet it is during this period that President Franklin D. Roosevelt committed one of the 
worst acts of human rights violations within the United States -- the internment of Japanese-
Americans.  Many US citizens consider that Presidential action to be a severe infringement on 
liberty and life.  Again, the period correlated to an increase in nationalist propaganda and 
rhetoric, as well as a general “rally around the flag” attitude among the American population. 
Such indirect support for a state controlling bodies is alarming, but may provide valuable 
insights to the current American political scene.  
The era of “McCarthyism” lasted much longer than the initial “Red Scare.”  Perhaps the 
influence of the Second World War played a role in heightening tensions, but the onset of the 
Cold War is most often considered the cause of increased polarization among American society. 
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Cold War tensions pitted society against communist or anarchist groups. At the heart of Cold 
War political theory was, in fact, that Soviet, communist and anarchist influences threatened the 
American “way of life”.   
President Roosevelt grasped power and used it to combat an economic “state of 
emergency” in a way that no other President had attempted previously.  The New Deal marked a 
momentous change in the role of the President in the U.S. government: it would thereafter 
become a position of immense power and influence in the government and society beyond, just 
as Schmitt and Agamben advocated should happen in a “state of exception.”  The 1930s marked 
a significant expansion of the considerations of “state of emergency” -- being that it now 
included economic emergency -- and vested the President with the role of doing whatever may 
be necessary to resolve the crisis, with the full support of the American people.   
 The New Deal set a precedent that was followed throughout WWII, especially in the 
wake of Pearl Harbor, when President Roosevelt authorized the internment of Japanese-
Americans in a way that violated the individual's’ rights to freedom. Having stomached such a 
reckless use of Presidential prerogative, it is no wonder the American people could so easily 
stand behind the era of the Second Red Scare and government-enforced McCarthyism.  Even 
dictionary definitions highlight the unjust nature of McCarthy-era detainments and deportations: 
the online source Dictionary.com defines it as “the practice of making accusations of disloyalty, 
especially of pro-Communist activity, in many instances unsupported by proof or based on 
slight, doubtful, or irrelevant evidence” (Dictionary.com).  Both Red Scares demonstrate the 
reach of the U.S. law enforcement and governmental agencies to literally control the movement 
of individual bodies, even via extra-legal methods and with dubious legitimacy.  Newspaper 
sources demonstrate the effectiveness of the government’s use of “emergency” to garner popular 
support -- even tacit support by the media is demonstrated in the sheer amount of attention paid 
to the topic.  
Contemporary American politics have been characterized by the state’s focus on the 
“terrorist other” -- the “terrorist” body.  Implicit in such an interest is a need to define that 
constitutes a terrorist and what actions make someone a terrorist rather than a criminal.  Law 
enforcement has tended to target the Muslim community in America as the most likely terrorists, 
much as the state of emergency in France presently and unfairly targets all Muslims.  The most 
significant acts of U.S. state repression of individual Muslim bodies have been made possible 
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through the USA PATRIOT Act, the employment of extraordinary rendition, and the acts of 
torture carried out at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, among other high-security detention 
facilities.  The state’s ability to take away one’s liberty and freedom is certainly a fundamental 
right of governments and law enforcement, yet it seems that in today’s “perpetual” emergency 
state, the American populace perpetually falls prey to the Schmittian concept of a warranted 
liberty- and freedom-encroaching tyrant. 
Rhetorical Analysis: Times Of Terrorism-Related “Emergency”  
Between 1918 and 1920, federal and state law enforcement agencies targeted suspected 
“reds” in a dramatic way: through raids, warrantless arrests, and mass deportations.  The New 
York Times reported on January 21, 1920, that “truck loads of alleged Reds from lodging 
houses, pool halls, cafes and soft, drink saloons, haunts of Russian Radicals, were delivered at 
the Government detention station last night in a carefully planned raid against suspected 
communists and anarchists in Seattle” (Anonymous 1919e, 15).  This quotation is only one of 
numerous Times articles from 1919 alone that highlighted the U.S. law enforcement’s aggressive 
pursuit to detain and deport suspected “Reds.”  Deportation and detainment, of course, are 
hallmarks of state limitation and control of bodies.  Restricting freedom of movement, for non-
criminal causes, seems to rub against the very essence of American democracy.  
An analysis of New York Times articles in the 1918-1920 period provides helpful 
insights about the nature of American society’s views towards the U.S. Government’s 
appropriation of bodies during the period.  Notably, many articles report abuses of individual 
liberty and freedom without passing a particular judgment.  Indeed, if one takes the news 
reporting to be a reflection of general American societal attitudes, it is evident that support for 
the government’s policies was high, even though said policies infringed on basic rights and 
liberties guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, such as the right to habeas corpus.  It is also 
relevant to note the significant parallels between the selected quotations below and contemporary 
political rhetoric.    
The quotations selected in Table 1 show the gradual violation of bodily rights by the 
government.  In early 1919, there was evidently a general unease and desire for increased 
security, yet mostly vague, broad calls for “increased security” and “war on anarchy”.  By June 
5, 1919, however, the Times reported that law enforcement officials had created a list of at least 
ten thousand “radicals” to be investigated.  The sheer amount of resources dedicated to the 
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investigations of these alleged “radicals” demonstrates the extent to which the “war on anarchy” 
represented a state of emergency/exception.   The link between the threat of anarchists and the 
government’s “right” to conduct covert surveillance of anyone demonstrates the extent to which 
the American public was willing to support drastic, liberty-infringing liberties and the right to 
privacy of one’s body and space.   
Tables 1-6 are divided into six tables comparing rhetoric across the three case studies by 
thematic categories, in order to demonstrate the similarities between the three selected periods of 
state repression leading to mass detainment and deportation.  While each time period 
corresponds to different levels of press formality, the nature of articles from the time period, and 
the sheer availability of such similar quotations, strongly demonstrates the consistency across the 
cases.  The references to terrorist bodies and the characterizations thereof are particularly 
interesting, as the casual manner in which they are discussed shows to some extent the level of 
complacency among the American population towards assaults on “terrorist” bodies.  
Table 1 considers how terrorists are described, and how the community is expected to 
interact with suspected terrorists.  During the First Red Scare, reporters referred to terrorist acts 
as “bomb outrages,” encouraging community members to be “extra vigilant”.  During both the 
Second Red Scare and modern era, descriptions of the terrorist “other” imply that their values are 
inherently anathema to cherished American liberal values.  In all three cases, non-state 
community actors constitute a significant force against terrorists, who are clearly stigmatized as 
being outside of the norm of society. 
Table 2 further shows the extent to which rhetoric in each period suggested the “terrorist” 
must be fought with actual physical force.  Physical force is so supported that many newspapers 
and politicians referred to a literal “war” between, essentially, the forces of good and the forces 
of evil.  Historians and political scientists often point to Lyndon B. Johnson’s declaration of a 
War on Poverty as the starting point for political uses of abstract wars among American 
presidents. Yet, as shown in Table 2, references to war and physically attacking even just 
suspected terrorists are common in the history of the American approach to counterterrorism.  In 
1919, The New York Times had no qualms about discussing a “war on anarchy” and a “hunt for 
anarchists” as being prominent and, to an extent, laudable approaches to anarchist violence.  The 
theme carried into the hunt for communists during the Second Red Scare, when community 
members were invited to join the “propaganda war” and “crusade” in order to “round up” 
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communists, as McCarthy did.  The awkward wording of “crusade” and the characterization of 
the terrorist as being an “enemy combatant”, of course, have characterized the contemporary era.  
Table 3 portrays anyone with even the least potential for terrorist sympathizers as a 
subversive bent on bodily harm. In 1919, anti-communists argued that anarchists sought “a reign 
of terror by bomb explosions.” In 1954, communists’ access to weapons could supposedly decide 
whether “the sons of American mothers may live or die.” An Islamophobic 2014 book even 
alleges that true Muslims must be willing to martyr themselves (i.e. sacrificing their bodies) to 
kill infidels and fulfill God’s wishes.  These quotations suggest a link between the bodies of the 
“good” and the bodies of the terrorists, in that the “good” are likely to be very physically and 
legitimately attacked.  The state, therefore, would likely need to attack the terrorists individually 
in order to truly combat the threat posed by terrorists. Table 3’s quotations would provide, as 
seen earlier in this paper, the foundation for state repressive actions.  
The USA PATRIOT Act received significant criticism for the authority it gave to the 
NSA to monitor electronic communications between American citizens (and noncitizens) 
without the traditional warrant approach to criminal investigations.  It also expanded the 
restrictive nature of US immigration laws.  Jennifer Chacon noted that, “changes in immigration 
enforcement [since 9/11] have increased racial and ethnic profiling in newly expanded 
immigration efforts and flooded an overburdened administrative and judicial system with 
detainees… (Chacon 2008,157).”  As Table 4 demonstrates, the use of surveillance, and even of 
making “lists” of suspected terrorists, is, once again, consistent with past uses of US state power 
to restrict individual's’ liberty to move and retain power over their body.  Mass surveillance is a 
direct watching of the individual body, in a way that infringes the private space and private 
sphere.  In many ways, electronic surveillance may actually be less intrusive than the typical, 
historical means of mass surveillance, as quotations from the Red Scares suggest citizens report 
suspicious neighbors to police in order to “index” terrorists, and even suggest detaining citizens 
in “disagreeable labor camps” in order to best monitor those with the potential to become 
terrorists. 
Table 5 considers the rhetoric used by the media in each of the three cases with regards to 
deportation, but it is especially enlightening to look at the selected quotation from 1919.   This 
quotation highlights the connection between deportation (forcing movement of a body and the 
home/private sphere) and torture.  In a period before Guantanamo functioned as a detention 
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center, individuals described as being deported “as anarchists and revolutionists” had “blackened 
eyes and lacerated scalps as souvenirs of the new attitude of aggressiveness which has been 
assumed by the Federal agents… (“Quick Deportation for the Reds” 1919c).”  In the latter two 
cases, on the other hand, efforts were directed less at deportation of those in the country, but 
rather the prevention of immigration.  The prevention of immigration is perhaps a hazy topic for 
this paper, as it concerns the state’s regulation of a non-citizen’s freedom of movement.  
However, the cases are still indicative of the ways in which a state reacts to insecurity by 
aggressively acting against bodies, whether through refusing asylum or scalping. Additionally, it 
is significant to note the significance of “raids” in all three cases, wherein Federal agents are 
seen as having some state power-derived right to enter into private domains. 
Table 6 describes the way Americans deported or proposed to deport three generations of 
immigrants who represented real or imagined threats to the United States, denying those 
immigrants freedom of movement. Politicians in 1920 sought “the protection of the country from 
the revolutionaries and radicals eager to descend upon it,” often an excuse to detain them and 
house them in subhuman conditions. In 1954, American officials referred to undocumented 
immigrants as “subversive aliens,” dehumanizing them so that the civil-rights violations of 
Operation Wetback seemed less inhumane. The upcoming Trump administration will “ensure 
that other countries take their people back when we order them deported.” In all three eras, 
administrations have denied immigrants control over their own bodies, ostensibly as a way to 
further secure the state.  Such detentions and deportations seem almost automatic to the 
perceived constant “state of emergency.”  
The transition from post-9/11 hard power to soft power  
Soft Power: Melting pot approach to integration 
 While the UK and France have had long ethnic and cultural histories involving 
prioritization of societal homogeneity, the US is founded, in principle, on the concept of a 
“melting pot.”  Yet a detailed understanding of US policies indicates that, in fact, the “melting 
pot” approach has been degraded in favor of securitized homogeneity in the past few centuries.  
Indeed, the US has acted as a “melting pot” in much the same way that French scholars view 
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French society -- as a mix of cultures and ethnicities by necessity, but a gradually homogeneous 
group by intentional socio-political effort.   
 The “melting pot” became exclusionary starting early on in US history. The Alien and 
Sedition Act of 1798, signed by President John Adams permitted  
 
“That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States at any time during the 
continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace 
and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned 
in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of 
the territory of the United Slates, within such time as shall be expressed in such order, 
which order shall be served on such alien by delivering him a copy thereof, or leaving the 
same at his usual abode, and returned to the office of the Secretary of State, by the 
marshal or other person to whom the same shall be directed... 
...All natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of...hostile nation or governments [as 
proclaimed by the President]...who shall be within the United States, and not actually 
naturalized, shall be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies.  
And the President of the United States shall be and is hereby authorized...to direct the 
conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States, towards the aliens…. the manner 
and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject, and in what cases, and upon 
what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal of those, 
who, not being permitted to reside within the United States, shall refuse or neglect to 
depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations which shall be found necessary in 
the premises and for the public safety….”  
  
The U.S. Supreme Court later struck down the act as unconstitutional.  But the language 
in the Act would not go away; in fact, as will be shown in data tables later in this chapter, the 
behaviors suggested in the Alien and Sedition Act were natural tendencies of law enforcement 
and government officials – even the President.  It speaks to the automatic association, dating 
back to 1798 and before, of outsider (Alien) individuals and national insecurity or emergency.  
The (perceived) intrinsic connection between immigration and national security 
continued throughout American history in various forms, including nationalist groups and 
movements like the “Know-Nothing” Party of the twentieth century.  The concept of “melting 
pot” persevered as well, as various immigration waves were brought into US fabric, although 
usually after a few decades of socio-political struggle for equality.  The distinction between 
ethnic groups broadened as globalization expanded the types of groups and peoples coming into 
the United States.   
For instance, US policymakers in the early years of the European refugee crisis (1938-
1941) turned to increasing restriction as they rode “an undercurrent of anti-refugee feeling, 
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emphasized their propositions that aliens caused unemployment and that the most effective 
solution would be to stop further immigration and deport as many noncitizens as possible.”129 
Even by then, such responses had been normalized from previous immigration and refugee 
waves.  The 1920s and 1930s, especially, saw a variety of efforts to close down on immigration.   
The significance of immigration closure for an analysis of “melting pot” integration is 
that, especially in the 1920s during the First Red Scare and the post-WWII Second Red Scare, 
immigration policies targeted specific immigrant ethnicities.  A “melting pot” approach to 
integration would imply that the response to a perceived migrant threat ought to be to bring 
communities together in different ways -- what in contemporary parlance is CVE.  Immigration 
policies, therefore, suggest a helpful framework for evaluating the effectiveness of community-
based approaches, which, when existing prior to immigration restriction, may have failed.  
It is relevant to note that many studies indicate Muslims in the U.S. are better integrated 
and even better assimilated than that elsewhere.  Chebel d’Appollonia remarks “such a belief 
partly explains why the radicalization of young US Muslims has for many years been perceived 
as less alarming than the situation in Europe, even after 9/11. While focusing on border controls 
to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the country and applying tight surveillance on Muslim 
foreign nationals, American policymakers tended to dismiss the very possibility of second- or 
third- generation immigrants joining jihadist ranks.”130  
Both Americanization programs and Gang de-radicalization programs are informative 
examples for contemporary policymakers seeking to implement CVE and deradicalization 
programs.  Americanization programs that mandated compulsory education until age 16 were the 
most successful of all Americanization measures put into place.  While intended to integrate 
communities, Americanization programs in fact created deeper dissonance between immigrant 
communities and law enforcement by making immigrant communities the subject of surveillance 
and enforcement -- truancy officers being some of the most visible law enforcement for children 
and child protective services taking a strong role in parental and adult lives.  Programs meant to 
unite gang-community leaders with law enforcement in order to establish safer cities also fell 
short in their aims.  Gang membership did alter slightly with law enforcement efforts to aid 
community leaders in finding employment for youths, but without the economic incentive to 
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integrate into society, community leaders returned to reliance on gang leaders and members for 
financial stability, encouraging gang activity.  
Furthermore, both time periods coincide with greater police and law enforcement activity 
in general.  Another example is the internment of Japanese-Americans in camps during WWII is 
an example of the extreme measures to which the government was willing to go in an effort to 
combat extremism.  Fortunately, there are few indications that the mass internment led to any 
kind of extended, long-term radicalization or extremist tendencies among the Japanese-American 
population, although some long-term psychological effects have been documented.131 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH: CVE 
Contemporary CVE programs mimic the Americanization programs of the early 
twentieth century to some extent.  Progress in small-scale integration and CVE efforts has been 
slow, but some private businesses and organizations have taken it upon themselves to develop 
cooperation with their local Islamic communities in order to prevent extremism on a small scale, 
much as private firms took it upon themselves in the 1920s to teach English and American 
values.  One example of business endeavors is a 2004 Northeastern University developed a 
“Promising Practices Guide” for their “Partnering for Prevention and Community Safety 
Initiative.”132  Northeastern University’s Initiative stated a variety of measures intended to 
support minority group working at the University and to foster open discussions about diversity 
and acceptance.  Private groups such as the NGO Cure Violence have likewise incorporated 
small-scale CVE efforts -- Cure Violence has been working “since 2000…[to apply] a mix of 
interventions, including providing safe spaces for youth, getting out of communities to detect 
potential flare-ups of violence, and training local actors on conflict prevention to reduce 
shootings in Chicago’s most dangerous neighborhood by 67 percent and in Baltimore by 56 
percent.”133 The policies’ continued implementation connotes success at creating more integrated 
communities in the workplace, and provides hope that a broader effort may be based on the 
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approach.  The local, decentralized nature of the small programs resembles NGO-level CVE and 
deradicalization groups in the UK and France as well.   
In the US, however, it took until 2011 for the national government to officially enact a 
counter-radicalization and countering violent extremism policy.  An analysis report by the 
Congressional Report Service broke the initial CVE program down into three components: 
community engagement, building government and law enforcement expertise, and countering 
violent extremist propaganda.134  The analysis also considers grassroots efforts as integral to the 
strategy, although regards the lack of a lead agency as adding some complexity.  Since the 2012 
report, CVE strategies expanded across departments, whereas CVE initially was confined to a 
subset of the Department of Homeland Security.   It is important to note the similarity between 
the tenets of community engagement, building expertise, and challenging propaganda and the 
tenets detailed in earlier chapters about Prevent.  Both projects employ a wide range of literature 
in order to explain the ideal forms of CVE.  The negatives are similar as well: both projects also 
refrain from defining in clear terms “extremism” or “community engagement,” and leave 
significant room for interpretation as to the role of law enforcement. Furthermore, both countries 
these tenets in practice rarely receive significant attention from practitioners.  Perhaps the state-
level approach is too far-removed from the law enforcement agents and community members 
responsible for implementing the ideals.   
For all departments, the foremost challenge to effective implementation of CVE 
programs is choosing appropriate community partners and establishing both legitimacy and 
trustworthiness of law enforcement or government representatives. A study notes that “the 
Administration’s CVE strategy depends on federal agencies cooperating with local groups to 
expand engagement efforts and to foster preventative programming to ‘build resilience against 
violent extremist radicalization.” 135  The emphasis on small-scale, community-led efforts to 
counter extremism, known in academic circles as the “community-based approach” to integration 
and CVE, has been utilized around the world for decades.  In the United States, CVE 
partnerships are regulated by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and other smaller 
                                                
134 Bjelopera, Jerome P. “Countering Violent Extremism in the United States.” Congressional Research 
Service, 2012.  
135Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service,[2012]).  
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’
 86 
government entities.  They work with US attorneys under the leadership of the US Attorney 
General. At the time of CVE implementation, the Obama Administration’s Attorney General 
Eric Holder expressed a genuine belief in the ability of CVE to transform counter-extremism in 
the US.  The Trump Administration, which took office on January 20, 2017, has largely claimed 
it intends to “undo” the program as defined. 
Each above department has published speeches and communiqués seeking to explain the 
nature and extent of CVE policies in the United States. Sarah Sewall, the Under Secretary for 
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, notably has been integral to the effort to 
educate the general American public (or at least, academic community) about CVE’s importance 
and role in modern-day counterterrorism.  For instance, she explained that  
“‘Hard’ approaches to counterterrorism remained critical for protecting us from 
immediate threats, they were ill-equipped at preventing new ones from emerging. That 
called for a broader approach, one that not only took the fight to violent extremists 
around the world, but prevented people from taking up violent extremism in the first 
place. That is the rationale for CVE.”136  
In general, the Obama Administration stressed the importance of identifying at-risk 
communities and working to decrease societal factors that would or had tended to increase risks 
of radicalization.  The compilation of Administrative reports and speeches suggests that 
economic disparity and a lack of employment opportunity are the most prevalent causes of 
radicalization.  Such a statement seems wise in light of the findings earlier in this chapter that 
gang violence only decreased with an improvement in economic situation.  Integration of violent 
anarchists, then gangs, only ceased with employment opportunities, especially within 
communities. Environmental terrorists in the late twentieth and early 21st century also have 
tended to cease perpetrating attacks when employment became available to them.   It is not, of 
course, a catchall approach – many analysts have been confounded by the number of well 
integrated, economically stable Westerners have joined the radical Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham.  But it is certainly significant to note.  
There has been little follow-up in government reports regarding the effectiveness of CVE 
policies.  In 2016, Justin Siberell noted several areas of CVE implementation that would require 
greater cooperation, efforts, and resources -- many of them similar if not exactly the same to 
recommendations in the 2012 report:  
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As part of our overall strategy, we also believe that we must increase our focus on 
preventing the spread of violent extremism in the first place – to stop the radicalization, 
recruitment, and mobilization of people, especially young people, to engage in terrorist 
activities. Secretary Kerry has directed the Bureau to play the lead role in enhancing and 
coordinating the Department’s work on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). The 
Department has renamed the Bureau and increased personnel resources to support this 
mission. We appreciate the support of Congress for this effort. In this role, we will be 
working very closely with USAID and the newly established interagency Global 
Engagement Center (GEC) to promote a more strategic, integrated, and ultimately 
accountable approach to CVE. In collaboration with the GEC, the Department has 
requested additional resources for CVE programming in Fiscal Year 2017 – including as 
part of CTPF – to expand partnerships with government, non-governmental, local 
communities, and civil society actors who can help counter violent extremist messaging 
and narratives and they recruitment and mobilization that they drive. 
 
In addition, we obligated more than $20 million in fiscal year 2014 funding for programs 
to help partner nations address FTF threat.  
 
 Siberell’s comments make it starkly evident that Islamist-targeting CVE policies have 
made little progress in the half-decade since their initial implementation.  It is thus also evident 
that CVE has not been the priority of policymakers, even in Departments specializing in 
countering extremism and radicalization.   The negligence of policymakers to reform CVE is 
another probable data point suggesting that the emphasis on medium power measures 
immigration controls and law enforcement increases as interest in soft power measures decrease.  
Hard Power: Islamophobia in the US and Policy Implications 
Leaders in both Muslim communities and the American political fabric have voiced 
serious concerns over rising Islamophobia.  Their concerns run parallel to an illusion held by 
members of state and national legislatures that Muslims pose a significant threat to the safety of 
Americans everywhere.  Texas came under fire in early 2017 for an inflammatory survey that 
sought to quantify the level of Islamist extremism in Texas.137 NGOs, such as Texas Impact and 
CAIR (the Council on American-Islamic Relations) expressed their opposition to such measures 
and solidarity with local mosques and Muslim families.  
Contemporary American politics have been characterized by the state’s focus on the 
“terrorist other”.  Implicit in such an interest is a need to define that constitutes a terrorist and 
what actions make someone a terrorist, rather than a criminal. Law enforcement has tended to 
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target the Muslim community in America as the most likely terrorists, much as the state of 
emergency in France targeted Muslims. The most significant acts of US state repression have 
been made possible through the USA PATRIOT Act, the use of extraordinary rendition, and the 
acts of torture carried out at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, among other high-security 
detention facilities. The state’s ability to take away one’s liberty and freedom is certainly a 
fundamental right of governments and law enforcement, yet it seems that in today’s perpetual 
emergency state, the American populace continues to fall prey to the Schmittian concept of a 
warranted liberty- and freedom-encroaching tyrant.  
Medium Power: Immigration and Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement which targets the Muslim community poses a major obstacle for 
establishing effective “community engagement” techniques.  In the 1920s and 30s case, 
community engagement took place within the employer-employee dichotomy, meaning if not 
trust then at least legitimacy was guaranteed.  In the late twentieth century and early 21st century 
anti-gang community efforts, a decrease in gang membership only occurred in communities with 
a good rapport between government representatives/police and gang leadership.  In comparison, 
Muslim communities in the US tend to be highly skeptical of the governmental arm.  Tom 
Malinowski noted, “seeing as how they had fled terrorism, I asked them if a scary terrorist 
moved into their neighborhood, would they call the police? They laughed, and one man replied: 
‘Of course not. If we did that, either the police would arrest us again to get a bribe, or, if they 
arrested the terrorist, someone would bribe him out, and then he’d come to kill us.”138  
Malinowski suggests that the only way to address the credibility problems is to respect rights of 
citizens -- which implicates the immigration-security nexus and the ways in which that 
contradicts liberal democratic views.  
Hard Power vs. Medium Power and the Islamist Threat 
The U.S. Government has acknowledged the legitimacy of taking actions against 
individual liberties and freedom of body in contemporary times as well. In 1994, Jamie S. 
Gorelick, at the time the U.S. Deputy Attorney General, noted, “the President has inherent 
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authority to conduct warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes and that the 
President may, as has been done, delegate this authority to the Attorney General”. The remainder 
of Gorelick’s speech suggested he did not condone the authority; he nonetheless did not actively 
fight against it, a trend which subsequent policymakers have continued since.  
 The American government has received significant blowback for its use of torture on 
noncitizen bodies held at Guantanamo Bay Detention Center. The U.S. Government, under the 
Bush administration, considered those held at Guantanamo to be unlawful combatants, and 
therefore not subject to international law regarding POW treatment.  Certainly, the use of torture 
at Guantanamo is a reprehensible use of state power.  Yet far less attention has been paid in the 
media to the U.S. Government’s use of “extraordinary rendition,” which persisted throughout the 
past several presidential administrations139.  
Extraordinary rendition poses a complex issue for the relationship between the U.S. 
state’s assertion of power and the bodies of citizens, yet it is ultimately an issue that directly 
parallels those of the Red Scares. In early December 2014, the U.S. Senate released a report in 
which it admitted to having wrongfully detained twenty-six American citizens in other countries.  
The Central Intelligence Agency captured detainees considered to potentially have intelligence 
valuable to the War on Terror, and sent them to third countries where domestic laws such as the 
Fourth and Eighth Amendments would not apply, where the CIA could use “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” (a euphemism for torture) on them (Ackerman 2016).  One of the 
twenty-six wrongfully detained detailed being forced to stand for sixty hours, being subjected to 
constant loud music, and being “shackled alone in freezing-cold cells in Afghanistan” (Shane 
2014).   
 The CIA even resorted to sexual abuse, more often than not employed by the worst of 
Africa and Asia’s dictatorships, to obtain information from detainees. CIA officers photographed 
blindfolded, naked detainees. The Intelligence Community retained the photos to use as leverage 
against former detainees who might pursue legal or political recourse against them (Ackerman 
2016). In other words, the CIA accepted and acknowledged -- at least internally and secretly -- 
that its actions likely violated detainees’ rights under American and international law.  Indeed, 
the American Civil Liberties Union has launched a lawsuit on behalf of former detainees against 
former CIA contractors alleged to have masterminded “enhanced interrogation techniques,” 
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raising the possibility that the CIA might have negated the negligible intelligence benefits of its 
torture program by opening a Pandora’s box of legal complications and dilemmas (ACLU 2016). 
Moreover, the country’s citizens and politicians must investigate and reflect on the American 
government’s preparation of fail-safes in order to violate its own laws. The CIA not only violated 
the rule of law but also sought to mitigate potential fallout with methods that were themselves 
illegal.   
 It is important to acknowledge the direct power the CIA therefore has over even 
American citizens’ bodies, but more relevant to this paper is the notion that this extent of torture 
and form of extraordinary rendition is the direct result of the War on Terror, which many see as a 
perpetual state of emergency, lasting from the attacks of 9/11 into the present day.  The 
beginning of the War on Terror, of course, was the U.S. Government’s passing of the Patriot Act.  
While the Patriot Act did not specifically condone torture, the enabling of heightened 
surveillance demonstrated the extent to which American government figures were willing to 
pursue intrusions into the private sphere of individuals.   
 In the same context, the U.S. government authorized the 2003 invasion of Iraq, ostensibly 
to remove Saddam Hussein from power and dismantle weapons of mass destruction.  The 
invasion of Iraq and American military efforts to create stability in a land of “emergency” led to 
one of the most abhorrent examples of torture in American history: the torture (often against 
innocent or low-level criminals) conducted at Abu Ghraib (Sontag 2004).  While U.S. 
Administrations never supported nor encouraged the human rights violations at Abu Ghraib, it 
remains an important data point in this analysis of the acceptance of torture during times of 
perceived threat or emergency.  The power of the state, acted upon detainees’ bodies in this way, 
demonstrates the link between state power and individual repression in such contexts. Sontag 
suggests that the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib by American military personnel 
demonstrates a blatant disregard for the humanity of the detainees.  It is perhaps an aspect of the 
“state of emergency”/”state of exception” that the state dehumanizes the “other” in order to 
preserve a sense of stability in a world in which the state has lost its legitimacy or power to 
control external forces and protect its citizens and its “way of life.”  It is a theme repeated by 
various scholars, including Nussbaum, who argues that a “politics of disgust” drives the creation 
of “other” groups by states (Nussbaum 2010). Even if the state did not directly condone or order 
the torture at Abu Ghraib, its overall dehumanization of the “enemy” allowed the soldiers 
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guarding the prison to justify their actions to themselves. 
 It is also interesting to consider the extent to which international condemnation has failed 
to elicit a genuine response from American policymakers and administration officials. In several 
instances throughout American history, the U.S. Government has condoned the use of torture or 
ostracizing of minority groups in other states.  Yet in many of the most extreme cases of the 
state’s use of torture and surveillance on individuals, pressure from the international community 
has been fairly subdued, at least as far as the American media is concerned; for example, 
revelations of NSA spying on EU and UN leaders has had little effect on US standing in Europe 
or the international community.  The findings of this paper suggest that tacitly-supportive 
reporting about U.S. government attacks on individual freedom reinforces the “rally around the 
flag” effect by heightening the perception among the American population that we are, in fact, in 
a perpetual state of emergency. 
Soft Power: Recent Developments in U.S. Programs 
In January 2016, the U.S. State Department transformed its Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications into the “revamped” Global Engagement Center.  The 
Department of Homeland Security likewise established an Office of Community Partnerships, 
ostensibly in order to use CVE-based “community engagement” in order to combat extremist 
tendencies in smaller communities.  
Scholars began to consider the role of interagency cooperation more seriously when the 
9/11 Commission published the 9/11 Commission Report.  Many have pointed to conflicting 
views and personalities within the different intelligence and security agencies in the U.S. 
Government as having created the intelligence lapse that failed to realize the immediacy and 
breadth of bin Laden’s plans to attack the United States140. Senator Rob Portman recently 
commented during a Senate hearing on “ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization & 
Recruitment on the Internet & Social Media,” that previous efforts to address this threat have 
struggled to overcome “bureaucratic hurdles, unclear authorities, and a lack of interagency 
communication and unity effort141.”  He was perhaps alluding here to the role of interagency 
                                                
140 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower, 1. ed. ed. (New York: Knopf, 2006).  
141 Committee on Homeland Security, Opening Statement of Chairman Rob Portman, HEARING OF 
THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS “ISIS ONLINE: COUNTERING 
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cooperation on the domestic level, which, has not significantly improved since the publication of 
the 9/11 Commission Report.  
 The trick, as noted in a report by USAID about USAID’s international CVE and 
community outreach programs, published in 2011, is to formulate evaluative measures and CVE 
policies which “walk the fine line between recognizing the importance of culture, and not 
exaggerating it.”142 The U.S. government rarely compares its efforts or even alludes to those of 
USAID.  The USAID report is perhaps the best tool for establishing ways and measures by 
which to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of CVE programs.  The wide scope of the 
document enables a reader to gain a deep appreciation for the basis of USAID’s CVE efforts, 
which are primarily utilized in African states in which USAID creates partnerships.  Ultimately, 
the analysis finds that one of the most important bases for CVE is knowledge of the causes of 
radicalization.  The document comprehensively discusses every cause of radicalization that can 
be found in radicalization scholarship worldwide.  USAID breaks the causes of radicalization up 
into social or individual causes, political causes, and economic causes.   
 While USAID’s Guides provide a useful starting point for an analysis of CVE programs, 
it is very tailored to a bureaucratic need to define all elements, and create an evaluative 
framework that is far more expansive in its reach than practical143.   
 In the wake of the May 2016 attacks at Brussels Airport, Belgium, the U.S. Dept. of State 
released a communiqué to its email listserv describing its efforts to counter violent extremism.144 
The document outlined the State Department’s work with USAID, whose CVE policies, as 
discussed above, have been developing and evolving for several years.  The State Department’s 
communiqué suggests that the Department is “helping to build a network to connect subnational 
and civil society leaders to counter violent extremism in all forms.”  This definition refers to the 
State Department’s efforts abroad -- which points again to the struggles of interagency and intra-
governmental coordination and information sharing.  
                                                                                                                                                       
TERRORIST RADICALIZATION &amp; RECRUITMENT ON THE INTERNET &amp; SOCIAL 
MEDIA” JULY 6, 2016, 2016, .  
142 USAID, Understanding and Responding to Causes of Violent Extremism, eds. Deborah M. Price and 
Joshua W. Morris (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2011).  
143 USAID, Understanding and Responding to Causes of Violent Extremism  
144 Justin Siberell, Counterterrorism: Assessing the State Department's Efforts to Counter Violent 
ExtremismU.S. Dept. of State,[2016]).  
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Trends in U.S. CVE  
Commentators in the wake of 9/11 have surmised that the massive expansion of the U.S. 
security apparatus and intelligence services are a component of what will henceforth be a 
perpetual state of emergency.  France has voted to renew its official state of emergency multiple 
times since attacks around Paris on November 13, 2015, shocked the country.  The U.S. has not 
conducted any such formal process, yet the renewal of security funding and attention to military 
efforts, both internal and external, point to the possibility that this is the case.  The ACLU quoted 
Mike German, a former FBI agent, as stating, “It raises fundamental questions about whether a 
domestic intelligence agency can protect civil liberties if they feel they have a right to collect 
broad personal information about people they don’t even suspect of wrongdoing” (ACLU 2016).  
This question should be at the core of policy debates in both academic and journalistic circles, 
yet there seems to be a lack of interest in the concerns raised by German and this paper.   
The rise of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States suggests that the 
American people accept the claim that modern America is under a constant and never-ending 
threat, as his campaign was predicated on nationalistic, racist sentiments suggesting a return to 
white, male-supremacist America.  This paper has shown that similar sentiments prompted 
severe restrictions on individual liberty and enabled an attack from the government against the 
American body and privacy of individuals’ homes.  There is thusly a desperate need for attention 
and consideration of the infringement of rights by the government during times of perceived 
(even if ill-founded perception) emergency.  
 Moreover, this analysis of current US policy as compared to previous integration and 
soft-power efforts suggests that soft power rarely works ‘enough’.  That is, integration efforts 
tend to precede a shift to medium, and then, sometimes, hard power. In present time, this cycle 
has resulted in drastic escalations of hard and medium power policies. The Trump 
Administration sought an “immigration ban” in the early months of its tenure in the US 
Presidency, and similarly exclusionary policies are expected to continue.  This trend is alarming, 
as it implies and increases in insecurity as the US Administration moves progressively away 
from the integration model that has been more or less effective in mitigating radicalism.  The old 
integration model allowed assimilation to happen somewhat more naturally than at present, and 
the turn away from that model portends an integration approach similar to that of France.  The 
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French continue to struggle with radicalism among their disaffected populations because of a 
lack of integrative acceptance, and a lack of state-enforced CVE policies.  No matter the 
governmental system, CVE cannot be effective without being accompanied by efforts to accept 
and integrate immigrants and/or minorities.   
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5. CONCLUSION 
 Terrorism is neither a new phenomenon nor one that is likely to end anytime in the 
foreseeable future.  The motivations behind terrorist actions are varied across time and individual 
attacks, making the efforts to stop radical ideologies before they manifest violently seem futile.  
Attempts to formulate a solution to the topic of countering extremism, however, emerge in the 
wake of nearly every attack.  For instance, in late March 2017 a radicalized Islamist attacked the 
London Parliament building and nearby bridge.  While the attack did not result in mass casualties 
– five dead and 40 injured – it is notable for the commentary given to it.  Prime Minister Theresa 
May reported that the suspect had been under investigation for “violent extremism” and that 
intelligence had deemed him not a theat.  News reports abound surmising how the attacker could 
have been radicalized, how it could have happened so quickly, and how family, community 
members, and law enforcement could have failed to predict and prevent the attack.  Despite the 
rarity of successful terrorist actions, in the wake of death or political turmoil the phenomenon of 
extremism takes on a superior role to all other policy discussions.  British Parliamentarian 
Michael Torrance noted the level of acceptance among Parliament that an attack was inevitable, 
stating “looking at it in context, up and until the late ‘70s, it was a frequent target of I.R.A. 
attacks.”145  
Soft Power: Community-Level Integration and Deradicalization 
 This paper has considered the relationships between immigration, integration, CVE and 
deradicalization.  Scholars have expounded on the interconnectedness of immigration and threats 
to national security, which most people consider to be a much stronger correlation than studies 
suggest it is in reality.   The perception that security is diminished with increased immigration 
led to legislation seeking to close immigration or to mandate heightened supervision of 
immigrant communities since the beginning of modern states.   
 CVE being as it is an extremely recent policy development; I considered historical 
techniques for integration as a relatively similar approach.  Integration programs share many 
components with CVE: assessing the needs of communities and providing housing, employment 
and language aid and services.  Similarly, deradicalization endeavors use community partners 
                                                
145 Bilfesky, Dan; Castle, Stephen; Rao, Phrashant S. “We Are Not Afraid,’ Theresa May Proclaims After 
U.K. Parliament Attack.” New York Times, 23 March 2017.  
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and peers to cultivate a sense of communion and understanding among the radicalized and non-
radicalized parts of a community, so as to pull the radicalized members away from a sense that 
violent action would be necessary.   
 Deradicalization began prominently in the UK, as policymakers and community leaders 
struggled to reincorporate ex-Irish militants into mainstream society, and even politics and 
governance.  The British thus had an incentive to develop soft strategies to gain respect among 
the ex-militant community for British government, in order to obtain a minimum level of 
security.  Yet evidence suggests that, despite some small programs which assist in employment 
for ex-radicals, British law enforcement placed much more emphasis on re-allocating those still 
in prison and formulating new offenses in order to continue to target, in a medium way, the Irish. 
 The British experience also demonstrates the ways in which contemporary CVE have 
gone awry.  While rightly taking credit for Prevent’s new conception of counterterrorism 
prevention as being at an ideological level, Parliament has also failed to reform Prevent 
adequately, and has, again, focused much more attention on building up law enforcement than on 
developing any kind of sustainable, long-term, adaptable strategy for countering extremist 
narratives.   Furthermore, politics and public opinion have proven to be highly significant to the 
story of Prevent.  For instance, the Liberal Democrats party received huge support for their plan, 
announced in October 2016, to de-fund several elements of the Prevent Strategy.  Anti-
immigration public sentiment in the UK is likely to cause much political discussion regarding 
community integration and multiculturalism in the UK in the coming years.  
  France has developed CVE policies to an even lesser extent, as it has more directly dealt 
with the political tensions between a Socialist party in power and the far-right Front National.  
Relatively frequent terrorist attacks, usually motivated by Islamist extremism, furthered the sense 
among the French population that immigrants, especially Arab refugees, represent a distinct 
threat to French identity. Indeed, France’s adherence to laïcité has prevented Parliament from 
taking significant action to work with France’s Muslim communities.  Despite some formal 
structures for state-Islam relations, notably the Grand Mosque of Paris and the Union of Islamic 
Organizations in France, there remains a problematic lack of formal mosques or recognition.  A 
series of political crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s resulted in the banning of “religious 
symbols” from public schools, meaning that French Muslims receive a message from the 
government that their religious practices are not considered “French” enough.  Furthermore, law 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 98 
enforcement has targeted French Muslims.  In the wake of recent terror attacks, Parliament 
approved plans for building more prisons across France, and the State of Emergency included 
provisions for extra-judicial raids in predominantly Muslim neighborhoods.  
 The US provided an interesting case study, as its history of Red Scares exemplified the 
cyclical nature of the immigration-security nexus.  The tables provided in the Appendix 
demonstrate the high correlation between political rhetoric at various times of “emergency” in 
the United States.  The analysis of the Italian anarchist integration is helpful for a study of 
contemporary CVE, as Italians in the United States are now largely integrated, and have 
conducted few, if any, present-day terror attacks.  The success of Italian and Communist 
integration seems to have occurred largely after the widespread persecution of the First Red 
Scare, WWII, and the McCarthy era, indicating that medium power measures of increased law 
enforcement and immigration controls do not actually decrease extremism in any meaningful 
way.   
 Current US policies towards CVE are informed from both international examples and a 
history of CVE work through government agencies like USAID.  In spite of the plethora of 
scholarship suggesting that CVE ought to be non-discriminatory, and run from members of the 
community themselves (as opposed to external state agents whose job is to ‘work with the 
community’), US policy has not evolved.  In fact, recent Senate Hearings demonstrate that 
improvement measures have simply involved delegating CVE work to different agencies, as 
opposed to improving and altering CVE policy within any particular department. The 
departmental drift of CVE policy is likely a signifier of CVE’s downfall in the US; it is well 
known that competition between US government departments stagnates most attempts to enact 
coherent policy.  
 In the France and US cases, the states also went so far as to toe the line between medium 
and hard power.  In France, increased threat levels from Islamist-related terrorism led President 
Hollande to call for drastically increased military involvement in the Syrian civil war.  In the US, 
the terror caused by 9/11 led the government to swiftly pass USA PATRIOT Act, which 
abridged human rights domestically and internationally and created a culture in which military 
action to respond to terrorism became normalized.  These cases of hard power are alarming, but 
receive significant more attention than increased use of medium power.  The role of politics and 
maneuvering around constantly shifting public opinion complicates the ability of governments to 
utilize and implement further soft power.  Political responses to anti-immigration fear have 
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tended to be the most visible measures.  Therefore, this study has emphasized the hidden – and 
dangerous – role of medium power in state responses to security threats.  There is a need for 
further scholarship in all three cases on the way in which intra-state political tensions between 
conservative and liberal factions affects legislation surrounding soft power.   
Medium Power: Emergency Policy 
 The conclusion from the above case studies is that states react to nation-wide existential 
emergency (or, at least, the appearance thereof) in similar patterns.  There is a tendency to 
acknowledge the superior and longer-lasting nature of soft power: improving integration of new 
communities, providing assistance in housing and employment, and the like.  However, the 
“urgency” of threats such as unforeseen terrorist attacks makes states far more likely to utilize 
medium power as a way to avoid hard power costs while still taking direct action against groups 
which appear as a distinct threat. 
 State policymakers have emphasized the importance of academic research into causes of 
radicalization and the motivations for acts of terror on Western soil. There is a disconnect, 
however, between calls for action and the response to academic inquiry.  France, for example, 
has held many conferences and sought advice from academics on multiple occasions.  Yet the 
results of most academic inquiries reflect similar statements: policymakers need to create 
programs to increase integration among minority and marginalized communities, foster 
economic opportunity for newcomers to the society, and aid newcomers in language instruction.  
None of these suggestions would entail high monetary costs, yet policymakers haven’t paid 
much attention.  A recent conference held in Paris on February 10, 2017 titled “Scientific 
Council for Analysis of Violent Religious Radicalization in France” sought to “analyze the 
phenomenon of violent religious radicalization in France, analyze the consequences of these 
phenomena on French society and define the means to protect the population.”146 Yet multiple 
pieces of French legislation (just like UK and US) have claimed to address these concerns.  It is 
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thus evident that policymakers have not given credence to their stated goals: this is likely due to 
the inherent understanding that CVE, integration and other soft power techniques are intended to 
be rhetorically powerful rather than practically useful.  Instead, states continue to rely on 
medium power.  
 The findings of this study have important implications for policymakers across the 
Western world. Policymakers ought to stop seeking the “causes of radicalization” and the best 
ways to implement CVE; rather, government bodies should consider the extent to which medium 
power may interfere with the policy aims of CVE programs already in place.  More quantitative 
research is necessary to establish the extent to which imprisonment numbers and abnormally 
high rates of incidents with law enforcement or immigration controls are correlated with levels of 
emergency.  The tables in the Appendix are a starting point for considering the ways in which 
political rhetoric may condone medium power more than soft power.  
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6. Appendix 
TABLE 1:  








Era Quotations (2001 -
2016) 
January 6, 1919 
-- “Since the anarchist 
bomb outrages in 
Philadelphia the New 
York police have been 
taking precautionary 
measures to prevent 
violence here….all 
members of the uniform 
force are to be extra 
vigilant in guarding 
public buildings...to 
keep the ‘Red’ leaders 
and their activities under 
close watch. (“Police 
Watch the Reds”, 
1919)” 
May 9, 1949 -- 
“The Communists 
dismissed from the 
University of 
Washington were secret, 
covert members of the 
party, masquerading as 




August 24, 2011 
-- “The Islamic world 
view divides the world 
into the House of War 
and the House of Islam. 
A state of war, not 
peace, perpetually exists 






mission is to educate 
students about “true free 
market values.” Charlie 
Kirk, its founder and 
executive director, 
wrote in a blog post that 
“it’s no secret that some 
of America’s college 
professors are totally out 
of line” and that it was 
time to expose them 
(Mele 2016).” 
 
TABLE 2:  








Era Quotations (2001 -
2016)  
June 5, 1919 --  
“officials throughout the 
country [were] rapidly 
being spread today in 
the most determined 
war on anarchy the 
September 13, 
1950 --  “Admiral 
William F. Halsey Jr. 
today called on every 
citizen to join the 
crusade for freedom as 
September 21, 
2001 -- “Our war on 
terror begins with al 
Qaeda, but it does not 
end there. It will not 
end until every terrorist 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 102 
Federal Government has 
ever undertaken…”  
“There will be 
no interference with him 
in his conduct of the 
hunt for anarchists”  
“Two of the 
best detectives of the 
bomb squad of the New 
York City pllice, who 
are familiar with the 
ways of anarchists, 
particularly the Italian 
anarchists of the 
metropolitan district…”  
“All statements 
and literature that are in 
any way un-American 
should be forwarded to 
Police Headquarters, 
giving names and 
addresses of 
persons…”  
(Special to The 
New York Times 1919, 
1)  
a fighter in the 
propaganda war with 
communism...there was 
another kind of war, a 
‘war of words and 
ideas,’ in which every 
American citizen should 
play a part...Premier 
Stalin’s ‘big lie’ he 
asserted, is repeated by 
Russian delegates who 
contend in the United 
Nations that the United 
States is out to conquer 
the world.” (“Crusade 
by All Urged,” 1950) 
group of global reach 
has been found, 
stopped and defeated. 
Americans are asking, 
why do they hate us? 
They hate what we see 
right here in this 




appointed. They hate 
our freedoms - our 
freedom of religion, our 
freedom of speech, our 
freedom to vote and 
assemble and disagree 
with each other.” (Bush 
2001) 
 
TABLE 3:  








Era Quotations (2001 -
2016)  
July 3, 1919 -- 
“the anarchists intend to 
create a reign of terror 
by bomb 
explosions...the plans 
have not been divulged, 
but it is known that 
many suspected persons 
have been under 
surveillance and that 
they will be arrested on 






March 2, 1954 -
- “He then read it, 
declaring exposure of 
Communists working on 
secret weapons might 
determine whether ‘the 
sons of American 
mothers may live or 
die.’” (“McCarthy, 
Dirksen Suggest Labor 
Camps for Army Reds; 
CAMPS’ SUGGESTED 
FOR REDS IN ARMY 
Witnesses at McCarthy 
Hearing”, 1954).  
August 21, 
2014 -- “To be wholly 
consistent with the 
tenets of Islam and to 
express one’s 
unconditional faith in it, 
a Muslim must be 
willing to die to advance 
the spread of Islam, and 
be deemed a “martyr” 





The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 103  
 
TABLE 4:  








Era Quotations (2001 -
2016)  
June 5, 1919 -- 
“In the search to find 
“those who exploded the 




indexed...every one of 
them will come in for a 
searching examination 
as to where he has been 
and what he has been 
doing for the past three 
months.”  
District 
Attorney Swann: “It 
would be well if [the list 
of suspected 
individuals] were 
enlarged so as to 
include not only those 
who have committed 
crimes but potential 
criminals of all kinds.”  
(Anonymous19
19b, 1) “Question 
Radicals Here”, 
Anonymous 1919c, 1)  
 
January 21, 
1920 -- “truck loads of 
alleged Reds from 
lodging houses, pool 
halls, cafes and soft, 
drink saloons, haunts of 
Russian Radicals, were 
delivered at the 
Government detention 
station last night in a 
carefully planned raid 
against suspected 
March 2, 1954 -
- “Senators Joseph K. 
McCarthy and Everett 
M. Dirkseen suggested 
today ‘disagreeable’ 
labor camps for armed 
services personnel who 
were Communists or 
who invoked the Fifth 




Secretary Stevens would 
be asked to produce 
figures on how many 
persons there might be 
in the Army, both as 
enlisted men and 
officers, who had 
admitted present or past 
Communist membership 
or who had refused to 
answer such questions 
on their loyalty forms.”  
 
“The junior Senator 
from Wisconsin has 
declared political 
war….Senator Watkins 
also said the Eisenhower 
Administration had 
reason to be proud of its 
record ‘in ferreting out 
Communists and 
jailing the guilty.’” 
(“McCarthy, Dirksen 
Suggest Labor Camps 
for Army Reds; 
CAMPS’ SUGGESTED 
FOR REDS IN ARMY 
November 17, 
2016 -- “Look, the 
president needs to 
protect America first, 
and if that means having 
people that are not 
protected under our 
Constitution have some 
sort of registry so we 
can understand, until we 
can identify the true 
threat and where it’s 
coming from, I support 
it.” (Carl Higbie, Trump 
supporter and former 
Navy SEAL) 
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American citizens were 
caught in the dragnet…” 
(“27 Seattle Reds 
Held”;(Anonymous1920
a, 17) 




1954 --  
“It listed eight 
items, including 
conviction of fifty 
Communist party 
leaders and indictment 
of forty-nine; addition 
of sixty-two 
organizations to the 
Justice Department’s 
official list of 
subversive organizations 
that now total 255; 
indictment of one 
person for treason; 
conviction of two for 
espionage and ten for 
making false statements 
to the Government 
 
TABLE 5: 








Era Quotations (2001 -
2016) 
November 9, 
1919 --  “an effort will 
be made to deport them 
as anarchists and 
revolutionists...most of 
them had blackened 
eyes and lacerated 
scalps as souvenirs of 
the new attitude of 
aggressiveness which 
has been assumed by the 
Federal agents against 
Reds and suspected 
Reds. Twelve of the 
men who were roughly 
handled and later 
released said they were 
soldiers….The thirty-
five alleged Reds who 
were sent to Ellis Island 
October 24, 
1954 -- “The McCarran-
Walter Immigration 
Act...refuse to admit 
Communists as 
temporary visitors to 
the United States. 
What American civil 
servant would not feel 
‘shyness about using his 
discretionary powers to 
waive the legal 
admissibility of a 
Communist?” 
(“Granting Visas to 
Communists, 1954).  
November 16, 
2016 -- “Anybody that's 
brought into this country 
from the migration is 
going to be out. We’re 
not gonna do it. We’re 
gonna have a country 
again, we’re gonna have 
borders, we’re gonna 
have a country again, 
right now we don't have 
a country.” (Trump, in 
ABC News 2015) 
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from this city last night 
were joined there by 
thirty of the same type 
who had been arrested 
in the northern district 
of New Jersey in raids 
directed by Federal 
Agent Frank P. Stone of 
Newark, The entire 
sixty-five will be taken 
before a Federal 
Commissioner on 
Monday...a lawyer 
representing some of the 
arrested men, said he 
would attempt to free 
them all through habeas 
corpus 
proceedings..they will 
probably be held in this 
country for some time, 
even if the court's order 
their deportation.” 
(Anonymous1919c, 3) 
“Quick Deportation for 




TABLE 6147:  
References to Increased Deportation and Efforts to Stop Immigration 
First Red Scare Quotations (1919-
1930) 




Quotations (2001 -2016) 
November 22, 1919 -- “An 
investigation is also being carried on 
by the agents of the Department of 
Justice into the circumstances which 
make it possible for hundreds of Reds 
who have been ordered deported to 





ion of 129 
alien 
subversive
C. 2016 -- “5. 
Immediately terminate 
President Obama’s two 
illegal executive 
amnesties. All 
immigration laws will 
be enforced - we will 
                                                
147 Citations for Tables 1-6: (Trump ; Cline 2014; Bush 2001; Gawthrop 2011; Savage 2009; Bilefsky 
2014, A13; Savage 2014; Shane 2014; Anonymous1919c, 1; Anonymous1919d, 3; Anonymous1920b, 1; 
Special to The New York Times 1919, 1; Anonymous1919e, 15; Anonymous1919b; Anonymous1919a, 
8; Anonymous1920a, 17; DAVID E SANGER and MAGGIE HABERMAN 2016; Arango 2015)  
 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 106 
up their propaganda for the 
destruction of the American 
Government...Chairman Johnson 
said that the committee intended to 
undertake a broad survey of the 
immigration problem, with a view to 
legislation which would permit 
entrance to this country only of 
men with the making of good 
citizens.” (Anonymous1919d, 15) 
“Red Plot to Kill Officials Bared” ; 
Anonymous 1919e, 15) 
 
December 3, 1920 -- 
“Besides amendments to the 
Naturalization Reorganization and 
Immigration bills and the Japanese 
question, it will consider immigration 
in general...Mr. Johnson, Chairman of 
the committee, favors a resolution to 
suspend all immigration 
temporarily and to secure time for 
careful deliberation on a general and 
permanent law.” 
“The protection of the 
country from the revolutionaries and 
radicals eager to descend upon it is 
one essential object of a general 
immigration law. It has sometimes 
appeared as if the immigration 
authorities were not too eager to keep 
out these undesirables. It is true that 
it is difficult to ascertain the opinions 
of the immigrants here, and that, 
except in the case of notorious Reds, 
the detection of the undesirables must 
be provided for on the other side. 
Elaborate systems for this purpose are 
being devised, but the best of them 
will be impotent if the representatives 
of this Government abroad and at 
home are tenderer to the suspected 
would-be settler among us than to the 
rights of American citizens and the 
safeguarding of our form of 
government from its most dangerous 
enemies...what is needed is vigorous 
enforcement of the law.” 
(Anonymous1920b, 1) 
“Immigration”; Anonymous 1920b, 
1) 
s; orders 






















triple the number of ICE 
agents. Anyone who 
enters the U.S. illegally 
is subject to deportation. 
That is what it means 
to have laws and to 
have a country. 
“7. Ensure that 
other countries take 
their people back when 





The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 107  
 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 108 
7. Bibliography 
"The 2014-2015 Middle East Immigration Numbers that should Concern Every American." . 
Accessed Dec 15, 2016. https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2016/06/2014-2015-
middle-east-immigration-numbers. 
"Americanization Programs." . http://immigrationtounitedstates.org/341-americanization-
programs.html. 
"Bill Defining Extremism Going through Russian Parliament." BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - 
Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, July 7, 2006. 
"COMMUNISTS ADMIT THEIR FAILURE HERE; Manifesto Says that Despite Favorable Conditions 
Party has made no Headway." . Accessed Dec 30, 
2016. http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=9A07E5D61F3AE333A25757C1A9619C9
46294D6CF. 
"Compte Rendu Du Conseil Des Ministres Du 15 Février 2017." . Accessed Feb 15, 
2017. http://www.gouvernement.fr/conseil-des-ministres/2017-02-15/la-politique-en-faveur-de-
la-langue-francaise-pour-la-cohesi. 
"Condemnation of London Bombings." UK Newsquest Regional Press - this is Lancashire, 14 Jul, 
2005. 
"Un Conseil Scientifique Pour Analyser La Radicalisation Religieuse Violente." . Accessed Mar 24, 
2017. http://www.gouvernement.fr/argumentaire/un-conseil-scientifique-pour-analyser-la-
radicalisation-religieuse-violente. 
"Un Conseil Scientifique Pour Analyser La Radicalisation Religieuse Violente." . Accessed Feb 16, 
2017. http://www.gouvernement.fr/argumentaire/un-conseil-scientifique-pour-analyser-la-
radicalisation-religieuse-violente. 
CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism: Annual Report for 2014. UK 
Parliament 2014-2015. 2015a. http://publicinformationonline.com/download/71706. 
"CONTEST/Prevent/Funding - WikiSpooks." . Accessed 18 Feb, 
2017. https://wikispooks.com/wiki/CONTEST/Prevent/Funding. 
"Deradicalisation Programme Referrals on Rise." BBC News, -10-08T09:31:45+01:00, 
2015b. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34469331. 
"Does Poverty Serve as a Root Cause of Terrorism?" In Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: 
Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, 34. Washington: CQ Press, 
2010a. doi:10.4135/9781483330822.n2. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781483330822.n2. 
Extraits du rapport de la Commission STASI sur la laïcité.(2004). , 107-136. Retrieved 
from http://pyramides.revues.org/381. 
"French Foundation to Administer and Build Mosques." . Accessed Jan 27, 
2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/french-foundation-administer-build-mosques-
160801133029106.html. 
. Histoire De L'Immigration En France, f. 
"Immigration." New York Times, 03 Dec, 1920. timesmachine.nytimes.com. 
 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 109  
"The Mysterious Wall Street Bombing, 95 Years Ago - History in the Headlines." . Accessed Dec 15, 
2016. http://www.history.com/news/the-mysterious-wall-street-bombing-95-years-ago. 
Nos Résultats | CPDSI. CPDSI.Fr. CPDSI, h. http://www.cpdsi.fr/publications-resultats/. 
"Police Watch the Reds." New York Times (1857-1922), Jan 6, 
1919a. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100458979. 
"PRECAUTIONS NATION-WIDE; Every Policy Agency Called into Action Against Reds." New York 
Times, 04 July, 1919b. timesmachine.nytimes.com. 
"Quesion Radicals Here." New York Times (1857-1922), Jun 5, 
1919c. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100372096. 
"Quick Deportation for Raided Reds." New York Times (1857-1922), Nov 9, 
1919d. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100369234. 
"A Record-Setting Decade of Immigration: 2000-2010." . Accessed Dec 15, 2016. http://cis.org/2000-
2010-record-setting-decade-of-immigration. 
"Red Brigades: Mapping Militants." . Accessed 15 Nov, 
2016. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/77. 
"Red Plot to Kill Officials Bared." New York Times (1857-1922), Nov 22, 
1919e. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100320910. 
"Senators Urge Administration to Address Internet Radicalization." States News Service,2011a. 
"Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and Youth 
Justice." ACI Information 
Group. http://scholar.aci.info/view/146482d05fe083b0168/156b6e2d451001073c3ff94. 
Terrorism Financing and State Responses : A Comparative Perspective&nbsp;, edited by Giraldo, 
Jeanne K., Harold A. Trinkunas. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2007. http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;query=Id:%22library/lca
talog/00141798%22. 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, (2011b): 
. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/enacted. 
"Trials Ahead for British Justice." Sunday Times, Sep 29, 
2002. http://search.proquest.com/docview/316785670. 
"Valls Annonce Des Centres De Réinsertion Pour « Personnes Radicalisées » Dans « Chaque 
Région »." Le Monde.Fr, -05-09T05:50:55+02:00, 
2016c. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/05/09/manuel-valls-doit-annoncer-ses-
mesures-contre-la-radicalisation-djihadiste_4915701_3224.html. 
- Aldworth, Scott. - Terror Firma: The Unyielding Terrorism Bar in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
Notes and Comments. 
Alexander, Yonah and Kenneth A. Myers. Terrorism in Europe. 1. publ. ed. New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1982. 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 110 
AM, Kurt Eichenwald On 2/4/16 at 6:02. "Right-Wing Extremists are a Bigger Threat to America than 
ISIS." . Accessed Dec 15, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/12/right-wing-extremists-
militants-bigger-threat-america-isis-jihadists-422743.html. 
Arnold, Kathleen R., ed. Anti-Immigration in the United States. Santa Barbara, Calif [u.a.]: 
Greenwood, 2011. 
Aronovici, Carol. Americanization. St. Paul: Keller Publishing Co., 1919. 
Ashley Fantz and Ben Brumfield. "More than Half the Nation's Governors Say Syrian Refugees Not 
Welcome." CNN Wire Service, Nov 16, 2015. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1733085028. 
Atran, Scott. "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism." The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 
2 (Mar 7, 2006): 127-147. 
doi:10.1162/016366006776026239. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v029/29.
2atran.html. 
———. "Why ISIS has the Potential to be a World-Altering Revolution." . 
Audrey Kurth Cronin. "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Groups." International Security 31, no. 1 (Jul 1, 2006): 7-48. 
doi:10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137538. 
Aydinli, Ersel. "Before Jihadists there were Anarchists: A Failed Case of Transnational 
Violence." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 10 (2008): 903-923. 
Barret, James R. "Americanization 
 
." . Accessed 2 Feb, 2017. http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/46.html. 
Bass, Warren. "The Triage of Dayton." Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (1998): 95-108. 
Baylis, Elena A. "National Security and Political Asylum." In Immigration, Integration, and Security, 
edited by d'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon Reich, 164-180. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2008. 
Beauchamp, Zack. "No, Donald Trump, the Chelsea Bombing Doesn’t Prove that Immigrants are 
Terrorist Threats." . Accessed Nov 14, 2016. http://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12974738/nyc-
bombing-chelsea-ahmad-khan-rahami. 
Beaune, Colette. Naissance De La Nation Francaise. Paris: Gallimard, 1985. 
Begag, Azouz. Le  Gone Du Chaâba. Paris: Éd. du Seuil, 1998. 
Berman, Ilan and Andrew Bowen. "Morocco's Islamic Exports." Foreign Affairs (12 May, 2016). 
Bezouh, Malik. "La Forte Baisse Des Actes Anti-Musulmans Sera-T-Elle Suffisante Pour Mettre Un 
Terme À La Culpabilisation Qui Empoisonne Les Débats Sur L’islam En France ?" . Accessed 
Oct 28, 2016. http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/forte-baisse-actes-anti-musulmans-sera-t-elle-
suffisante-pour-mettre-terme-culpabilisation-qui-empoisonne-debats-islam-en-france-
2858586.html. 
Bjelopera, Jerome P. Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2012. 
 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 111  
Bjorgo, Tore, Jaap van Denselaar, and Sara Grunenberg. "Exit from Right-Wing Extremist Groups: 
Lessons from Disengagement Programmes in Norway, Sweden and Germany." In Leaving 
Terrorism Behind. 1st ed. Hoboken: Routledge Ltd, 2008. 
Blévis, Laure, Hélène Lafont-Couturier, Nanete Jacomijn Snoep, and Claire Zalc, eds. 1931, Les 
Étrangers Au Temps De L'Exposition Coloniale. Paris: Gallimard, 2008. 
Boguhn, Ally. "Clinton Denounces Trump's 'Scare Rhetoric,' Vows to Protect Abortion Rights." . 
Accessed Nov 15, 2016. https://rewire.news/article/2016/10/20/clinton-denounces-trumps-
scare-rhetoric-vows-protect-abortion-rights/. 
Bouanchaud, Cécile. "Quel Suivi Judiciaire Pour Les Candidats Du Djihad?" Le Monde, 28 Jul, 
2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/07/28/quel-suivi-judiciaire-pour-les-
candidats-au-djihad_4975585_1653578.html. 
Bove, Vincenzo and Tobias Böhmelt. "Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?" The Journal of 
Politics 78, no. 2 (2016): 572-588. 
Brian J Phillips. "This is Why the Paris Attacks have Gotten More News Coverage than Other 
Terrorist Attacks." WP Company LLC d/b/a The Washington 
Post. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1733384944. 
Brouard, Sylvain and Vincent Tiberj. "The Challenge to Integration in France." In , 283-299: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008. http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00388753/en/. 
Burnett, John. For Irish Illegally in U.S., A Life Locked in Place, Hoping for Change National Public 
Radio, Inc. (NPR), 2015. 
Butler, Michelle. "Lessons from Northern Ireland: Don'T Put Islamist Extremists in Special Prison 
Units &nbsp;" . Accessed 8 jan, 17. https://sg.news.yahoo.com/lessons-northern-ireland-dont-
put-113619820.html. 
Cameron, Geoffrey. "Integration of Muslims into Western Liberal Countries." The Review of Faith & 
International Affairs 13, no. 1 (2015): 83-87. 
Camrichael, Alistair. "Why we should Scrap the Prevent Strategy." Prospect (12 October, 2016). 
Casciani, Dominic. "Analysis: The Prevent Strategy and its Problems." BBC News, -08-
26T16:27:39+01:00, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28939555. 
Chacon, Jennifer M. "The Security Myth: Punishing Immigrants in the Name of National 
Security&nbsp;" In Immigration, Integration, and Security, edited by d'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel 
and Simon Reich, 145-163. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008. 
Committee on Homeland Security. Opening Statement of Chairman Rob Portman, HEARING OF 
THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS “ISIS ONLINE: COUNTERING 
TERRORIST RADICALIZATION &amp; RECRUITMENT ON THE INTERNET &amp; SOCIAL 
MEDIA” JULY 6, 2016. 6 Jul, 2016. 
Chebel d'Appollonia, Ariane. Frontiers of Fear. Ithaca [u.a.]: Cornell Univ. Press, 2012. 
Chowanietz, Christophe. "Rallying Around the Flag Or Railing Against the Government? Political 
Parties' Reactions to Terrorist Acts." Party Politics 17, no. 5 (2010): 673-698. 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 112 
Cinalli, Manlio. ""Weak Immigrants" in Britain and Italy: Balancing Demands for Better Support 
Versus Tougher Constraints." In Immigration, Integration, and Security, edited by d'Appollonia, 
Ariane Chebel and Simon Reich, 300-320. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008. 
Clarke, Liam. "MI5 to Get Irish Terrorists Role." Sunday Times (London, England), Jun 30, 2002. 
Clutterbuck, Lindsay. "The Progenitors of Terrorism:Russian Revolutionaries Or Extreme Irish 
Republicans?" Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 1 (2004): 154-181. 
CNN, Jeremy D. "Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim Travel to U.S." . Accessed Dec 15, 
2016. http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-immigration/index.html. 
Cobain, Ian. "UK's Prevent Counter-Radicalisation Policy 'Badly Flawed'." The Guardian, -10-18, 
2016. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/19/uks-prevent-counter-radicalisation-
policy-badly-flawed. 
Collins, Eamon and Mick McGovern. "Introduction 
." In Killing Rage, 1-29. London: Granta Books, 1997. 
Cragin, R. K. "Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non-Radicalization." Terrorism 
and Political Violence 26, no. 2 (2014): 337-353. 
Crenshaw, Martha. "Terrorism as an International Security Problem." In Pirates, Terrorists, and 
Warlords, edited by Norwitz, Jeffrey H., 402-411. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009. 
d'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel. "Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union." 
In Immigration, Integration, and Security, edited by d'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon 
Reich, 203-228. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008. 
d'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon Reich, eds. Immigration, Integration, and Security : America 
and Europe in Comparative Perspective. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2008. 
Delshad Irani. "How Social Media is Preventing the ISIS Advance Online [Brand Equity]." The 
Economic Times (Online), Nov 3, 2016. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1835099191. 
Dempsey, Grahame Allen Noel. Briefing Paper: Prison Population Statistics. London: British Crown, 
2016. 
Dept. of Justice. "Attorney General Holder Announces Pilot Program to Counter Violent Extremists." . 
Accessed Oct 28, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announces-
pilot-program-counter-violent-extremists. 
Dillon, Jo and Severin Carrell. "War Against Terror: Court Challenge to UK Anti-Terror Laws." The 
Independent, Jul 14, 2002. http://search.proquest.com/docview/312073397. 
Dodd, Savannah D. "The Structure of Islam in Switzerland and the Effects of the Swiss Minaret 
Ban." Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 35, no. 1 (2015): 43-64. 
Drake, Richard. "The Red and the Black: Terrorism in Contemporary Italy." International Political 
Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique 5, no. 3 (1984): 279-298. 
Epifanio, Mariaelisa. "Legislative Response to International Terrorism." Journal of Peace 
Research 48, no. 3 (2011): 399-411. 
Ferguson, Neil. "Disengaging from Terrorism: A Northern Irish Experience." Journal for 




The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 113  
Fernandez, David Montgomery and Manny. "Texas Muslims Voice Concerns After Inflammatory 
Survey and Forum." . Accessed Feb 5, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/us/texas-
muslim-community.html. 
French Government. ""La Question Scolaire Est Indissociable À Nos Yeux De Celle De La Justice 
Sociale"." . Accessed Jan 12, 2017. http://www.gouvernement.fr/la-question-scolaire-est-
indissociable-a-nos-yeux-de-celle-de-la-justice-sociale. 
———. "La Loi "Égalité Et Citoyenneté"." . Accessed Jan 12, 
2017. http://www.gouvernement.fr/action/la-loi-egalite-et-citoyennete. 
Friman, H. Richard. "Migration and Security: Crime, Terror and the Politics of Order." In Immigration, 
Integration, and Security, edited by d'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon Reich, 130-144. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008. 
Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. 
New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011. 
Gabaccia, Donna R. Militants and Migrants. New Brunswick u.a: Rutgers Univ. Pr, 1988. 
Gardner, Frank. "Prevent Strategy: Is it Failing to Stop Radicalisation?" BBC News, -03-
06T04:26:25+00:00, 2015a. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31756755. 
———. "Prevent Strategy: Is it Failing to Stop Radicalisation?" BBC News, -03-06T04:26:25+00:00, 
2015b. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31756755. 
GITHENS-MAZER, JONATHAN and ROBERT LAMBERT. "Why Conventional Wisdom on 
Radicalization Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse." International Affairs 86, no. 4 
(2010): 889-901. 
Glenny, Misha. "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans." Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995): 98-108. 
Goldman, Adam. "‘He was Not a Stable Person’: Orlando Shooter showed Signs of Emotional 
Trouble." . Accessed Dec 15, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ex-
wife-of-suspected-orlando-shooter-he-beat-me/2016/06/12/8a1963b4-30b8-11e6-8ff7-
7b6c1998b7a0_story.html. 
Gorelick, Jamie S. "Gorelick Testimony." . Accessed Nov 22, 
2016. https://thinkprogress.org/gorelick-testimony-d7ec8d22996d#.3u84wrv2m. 
Gowen, Annie. "‘I Can’t Take it Anymore’: Ohio State Attacker Said Abuses of Burma’s Muslims Led 
to ‘boiling Point’." . Accessed Dec 15, 
2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/29/i-cant-take-it-anymore-
ohio-state-attacker-said-abuses-of-burmas-muslims-led-to-boiling-point/. 
Great Britain. Home Office. Counter-Extremism Strategy / Home Office. London: British Crown, 
2015. http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;query=Id:%22library/lca
talog/01133518%22. 
The Weather Underground 
 
. Film. Directed by Green, Sam and Bill Siegel. 2003. 
Green, Shannon N. "Terrorism has been Democratized, so Too must Counterterrorism." Boston 
Globe, Sep 19, 2016. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1820590315. 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 114 
Grimwood, Gabrielle Garton and Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons. Radicalisation in 
Prisons in England and Wales&nbsp;. London: House of Commons Library, 2016. 
Guène, Faïza. Kiffe Kiffe Tomorrow. Boston: Mariner Books, 
2006. http://lib.myilibrary.com?ID=519595. 
Halliday, Josh. "Almost 4,000 People Referred to UK Deradicalisation Scheme Last Year." The 
Guardian, -03-20, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/20/almost-4000-
people-were-referred-to-uk-deradicalisation-scheme-channel-last-year. 
Hanlon, Querine H. "Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups." In Pirates, Terrorists, 
and Warlords, edited by Norwitz, Jeffrey H., 125-134. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009. 
Heisbourg, François and Jean-Luc Marret. Le Terrorisme En France Aujourd'Hui. Sainte-Marguerite-
sur-Mer: Éd. des Équateurs, 2006. 
Hirsch, Michael. "Why Didn'T the FBI Stop Omar Mateen?" Politico (-06-17, 2015). 
Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. Rev. and expanded ed. ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 
2006. 
Home Department, Secretary of State. Ending Gang and Youth Violence Programme Annual Report 
2014/15. London: British Crown, 2015. http://publicinformationonline.com/download/71307. 
Home Office. "Prevent Duty: New Burdens Assessment - Publications - GOV.UK." . Accessed Feb 
16, 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-new-burdens-assessment. 
Home Office, Secretary of State. Police Transformation Fund: Successful Bids 2016 to 2017. 
London: British Parliament, 2016. 
———. . Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: For England and Wales. London: British Crown, 2015. 
Hooper, Simon. "EXCLUSIVE: UK Government to Introduce 'Mandatory Deradicalisation' Scheme." . 
Accessed Jan 13, 2017. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-uk-government-
introduce-mandatory-deradicalisation-scheme-746303354. 
Horgan, John. "Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis." In Leaving Terrorism Behind: 
Individual and Collective Disengagement, edited by Bjorgo, Tore and John Horgan. New York: 
Routledge, 2009a. 
———. Walking Away from Terrorism. 1. publ. ed. London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2009b. 
Horgan, John and Kurt Braddock. "Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the 
Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs." Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (Mar 
11, 2010): 267-291. 
doi:10.1080/09546551003594748. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0954655100359
4748. 
Howorth, Jolyon. "European Security and Counter-Terrorism." In Immigration, Integration, and 
Security, edited by d'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon Reich, 95-110. Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2011. 
Huber, Peter and Doris A. Oberdabernig. "The Impact of Welfare Benefits on Natives' and 
Immigrants' Attitudes Toward Immigration." European Journal of Political Economy 44, (2016): 
53-78. 
Huff, C. Ronald. Gangs in America. 2. ed. ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif. [u.a.]: Sage, 1996. 
 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 115  
IRR News Team. An Open Discussion about Counter-Radicalisation Measures in Schools should be 
Welcomed | Institute of Race Relations. Institute of Race Relations. Institute of Race Relations, 
UK, 2016. http://www.irr.org.uk/news/an-open-discussion-about-counter-radicalisation-
measures-in-schools-should-be-welcomed/. 
Jacobson, Michael. The West at War; U.S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts, Post-September 
11. Vol. 21. Portland: Ringgold Inc, 2006. 
Jan Orf. Criminal Justice 2016. http://libguides.stthomas.edu/criminaljustice. 
Johnson, Jeh Charles. Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2016: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
La Loi Égalité Et Citoyenneté&nbsp; (2016): . 
Kassimeris, George. Playing Politics with Terrorism. New York [u.a.]: Columbia Univ. Press, 2008. 
Kimberly Cowell-Meyers and Paul Arthur. Irish Republican Army (IRA) Encyclopædia Britannica Inc, 
2016. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Irish-Republican-Army. 
Kotecha, Sima. "More than 400 Children Under 10 Referred for 'Deradicalisation'." BBC News, -01-
21T06:08:04+00:00, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35360375. 
Kundnani, Arun. "Why the US Military Thinks the Hijab is 'Passive Terrorism'." The National (Abu 
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates), Mar 5, 2016. http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/why-the-us-
military-thinks-the-hijab-is-passive-terrorism. 
Committee on Homeland Security. Statement of Meagen M. Lagraffe Chief of Staff Global 
Engagement Center. 6 JUL, 2016. 
Lake, David A. "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century." Dialogue 
IO 1, no. 1 (Jan 1, 2002): 15-29. http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S777777770200002X. 
Lambert, Robert. "Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism 
Case Study." PS: Political Science and Politics 41, no. 1 (2008a): 31-35. 
———. "Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised Minority Faith Communities Countering Al-
Qaida." Crime, Law and Social Change 50, no. 1 (2008b): 73-89. 
Laurence, Jonathan. "Muslims and the State in Western Europe." In Immigration, Integration, and 
Security, edited by d'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon Reich, 229-253. Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008. 
Lequin, Yves. Histoire Des Étrangers Et De L'Immigration En France. Paris: Larousse, 1992. 
Levin, Murray B. Political Hysteria in America. 2.print. ed. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 
Levy, Michaël. "Marseille : La Population Ne Décolle Plus." . Accessed Jan 27, 
2017. http://www.laprovence.com/article/edition-marseille/3742335/la-population-ne-decolle-
plus.html. 
Lleras-Muney, Adriana and Allison Shertzer. "Did the Americanization Movement 
Succeed?" American Economic Journal 7, no. 3 (2015): 258-
290. http://www.econis.eu/PPNSET?PPN=83454475X. 
Madison, James. "The Federalist #10." . Accessed Feb 3, 
2017. http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm. 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 116 
Malik, Kenan. "The Failure of Multiculturalism: Community Versus Society in Europe." Foreign 
Affairs 94, no. 2 (Mar 1, 2015): 21-32. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:ho-us&rft_dat=xri:ho:sup_ref:3606947171:3606947171::TG:6:6. 
Mandelbaum, J. (2012, Feb 14,). Le film qui répond à Claude Guéant. Le Monde, Retrieved from 
ProQuest International Newsstand (Canada) database. Retrieved 
from http://search.proquest.com/docview/921319665. 
McCants, William and Christopher Meserole. "The French Connection: Explaining Sunni Militancy 
Around the World&nbsp;" . http://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/03/25/the-
french-connection-explaining-sunni-militancy-around-the-world/. 
Michelle Ye Hee Lee. "The Viral Claim that 'Not One' Refugee Resettled since 9/11 has been 
'Arrested on Domestic Terrorism Charges'." WP Company LLC d/b/a The Washington 
Post. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1734592983. 
Mouterde, Perrine. "Après Guantanamo, Le Combat De Mourad Benchellali Pour Faire Entendre Ses 
Mots." Le Monde.Fr, -03-07T11:47:09+01:00, 
2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/03/07/apres-guantanamo-le-combat-de-
mourad-benchellali-pour-faire-entendre-ses-mots_4877821_3224.html. 
MR JUSTICE McREYNOLDS. "MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)." . Accessed Feb 4, 
2017. https://casetext.com/case/meyer-v-state-of-nebraska. 
Mulaj, Klejda. Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2009. 
Mullins, Sam. 'Home-Grown' Jihad. London: Imperial College Press, 2016. 
Murphy, Emily. Interview with Brigitte Bachelot 2016. 
Murphy, Shelley and Globe Staff. "US Attorney Details Efforts to Stop Violent Extremists - the Boston 
Globe." . Accessed Oct 28, 2016. https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/10/03/attorney-
details-efforts-stop-violent-extremists/jC6JDiUiLa3Wv8TrblOM1J/story.html. 
Nagata, Donna. "Psychological Effects of Camp." 
. http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Psychological_effects_of_camp/. 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Current De-Radicalization Initiatives and Identifying Implications for the 
Development of U.S.-Based Initiatives in Multiple Settings. College Park: START UMD, 2009. 
Neumann, Peter. Radicalization. Radicalization&nbsp;. London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2015. 
Nossiter, Adam. "He Disavowed Radical Islam. was He Lying?" . Accessed Jan 15, 
2017. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/world/europe/europe-security-isis.html. 
O Beachain, Donnacha. "From Revolutionaries to Politicians: Deradicalization and the Irish 
Experience." Radical History Review 85, no. 1 (Jan 7, 2003): 114-
123. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1obeachain.html. 
O Dochartaigh, Dr Niall. "Negotiated Deradicalization in the Irish Peace Process 
 
."Galway. 
O'Hanlon, Michael. "Clinton's Strong Defense Legacy." Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 126-134. 
 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 117  
Oshinsky, DAVID OSHINSKY; David M, University, a professor of history at Rutgers and McCarthy.'', 
is the author of ''A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe. "What Trotsky Meant to Them." . 
Accessed Dec 30, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/07/books/what-trotsky-meant-to-
them.html. 
Papayoanou, Paul A. "Intra-Alliance Bargaining and U.S. Bosnia Policy." The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 41, no. 1, New Games: Modeling Domestic-International Linkages (1997): 91-116. 
PAPE, ROBERT A. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." American Political Science 
Review 97, no. 3 (Aug 1, 2003): 343-361. 
doi:10.1017/S000305540300073X. http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S000305540300073X
. 
Pelletier, Jean. "La MIVILUDES Explication." . Accessed Jan 27, 
2017. http://www.agoravox.fr/actualites/politique/article/la-miviludes-explication-134905. 
Postel, Therese. "How Guantanamo Bay's Existence Helps Al-Qaeda Recruit More Terrorists." . 
Accessed 14 Dec, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/how-
guantanamo-bays-existence-helps-al-qaeda-recruit-more-terrorists/274956/. 
Purtill, Corinne. "Anguish Haunts Northern Ireland's Retired Terrorists." . Accessed 8 Jan, 
17. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/anguish-haunts-northern-irelands-retired-terrorists-
n392326. 
———. "What Northern Ireland Teaches Us about Today's War on Terror." . Accessed Jan 13, 
2017. http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-07-15/what-northern-ireland-teaches-us-about-todays-
war-terror. 
Ramirez, Deborah A., Sasha Cohen O'Connell, and Rabia Zafar. Developing Partnerships between 
Law Enforcement and American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Communities: A Promising Practices 
Guide Executive Summary&nbsp;. Boston: Northeastern University School of Law, 2004. 
Rao, Dan Bilefsky, Stephen Castle and Prashant S. "‘We are Not Afraid,’ Theresa may Proclaims 
After U.K. Parliament Attack." . Accessed Mar 23, 
2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/world/europe/london-attack-uk.html. 
Rapoport, David C. "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions." The American 
Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 658-677. 
RICHARDS, ANTHONY. "The Problem with ‘radicalization’: The Remit of ‘Prevent’ and the Need to 
Refocus on Terrorism in the UK." International Affairs 87, no. 1 (Jan, 2011): 143-152. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00964.x. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
2346.2011.00964.x/abstract. 
Roberts, Peter. The Problem of Americanization. New York: Macmillan Company, 
1920. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0wp9w84f. 
Rodriguez, G. "Illegal? Better if You'Re Irish." Los Angeles Times, 8 Apr, 
2007. http://www.latimes.com/la-op-rodriguez8apr08-column.html. 
Rosenthal, Max J. "Yes, One of the California Shooters was an Immigrant. no, Don'T Blame 
Refugees." . Accessed Dec 15, 2016. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/12/yes-one-
california-shooters-was-immigrant-no-dont-blame-refugees. 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 118 
Ross, Tim. "Extremists Will be Forced Onto 'Deradicalisation Programme' in New Terror 
Crackdown." The Telegraph, -07-31 11:38, 
2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/31/extremists-will-be-forced-onto-
deradicalisation-programme-in-new/. 
Roy, Olivier. "France's Oedipal Islamist Complex." Foreign Policy (7 Jan, 
2016). http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/07/frances-oedipal-islamist-complex-charlie-hebdo-
islamic-state-isis/. 
Rumney, Emma. "UK to Spend $130m of Aid Budget to Prevent Migration." . Accessed 18 Feb, 
2016. http://www.publicfinanceinternational.org/news/2016/09/uk-spend-130m-aid-budget-
prevent-migration. 
Satterthwaite, Margaret L. "Missing Indicators, Disappearing Gender: Measuring USAID's 
Programming to Counter Violent Extremism." In Gender, National Security, and Counter-
Terrorism : Human Rights Perspectives, edited by Satterhwaite, Margaret L. and Jayne C. 
Huckerby, 105. New York: Routledge, 2013. 
Schain, Martin. "Immigration Policy and Reactions to Terrorsim After September 11 
." In Immigration, Integration, and Security, edited by d'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon 
Reich, 11-129. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008a. 
———. Theoe Politics of Immigration in France, Britain, and the United States. 1st ed. New York 
[u.a.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008b. 
Schatz, Joseph J. "The (Bad) Luck of the Irish." . Accessed 14 Dec, 
2016. http://www.politico.eu/article/the-bad-luck-of-the-irish-us-immigration-policy-illegal-
immigrants/. 
Schmitt, Eric. "U.S. is Trying to Counter ISIS’ Efforts to Lure Alienated Young Muslims." . Accessed 
Oct 28, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/us/us-is-trying-to-counter-isiss-efforts-to-lure-
alienated-young-muslims.html. 
Schor, Ralph. Français Et Immigrés En Temps De Crise (1930-1980). France: 2004. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department. Prevent Strategy. London: British Crown, 2011. 
U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security. Written Statement of George Selim, Director Office 
for Community Partnerships U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 6 JUL, 2016. 
Sethi, Arjun S. "The FBI Needs to Stop Spying on Muslim-Americans." 
. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/muslim-american-surveillance-fbi-spying-
213773. 
Sewall, Sarah. Countering Violent Extremism: How Human Rights and Good Governance Help 
Prevent Terrorism. Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, 2016. 
Shaw, Danny. "Why the Surge in Muslim Prisoners?" BBC News, -03-11T01:42:44+00:00, 
2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31794599. 
Shaw, Stanford J. "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914." International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 9, no. 3 (1978): 325-338. 
Siberell, Justin. Counterterrorism: Assessing the State Department's Efforts to Counter Violent 
Extremism: U.S. Dept. of State, 2016. 
 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 119  
Somer, Murat. "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional 
Implications." Middle East Journal 58, no. 2 (2004a): 235-253. 
———. "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional 
Implications." Middle East Journal 58, no. 2 (2004b): 235-253. 
Special to The New York Times. "Dragnet for Reds all Over Country." New York Times (1857-
1922), Jun 5, 1919. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100387052. 
Stabile, Emily. "Recruiting Terrorism Informants: The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the 
S-6 Visa Comment." California Law Review 102, no. 235 (2014): 235-276. 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS. Statement of Michael 
Steinbach Executive Assistant Director Federal Bureau of Investigation. 6 JUL, 2016. 
Stephen Vertigans. The Sociology of Terrorism : Peoples, Places and Processes. Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2011. 
Svendsen, Adam D. M. "The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Change: Addressing US Domestic 
Counter-Terrorism Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 3 (2012): 371-397. 
Teltsch, Kathleen. "40 Share $1 Million in Rockefeller Foundation Aid." . Accessed Dec 30, 
2016. http://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/29/nyregion/40-share-1-million-in-rockefeller-foundation-
aid.html. 
Travis, Alan and home affairs editor. "Being a Good Brit: A User's Guide." The Guardian, -09-04, 
2003. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2003/sep/04/asylum.politics. 
Tual, Martin Untersinger et Morgane. "Contre La Propagande Djihadiste En Ligne, Le Gouvernement 
Se Tourne Vers Le Secteur Privé." Le Monde.Fr, -05-09T19:22:41+02:00, 
2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/05/09/contre-la-propagande-djihadiste-en-ligne-
le-gouvernement-se-tourne-vers-le-secteur-prive_4916283_4408996.html. 
UK Parliament. CONTEST the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism. UK Parliament 
2010-2012. London: 2011. http://publicinformationonline.com/download/23565. 
UK and France. "UK France Summit Conclusions."3 Mar 2016. 
USAID. Understanding and Responding to Causes of Violent Extremism, edited by Price, Deborah 
M., Joshua W. Morris. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2011. 
Valla, Edward J. and Gregory Comcowich. "Domestic Terrorism: Forgotten, but Not Gone." 
In Pirates, Terrorists, and Warlords, edited by Norwitz, Jeffrey H., 176-192. New York: Skyhorse 
Publishing, 2009. 
Vidino, Lorenzo. "Countering Radicalization in America." In Radicalization. Vol. 4, 411-429. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010. http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo19413. 
Walt, Stephen M. "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 79, no. 2 (2000): 63-79. 
Warne, Frank Julian. "Slavs and Italians." In The Immigrant Invasion, 53-67. New York: Dodd, Mead 
and Company, 1913. 
Wolfowitz, Paul D. "Clinton's First Year." Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994): 28-43. 
Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower. 1. ed. ed. New York: Knopf, 2006. 
Boston College 
The Myth of ‘Soft Power Counterterrorism’ 
 120 
Wyman, David S. Paper Walls : America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941. United States: The 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1968. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001151978. 
Zartman, Ira William. Engaging Extremists. 1. publ. ed. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2011. 
 
